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#### Restrictions are prohibitions

Northglenn 11 (City of Northglenn Zoning Ordinance, “Rules of Construction – Definitions”, http://www.northglenn.org/municode/ch11/content\_11-5.html)

Section 11-5-3. Restrictions. As used in this Chapter 11 of the Municipal Code, the **term "restriction**" shall mean a prohibitive regulation. Any use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing which is the subject of a restriction is prohibited, and no such use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing shall be **authorized by any permit or license**.

### CP1

#### TEXT: The Executive Branch of the United States federal government should require congressional approval before entering armed forces into hostilities to prevent proliferation.

#### Internal checks and balances within the executive branch are the best middle ground --- solves case and avoids our disads

Katyal 06 Neal Kumar Katyal, Yale Law Journal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/115-9/Katyal.pdf

This Essay therefore outlines a set of mechanisms that create checks and ¶ balances within the executive branch. The apparatuses are familiar—separate ¶ and overlapping cabinet offices, mandatory review of government action by ¶ different agencies, civil-service protections for agency workers, reporting ¶ requirements to Congress, and an impartial decision-maker to resolve interagency conflicts. But these restraints have been informally laid down and ¶ inconsistently applied, and in the wake of September 11 they have been ¶ decimated.8¶ A general framework statute is needed to codify a set of practices. ¶ In many ways, the status quo is the worst of all worlds because it creates the ¶ façade of external and internal checks when both have withered. ¶ This Essay’s proposed reforms reflect a more textured conception of the ¶ presidency than either the unitary executivists or their critics espouse. In ¶ contrast to the unitary executivists, I believe that the simple fact that the ¶ President should be in control of the executive branch does not answer the ¶ question of how institutions should be structured to encourage the most robust ¶ flow of advice to the President. Nor does that fact weigh against modest ¶ internal checks that, while subject to presidential override, could constrain ¶ presidential adventurism on a day-to-day basis. And in contrast to the doubters ¶ of the unitary executive, I believe a unitary executive serves important values, ¶ particularly in times of crisis. Speed and dispatch are often virtues to be ¶ celebrated. ¶ Instead of doing away with the unitary executive, this Essay proposes ¶ designs that force internal checks but permit temporary departures when the ¶ need is great. Of course, the risk of incorporating a presidential override is that ¶ its great formal power will eclipse everything else, leading agency officials to ¶ fear that the President will overrule or fire them. But just as a filibuster does ¶ not tremendously constrain presidential action, modest internal checks, buoyed ¶ by reporting requirements, can create sufficient deterrent costs.

### CP2

#### Counterplan Text: The United States federal government should fully fund a program to cover 4.8% of the surface of the Earth’s oceans in a monolayer of 0.1 μm diameter latex particles, either hollow, or of core-shell morphology, bearing a conventional stabilization system that is inactivated in salt water.

#### Solves warming, only costs $2 billion, and avoids all solvency deficits associated with traditional ocean albedo modifications.

Morgan 11 – (10/8/11, John, PhD in physical chemistry, runs R&D programmes at a Sydney startup company, research experience in chemical engineering in the US and at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, Australia's national science agency, “Low intensity geoengineering – microbubbles and microspheres,” <http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/10/08/low-intensity-geoengineering-microbubbles-and-microspheres/>)

Is there another way to look at this? The Achilles heel of the hydrosol approach is the short bubble lifetime. But are there other ways to brighten water? Are there any other micron sized light scattering particles cheaply available in prodigious quantities, which float in water and don’t dissolve?

It turns out the answer is yes. Synthetic latex is produced on a huge scale – 1010 kg in 2005. A latex is a dispersion of polymer microspheres in water (Figure 5). The particle size is typically around 0.1 – 0.5 μm. The polymer content is high – about 50% by weight. And its cheap – a bit over a dollar per kilo wet. It looks like a bright white opaque liquid, like wood glue, which is a polyvinylacetate latex. Its a bulk commodity used in adhesives, paper coatings, paint and many other applications.

Lets run the numbers on this and ask, what would it take to reverse current warming? First we need to know how much light these particles scatter back to space. I used Mie theory to analyse scattering of 500 nm wavelength light (roughly the solar peak) from 0.1 μm diameter polystyrene spheres, as if the sun were overhead. The back scattering from these very small particles is intense – 42% of overhead light returns to space. And this is just direct scattering. Some of the light that scatters forward will scatter off a second particle, and a third. Multiple scattering will see more than 42% of light returned to space.

Since these particles attach to the surface, lets consider, for the moment, a monolayer on the water surface. This requires 1014 particles per square metre, with a volume of 5.2×10-8 m3 per m2 (or 5 parts per billion of the top 10 m, for comparison with Seitz’ figures). Polystyrene has a density of 1050 kg m-3, so that’s a mass of 55 mg m-2. Over 3.16×1014 m2 of ocean that’s 1.7×1010 kg polymer.

What would this do to the earth’s energy balance? Average insolation (accounting for cloud cover [Jin et al. 2002, cited by Seitz]) is 239 Wm-2. The monolayer cross sectional area fraction is pi/4. So the energy returned by direct overhead scattering is about 78 W. That’s huge compared to the current CO2 forcing of about 2.25 Wm-2.

Modelling reported by Seitz indicates an increase of ocean albedo of 0.05 translates to an increase of planetary albedo by 0.031 [Seitz 2010; Figure 5]. So I’ll assume planetary albedo increase is 60% of the ocean albedo increase, which means we need ocean backscattering of 3.75 Wm-2. We would only need 4.8% of a monolayer to offset current CO2 forcing (ignoring the contribution from multiple scattering).

4.8% of a whole ocean monolayer is 8.3×108 kg of dry polymer, or about 1.7×109 kg wet latex. At say $1.20 per kg, this would cost $2.0 billion and account for 17% of 2005 global production capacity.

This is, surprisingly, well within reach. **$2.0b to reverse global warming is cheap.** Restricting dispersal to the mid latitudes where the greatest effect is achieved, using core-shell latex technology, and properly accounting for multiple scattering would see this cost drop even further. Annual growth in latex production grew organically by 4.5% per annum between 2000-2005. Ramping production by 17% would be completely feasible.

The ongoing cost depends on the residence time of the particles at the ocean surface. Equatorial currents run at about 1 ms-1, which would imply a traversal time of about 1 year for the Pacific ocean. Mid latitude the currents are much slower. The latex particles themselves will degrade in the environment, and there will be losses by association and entrainment in a complex marine environment.

But let’s provisionally estimate a cost of $2b per year. This is significantly cheaper than, say, stratospheric sulfur aerosol injection which is estimated at $25-50b per year, let alone space sunshades. And it doesn’t require exotic engineering, enabling R&D, or orbital launches – it uses existing materials at a rate well inside existing production capacity.

Conclusion

So consider this final elaboration of Russell Seitz’ bright idea: 0.1 μm diameter latex particles, possibly hollow, or of core-shell morphology, bearing a conventional stabilization system that is inactivated in salt water ensuring that the particles are retained at and near the surface, are produced in bulk using about 17% of existing production capacity and using commercial recipes, and are sprayed onto the sea from tanks aboard ships or crop dusting aircraft, oil rigs, and other structures, in the mid latitudes.

For a cost in the order of a mere $2b per year we could offset current global warming, subject to the many disclaimers and qualifications discussed above, and many others not mentioned. More limited, local applications, such as the direct cooling of coral reefs as envisaged by Seitz for the microbubble concept, are also possible.

### DA1

#### Immigration reform will pass --- Obama’s political capital is key

JIM KUHNHENN | Associated Press, 1/7/14, New prospects in 2014 for an immigration overhaul, <http://news.yahoo.com/prospects-2014-immigration-overhaul-202531626--finance.html>, jj

WASHINGTON (AP) — His agenda tattered by last year's confrontations and missteps, President Barack Obama begins 2014 clinging to the hope of winning a lasting legislative achievement: an overhaul of immigration laws. It will require a deft and careful use of his powers, combining a public campaign in the face of protests over his administration's record number of deportations with quiet, behind-the-scenes outreach to Congress, something seen by lawmakers and immigration advocates as a major White House weakness. In recent weeks, both Obama and House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, have sent signals that raised expectations among overhaul supporters that 2014 could still yield the first comprehensive change in immigration laws in nearly three decades. If successful, it would fulfill an Obama promise many Latinos say is long overdue. The Senate last year passed a comprehensive, bipartisan bill that addressed border security, provided enforcement measures and offered a path to citizenship for the estimated 11 million immigrants living in the United States illegally. House leaders, pressed by tea party conservatives, demanded a more limited and piecemeal approach. Indicating a possible opening, Obama has stopped insisting the House pass the Senate version. And two days after calling Boehner to wish him happy birthday in November, Obama made it clear he could accept the House's bill-by-bill approach, with one caveat: In the end, "we're going to have to do it all." Boehner, for his part, in December hired Rebecca Tallent, a former top aide to Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., and most recently the director of a bipartisan think tank's immigration task force. Even opponents of a broad immigration overhaul saw Tallent's selection as a sign legislation had suddenly become more likely. Boehner also fed speculation he would ignore tea party pressure, bluntly brushing back their criticism of December's modest budget agreement. "We believe immigration reform is going to pass," White House spokesman Jay Carney said Tuesday. "It's going to pass, you know, and it's up to the House to decide when. But it's going to happen." Republican pollster David Winston, who regularly consults with the House leadership, said the task ahead for both sides is to distinguish the key issues they must have in the legislation from those that are merely preferences. "The question is what are the core things that Republicans can't move away from, what are the core things that Democrats can't walk away from," he said. "That's part of the process of going back and forth." If successful, an immigration compromise could restore some luster to Obama's agenda, tarnished in 2013 by failures on gun legislation, bipartisan pushback on his efforts to take military action against Syria and the disastrous enrollment start for his health care law. Obama has repeatedly argued that final immigration legislation must contain a path toward citizenship for immigrants living in the United States illegally. Opponents argue citizenship rewards lawbreakers, and many Republicans are loath to support any measure granting citizenship no matter how difficult and lengthy that path may be. But some advocates of reform are beginning to rally around an idea to grant immigrants legal status in the U.S. and leave the question of citizenship out of the legislation. In other words, they can work, but not vote. "I don't think this is a good idea because citizenship is important, but I don't think it is a big deal breaker either," Rep. Luis Gutierrez, D-Ill., a leading congressional advocate for overhauling U.S. immigration law, said in a speech last month. "Right now we have to stop the deportations that are breaking up families. And if we do not get citizenship this year, we will be back next year and the year after that." While strong majorities of Hispanics continue to back a pathway to citizenship, a Pew Research Center poll last month found that being able to live and work in the U.S. legally without the threat of deportation was more important to Latinos by 55 percent to 35 percent. "Is the sticking point going to be we have to have immediate voting privileges for those who came here illegally?," Sen. Rand Paul of Kentucky, a Republican who voted against the Senate immigration bill, said Sunday on ABC. "If the Democrats are willing to come halfway, I think we can pass something, some meaningful reform that would help the 11 million who are here." Carney said Tuesday that Obama's views have not changed and that he continues to insist on a comprehensive overhaul that includes a path to citizenship. Still, that the immigration argument is now over legalization versus citizenship is remarkable enough. A 2005 Republican House immigration bill, instead of legalizing immigrants, would have made them felons if they were not authorized to be in the U.S.

#### Fighting to defend his war power will sap Obama’s capital, trading off with rest of agenda—it’s empirically killed immigration reform

Kriner, 10 --- assistant professor of political science at Boston University

(Douglas L. Kriner, “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec 1, 2010, page 68-69)

While congressional support leaves the president’s reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president’s foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives. Moreover, any weakening in the president’s political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War. 60

In addition to boding ill for the president’s perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon Johnson’s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush’s highest second-term domestic proprieties, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.61

When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies. If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

***Immigration reform expands skilled labor --- key to India relations***

**L**os **A**ngeles **Times**, 11/9/20**12** (Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, p. <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html>)

"C**omprehensive** i**mmigration** r**eform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted** B. Lindsay **Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University**. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, **Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China." There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad** from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, **and** I think **they** still **see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said**.

***Relations check Indo Pak nuke war***

**Dugger, ’02** (Celia “Wider Military Ties With India Offer U.S. Diplomatic Leverage”, NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/10/world/wider-military-ties-with-india-offer-us-diplomatic-leverage.html, 6/10)

Military cooperation between India and the United States has remarkably quickened since Sept. 11, with a burst of navy, air force and army joint exercises, the revival of American military sales to India and a blur of high-level visits by generals and admirals. The fledgling relationship between American and Indian military leaders will be important to Mr. Rumsfeld in talks intended to put to rest fears of war between India and Pakistan. ''We can hope this translates into some influence and trust, though I don't want to overstate it,'' a senior American defense official said in an interview on Thursday. ''I don't want to predict this guarantees success.'' The American diplomatic efforts yielded their first real gains on Saturday when India welcomed a pledge by Pakistan's military ruler to stop permanently the infiltration of militants into Kashmir. India indicated that it would soon take steps to reduce tensions, but a million troops are still fully mobilized along the border -- a situation likely to persist for months -- and the process of resolving the crisis has just begun. India has linked the killing of civilians in Kashmir to a Pakistan-backed insurgency there and has presented its confrontation with Pakistan as part of the global campaign against terrorism. India itself made an unstinting offer of support to the United States after Sept. 11, and Washington responded by ending the sanctions placed on India after its 1998 nuclear tests. With that, the estrangement that prevailed between the world's two largest democracies during the cold war, when India drew close to the Soviet Union and the United States allied with Pakistan, has eased. India, for decades a champion of nonalignment, seeks warmer ties with the United States in hopes of gaining access to sophisticated military technology and help in dealing with Pakistan. From the start of President Bush's term, some influential officials in his administration saw India as a potential counterweight to that other Asian behemoth, China, whose growing power was seen as a potential strategic threat. But since Sept. 11, the priority has been terrorism. The United States is hoping its deeper military and political ties with India will give it some measure of leverage to prevent a war between India and Pakistan that could lead to a nuclear ~~holocaust~~ and would play havoc with the hunt for Al Qaeda in Pakistan.

### DA2

#### \*\*\*Tea Party candidates will lose in 2014 primary elections now, but war power issues energize their base

Decide fate of GOP

Gonyea 12/24-’13, [Don Gonyea is a NPR National Political Correspondent based in Washington, D.C., he spends much of his time traveling throughout the United States covering campaigns, elections, and the political climate throughout the country. His reports can be heard on all NPR programs and at NPR.org, December 24, 2013, NPR, Amid Declining Popularity, The Tea Party Prepares To Fight, <http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/12/24/256859872/amid-declining-popularity-the-tea-party-prepares-to-fight>, jj]

"You know, there are some people who want to write the obituary for the tea party, but if you look around to this crowd on a Wednesday afternoon, the tea party is alive and well," said Mike Needham at a rally in June outside the U.S. Capitol. Needham is with Heritage Action for America — one of the big outside groups that poured cash into supporting tea party candidates. "And we are going to write the obituary for big government." This was a year that saw the emergence of some big national stars of the movement: players who weren't just media personalities, like Glenn Beck, but who actually held high office, like Republican Sen. Rand Paul of Kentucky. Paul's 13-hour filibuster in March against John Brennan's CIA nomination protested what he says is the threat posed by a state ready to violate individual rights in the name of national security. His popularity among tea party activists soared. But the biggest fight the tea party waged this year was a failed standoff to repeal the Affordable Care Act. Enter GOP Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas, who launched a marathon speech in the Senate in September as a deadline to fund the federal government was fast approaching. "I intend to speak in opposition to Obamacare," he said. "I intend to speak in support of defunding Obamacare until I am no longer able to stand." Cruz's position: To block any government spending bill that contained money to fund Obamacare. That became the focal point of debate. It tied the hands of the GOP leadership looking for a deal. It made compromise impossible. A partial government shutdown lasting 16 days ensued in October. Tea party activists around the country urged their congressional allies to stand firm. It was a moment of strength for the movement – which, at the very same time, demonstrated how out of touch it was with public opinion. A CBS News poll in October, found that 72 percent of Americans thought the dispute over Obamacare should not have led to the shutdown. Forty-four percent blamed congressional Republicans, while 35 percent blamed President Obama. A Gallup poll out this month shows that just 22 percent of those questioned call themselves tea party supporters – a near-record low. Establishment forces like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce began to directly take on the tea party. Even the mainstream GOP began to resist: An end-of-year news conference by House Speaker John Boehner demonstrated that some Republican leaders are ready to push back — hard. "They pushed us into this fight to defund Obamacare and to shut down the government," he said. "Most of you know, my members know, that wasn't exactly the strategy that I had in mind. But if you'll recall, the day before the government reopened, one of these groups stood up and said, 'Well, we never really thought it would work.' Are you kidding me?" It does seem that the tea party is much at war with Republicans as it is with Democrats. The movement rejected a GOP effort to rebrand itself after the 2012 election and helped derail action on a new immigration law. But in the coming year of midterm elections, tea party candidates are challenging many incumbent Republicans in the House and Senate in primary races. Such battles could define both the shape and future of the GOP.

#### Plan’s a wedge issue that causes Tea Party success in the midterms as rank-and-file GOP voters rebel against establishment candidates

Silver, ’13 [Nathaniel Read "Nate" Silver is an American statistician and writer who analyzes in-game baseball activity and elections. He is currently the editor-in-chief of ESPN's FiveThirtyEight blog and a Special Correspondent for ABC News. June 11, 2013, 538 – NYT, Domestic Surveillance Could Create a Divide in the 2016 Primaries, <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/11/domestic-surveillance-could-create-a-divide-in-the-2016-primaries/?_r=0>, jj]

A poll released on Monday by the Pew Research Center and The Washington Post found a partisan shift in the way Americans view the National Security Agency’s domestic surveillance programs. In the survey, slightly more Democrats than Republicans said they found it acceptable for the N.S.A. to track Americans’ phone records and e-mails if the goal is to prevent terrorism. By comparison, when Pew Research asked a similar question in 2006, Republicans were about twice as likely as Democrats to support the N.S.A.’s activities. The poll is a reminder that many Americans do not hold especially firm views on some issues and instead may adapt them depending on which party controls the executive branch. When it comes to domestic surveillance, a considerable number of Democrats seem willing to support actions under President Obama that they deemed unacceptable under George W. Bush, while some Republicans have shifted in the opposite direction. What may be just as significant is the way in which attitudes toward the security state could split voters and elected officials within each party — possibly creating a wedge issue in both party primaries in 2016. Politicians who are normally associated with being on the far left and the far right may find common cause with grass-roots voters in their objection to domestic surveillance programs, fighting against a party establishment that is inclined to support them. Take, for example, the House’s vote in May 2011 to extend certain provisions of the Patriot Act — including the so-called library records provision that the government has used to defend the legality of sweeping searches of telephone and e-mail records. The bill passed with 250 yes votes in the House against 153 no votes, receiving more of its support from Republicans. (In the Senate, the bill passed, 72-23, winning majority support from both parties.) However, the House vote was not well described by a traditional left-right political spectrum. In the chart below, I’ve sorted the 403 members of the House who voted on the bill from left to right in order of their overall degree of liberalism or conservatism, as determined by the statistical system DW-Nominate. Members of the House who voted for the bill are represented with a yellow stripe in the chart, while those who voted against it are represented in black. The no votes are concentrated at the two ends of the spectrum. The 49 most liberal members of the House (all Democrats) who voted on the bill each voted against it. But so did 14 of the 21 Republicans deemed to be the most conservative by DW-Nominate. By contrast, 46 of the 50 most moderate Republicans voted for the Patriot Act extension, as did 38 of the 50 most moderate Democrats. Perhaps, you might object, a one-dimensional spectrum doesn’t do a very good job of capturing all the nuances of what it means to be liberal or conservative in America today. In considering the surveillance state, for example, Republicans must weigh their traditional support for aggressive antiterrorism policies against their distrust of government, while Democrats must weigh their trust of Mr. Obama, who so far has been unapologetic for the N.S.A.’s actions, against their concern about civil liberties violations. Or more broadly, what about libertarians who take conservative views on economic policy but liberal views on social policy — or conservative Democrats who support the welfare state but not policies like gay marriage? Where are they represented on the spectrum? I am sympathetic toward these objections as a theoretical matter. Without making this too much of an editorial comment, I find the platforms of both parties to be lacking in philosophical cohesion — why, for example, should views on abortion have much to do with preferences on tax policy? But when it comes to American political parties and their representatives in Congress, partisanship tends to dominate all other considerations. National Journal has a different system for ranking members of Congress from liberal to conservative. It is somewhat less statistically rigorous than DW-Nominate’s system, but it does have the advantage of breaking votes down into three categories: those on economic, social and foreign policy. The correlations between the three policy areas are very high (specifically, they are about 0.9, where 1 would represent a perfect correlation). Members of Congress who take conservative views on economic policy tend almost always to take conservative views on social policy and foreign policy as well, while members who are liberal on one set of issues tend to cast liberal votes on almost all other issues. This does leave the question of how liberal and conservative policy stances are defined. (Support for gun rights, for example, is generally seen as socially conservative rather than socially liberal, even though socially liberal stances are often thought of as promoting the rights of individuals against communities or governments.) Nevertheless, for members of Congress today, a vote on any one issue is highly predictable based upon his votes on other issues. There are extremely few mavericks in Congress who vote on each issue on an independent and nonpartisan basis. DW-Nominate uses a different method to classify Congressional votes. Instead of assigning a subjective definition to each vote as liberal or conservative, it instead uses an automated process called optimal classification. The goal of this process is essentially to explain the highest number of Congressional votes based on a one-dimensional scale, regardless of the content of the legislation that comprises it. Whichever votes are not well explained by this first dimension are then explained by additional dimensions. The process is more intuitive than it might sound. For example, during the 1960s, Congressional votes on civil rights policy toward African-Americans were not very strongly correlated with votes on other types of political issues. (For instance, Southern Democrats were often staunchly opposed to civil rights for blacks while casting very liberal votes on the welfare state.) Thus, you needed at least two dimensions to describe Congressional voting patterns in a reasonably comprehensive way. In recent years, however, this has been much less of a problem: the one-dimensional spectrum explains about 95 percent of Congressional voting, and votes on economic, social and foreign policy are highly correlated. But a few votes still fall outside of the spectrum — the 2011 vote on the Patriot Act among them. If the second dimension no longer represents a distinction between economic and social policy, then what does it reflect? The authors of DW-Nominate are interpreting it to measure a distinction between what they call “establishment” members of Congress and “outsiders.” Here at FiveThirtyEight, I have sometimes used the same labels when describing the ideological space occupied by different candidates during the presidential primaries. Some candidates, like Mitt Romney, run as insider or establishment politicians, offering some iteration of what they say are tried-and-true solutions, while others run as insurgents or outsiders, submitting a more profound critique of politics as usual and claiming they will topple an unacceptable status quo. In general, those politicians who rate as insurgents or outsiders are on the wings of the liberal-conservative scale. The Tea Party, Occupy Wall Street and Ron Paul movements probably all fit into the outsider or insurgent category, for example, even though they inhabit vastly different spaces on the traditional left-right political spectrum. Conversely, moderates in both parties tend to score as establishment politicians. There aren’t very many “radical centrist” members of Congress who offer a pronounced critique of the status quo while also coming down somewhere in the middle on most policy issues. In the case of the Patriot Act vote, the establishment-outsider axis makes nearly as much difference as the liberal-conservative or Democratic-Republican scales. Among the so-called establishment members of the House who voted on the bill, 78 percent voted to extend the Patriot Act, while only 41 percent of the so-called outsiders did, according to DW-Nominate’s classifications. You can find similar patterns in certain votes on policy toward the financial sector — for example, during the various bailout votes that were cast toward the end of 2008. More recently, votes on the federal debt ceiling have taken on some of the same contours. What is the link between the financial votes and those on the surveillance state? In both cases, members of Congress were asked to trust the assertions of elites that significant harms would result if the bills were not enacted: terrorist acts in the event that the Patriot Act was not extended, or financial calamity in the event that the bailout was not passed or the debt ceiling was not raised. As a matter of practice (but not necessarily theory), convincing someone that a future crisis must be averted requires a higher level of persuasion than making the case for a policy that is claimed to ameliorate some extant problem. Members of Congress who are members of their party establishments might be more inclined to trust testimony from financial or national security elites, and therefore might have been easier to pitch on these bills. We should be careful about extrapolating the voting behavior of Congress to policy views among the general public. But as I have suggested, the establishment-outsider divide can loom large in presidential primaries. Particularly within the Republican Party, rank-and-file voters have increasingly lukewarm views of the party leadership. But Democrats will also face a primary after Mr. Obama’s tenure in office. Highly liberal, activist voters who might ordinarily be inclined to critique the status quo could face some awkward questions given that the status quo has featured a Democratic president. Debates on domestic surveillance could serve as proxy battles for these intraparty factions. Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky, perhaps along with other Republican candidates, could use his opposition to surveillance programs to help consolidate the support of libertarian and Tea Party voters, at the risk of alienating national security conservatives. Democratic candidates who criticize the Patriot Act or the N.S.A.’s actions will be finding fault with policies that Mr. Obama has defended – and Mr. Obama will very likely remain quite popular among Democrats three years from now.

#### This costs GOP moderates their seats and swings the election to the Tea Party

PDT 8/7-’13 [Pakistan Daily Times, Republican rift seeping into US foreign policy, <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013%5C08%5C07%5Cstory_7-8-2013_pg4_7>, jj]

Old-guard Republicans like Senator John McCain hew to the traditional line that the exertion of American power is the primary force of good in a chaotic world. They advocate supplying weapons to rebels in Syria, aiding Egypt despite the turmoil of the recent military coup, and using all tools at US disposal, including the surveillance of hundreds of millions of citizens, to keep America safe. But insurgent conservatives, led by libertarian-leaning Senators Rand Paul and Ted Cruz, are challenging that orthodoxy, and their influence has become difficult to ignore. A case in point came before the Senate late last week when Paul introduced a measure that would block $1.5 billion in aid to Egypt. His amendment was handily defeated, but not before heated debate between him and McCain over the role of the United States abroad. Notably voting with Paul and 11 other core conservatives was Mitch McConnell, the Senate’s top Republican. Together their vote bucked the position of AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobby that often finds Republican support in Washington. Earlier this year McCain derisively called Cruz and Paul “wacko birds” on the Senate floor, citing their procedural opposition to virtually anything supported by President Barack Obama, including the US budget, immigration reform, drone use, the national health law and foreign aid. “There may be more wacko birds in the Senate than is suspected,” Cruz, 42, sniped back at the 2008 Republican presidential nominee who is 34 years his senior. Cruz passed a big test last month in Iowa, where he was warmly received by several hundred evangelical pastors, a group that carries huge influence over the outcome of the first-in-the-nation primaries. Paul became a hero for many in March when he launched a 13-hour filibuster in the Senate to demand the Obama administration clarify its position on domestic use of drones. Political observers see a test brewing ahead of the presidential race in 2016 and even the mid-term elections in 2014, when voters will be confronted with what appears to be two divergent Republican strains. Michael Steele, a former chairman of the Republican National Committee, said recent ideological clashes have highlighted the “fracturing within the party.” “The question is will the John McCain view prevail ultimately going into 2014, or will the Ted Cruz view prevail?” he told MSNBC. The establishment’s growing unease with the upstarts, Paul led the Republican field in a recent PPP poll on the 2016 race, is likely what fueled a very public war of words late last month between two likely Republican contenders for the White House. New Jersey Governor Chris Christie blasted Paul’s position on domestic surveillance, and House of Representatives lawmakers who nearly de-funded the intelligence program that scoops up telephone records on millions of Americans. “This strain of libertarianism that’s going through both parties right now and making big headlines, I think, is a very dangerous thought,” Christie said at a mayoral panel. Paul shot back that “spying without warrants is unconstitutional.” The two carried on their bickering for days until reaching an uneasy truce. Congressman Peter King, the New York Republican who has chaired the House Homeland Security Committee, warned that the Tea Party favorites could threaten GOP aspirations for taking back the White House, especially if they were running against former secretary of state Hillary Clinton. “I think she’s very strong on foreign policy, and I think that if we nominate someone from our isolationist wing of the party, she’ll destroy them,” King told ABC News, adding that their pushing of the national debate is “harmful to the country.” Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer argued in his Friday column that the return of conservative isolationism “was utterly predictable.” After years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, debate over countless drone strikes and the revelations of mass surveillance by the National Security Agency, “the natural tension between isolationist and internationalist tendencies has resurfaced,” he wrote. Thomas Mann, a veteran congressional expert at the Brookings Institution, told AFP that while the Republican Party has largely accommodated the “economic libertarianism” of the Tea Party faithful in Congress,” true isolationists have little support among Republicans in office. “With Americans weary of war, this could begin to change but it would presage a real crackup of the GOP,” he said. afp

#### Continued Tea Party influence radicalizes the GOP which crashes the economy—electing moderates is key

Moyers, Ornstein & Mann, 10/11-’13 [Bill Moyers, has received more than 30 Emmys, two prestigious Alfred I. duPont-Columbia University Awards, nine Peabodys, and three George Polk Awards, president of the Schumann Media Center, a nonprofit organization that supports independent journalism. Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, Chair and a senior fellow in Governance Studies @ Brookings Institution & political scientist and resident scholar @ American Enterprise Institute, TruthOut, Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann Explain Why Congress Is Failing Us, <http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/19383-norman-ornstein-and-thomas-mann-explain-why-congress-is-failing-us>, jj]

Bill Moyers: Even if the threat of terrorists went away, none of those bold projects Glenn Greenwald described as defining American greatness would happen today. Our government is paralyzed and dysfunctional, and it’s getting worse than ever. Just ask Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann, as I’m about to do. For decades, these two political scientists were on the go-to list for Beltway pundits and reporters seeking wisdom on the curious ways of governance. But then, almost exactly a year ago to this day, they published an op-ed piece in The Washington Post headlined, “Let’s just say it: The Republicans are the problem.” Mann and Ornstein argued that democracy and the economy are in a crash dive, and that congressional gridlock was largely the fault of the Republican Party and its takeover by right wing radicals. What’s more, they said, the mainstream media was adding to the problem by resorting to “false equivalency,” pretending that both parties were equally at fault. The article was based on their book, It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism. A paperback edition, with a new preface and afterword, will be out later this year. Thomas Mann is the W. Averell Harriman Chair and a senior fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. Norman Ornstein is resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. In their book, It’s Even Worse than It Looks, they predicted, “If President Obama gets reelected but faces either a continuing divided Congress or a Congress with Republicans in charge of both houses, there is little reason to expect a new modus vivendi in which the president and GOP leaders are able to find reasonable compromises in areas like budget policy, health reform and financial regulation.” Welcome to the both of you. Norman Ornstein: Great to be with you, Bill. Thomas Mann: Thank you, Bill. Bill Moyers: Okay, the election's come and gone and the deep dysfunction that has gripped our government for so many years now is still with us. What are you thinking today? Thomas Mann: You know, the election was even more stunning, in a way, in its sweep than we might have imagined. So you would have thought things would be different. Maybe in an issue or two, like immigration, it will be. But if you look at the gun issue, the background check, so much of the focus has been on the four Democrat apostates who drifted away from their party. Forty-one of 45 Republicans voted no. That includes people from states that wouldn't naturally be a part of a big gun culture. What's the reason? It's the tribalism we described in the book that continues. If he's for it, we're against it. We're not going to give him a victory, even if we were for it yesterday. And I'm afraid that pathology is still a driving force, dramatically so in the House; a little bit less in the Senate. But as we saw with background checks, not quite enough. Thomas Mann: Sadly, divided party government, which we have because of the Republican House, in a time of extreme partisan polarization, is a formula for inaction and absolutist opposition politics, not for problem solving. You know, it wasn't that long ago when you could actually get something done under divided government. There'd be enough members of the opposition party who want to legislate, not simply to engage in what we used to call the permanent campaign is now a permanent war. But that doesn't happen anymore now. It's Republicans are unified in their oppositions, or beholden to a "no new tax" pledge that really keeps the country, the Congress, and its political system from dealing honestly and seriously with the problems we face. Bill Moyers: Well, take the gun vote again. It occurred to me that Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid may have made a fatal blunder when he caved earlier in the year and didn't go for the end of the filibuster, as he could have. Do you agree with that? Norman Ornstein: I have mixed feelings about that, Bill. The difficulty that Harry Reid faced was to do this would cause a lot of turmoil in the Senate. There are so many other ways that a minority party can bollix up the works. And it's worth a price, if it's going to lead to legislative outcomes. But with a Republican House, all those bills passed would have met a graveyard. Bill Moyers: They could have still blocked it over in the… Norman Ornstein: Could have still… Bill Moyers: Anything that… Norman Ornstein: …blocked it. Bill Moyers: …passed in the Senate. Norman Ornstein: So he went for a deal with Mitch McConnell which makes it easier, if the two leaders want to do something, to overcome individual rogue senators, like a Ted Cruz or a Rand Paul. But it didn't bank on, he didn't bank on the Republican leader basically going back to where he had been for the first four years of the Obama administration on nominations for judges and top administration officials, and on a whole host of bills, and once again raising the bar to 60 routinely. Bill Moyers: You really surprised me last year, because I know how hard you both have worked to be bipartisan and to work with Democrats and Republicans, but you were very blunt in the way you came out and finally, you know. Thomas Mann: Yeah. Bill Moyers: …named names and pointed fingers. You wrote, "The two parties are not equally to blame because the Republicans have become extreme both in," quoting you, "in terms of policy and process." And you're saying here today, a year later, that's still the case? Thomas Mann: It's very much the case, Bill. We had no choice but to say it. It was in some ways, it was obvious if you if you look at the situation, and there is a body of scholarly research that has demonstrated this rightward march of the party, both among elected officials, but also rank-and-file Republicans. And the strongest, most extreme of those, the Tea Party people, have pulled the others back toward them. It's a reality, and it's not just ideological difference either. They begin with those differences, but then it's the strategic hyper-partisanship, what Norm referred to earlier: If Barack Obama is for something, we have to be against it because he's not a real American. Norman Ornstein: Let me just offer a bit of a caveat here on two fronts. First, we're not saying Democrats are angels here. Plenty of flaws there. But I also hold out still some hope for the Senate. You have a number of Republicans in the Senate, and this has less to do with ideology than with focus. Are you there to solve problems, or are you there either to pursue a radical agenda or to gain political advantage? Everybody's going to look for political advantage. There are problem-solvers in the Senate. They are flawed ones, as we saw with the gun bill. You know, people like Lamar Alexander or Bob Corker, who joined with most of their colleagues. But I've talked to them when it comes to either reforming the nomination process, doing something in a larger fiscal sense that will include revenues, acting on immigration. I think you've got some opportunities here. Those opportunities will go to the House, and the only way they'll pass is with far more Democrats than Republicans. And they may not make it through. But we don't have a lost cause yet in the Senate. Now, the recent evidence is not great on that front. And the fundamental pathologies that we wrote about and talked about and we just felt an obligation that we'd built up some capital over the years. What's it for if you're not going to spend it now? Bill Moyers: You riled the Republicans but you riled the press by talking about false equivalency. Their evenhanded treatment of decidedly uneven behavior on the part of the two parties, the equal treatment for true and false statements by advocates, equal weight to competing spin between opposing politicians and pundits without regard to the accuracy of either. You didn't get invited on the Sunday talk shows after that, did you? Norman Ornstein: And still haven't been. Thomas Mann: You noticed that? It's because those programs are predicated upon having spin from one side and then the other side. We're not the first to point out the, this artificial balance. I mean, reporters, good reporters do it partly out of a sense of professionalism, to be fair. To be wary of allowing your own personal political views to influence your writing. All of that is good. But now it's a safety valve. It keeps you from being charged as a partisan. It satisfies your producers, worried about advertising. And frankly, it's become really quite pernicious. We point out example after example in the book where they treat clearly unequal behavior as equivalent. Norman Ornstein: You know it's not even that we weren't invited on the Sunday shows, it's the radio silence on the topic. So you mention “The Washington Post” piece that appeared at right at the time that the book was published. And it just exploded on the scene, frankly; partly because of the title, which was “Let's Just Say It: Republicans Are the Problem”. You know, within less than 24 hours after it was up unannounced on The Washington Post website, they had 5,000 comments. They stop counting after that. We got over 265,000 Facebook referrals; 1.5 million web his. That weekend it appeared on a Thursday, and then in the paper on Sunday. That weekend, this was the topic of discussion in Washington, there's no doubt about that. All those Sunday shows have panels, their charge being, let's talk about what people are talking about in Washington. Nothing. You could invite other people on; you may not want to have us for one reason or another. How can you not raise the issue at all? Because it's so uncomfortable for them to even raise the notion that they should focus on the truth rather than this notion of balance no matter what. And that remains the case. Bill Moyers: So look what's happening. Senate Republicans are filibustering and blocking scores of executive and judicial nominations, as you point out in your new preface; they're delaying the confirmation of others. They're still willing, as you said last year, to use any tactic, no matter how dangerous and destructive, to damage the President and to force its will on him through a form of policy hostage-taking. You say that this policy hostage-taking was devised by this group, calling itself the “Young Guns.” Who are they? Thomas Mann: They are Eric Cantor they are Paul Ryan, and the third is the Republican whip Representative McCarthy of California. They laid out before the election a strategy to take hostage the full faith and credit of the United States by threatening not to raise the debt limit to accommodate previous decisions made by Congress, and signed by the president. It's hard to imagine a more destructive action that could be taken. We've got problems here, but there is still a flight to the dollar around the world. The one thing we have going for us is people trust the dollar and trust the fact that Treasury will pay its obligations when people buy bonds. But they were going to take that hostage in order to get immediate spending cuts. Bill Moyers: There was some compromise in January over the, over the deficit. Were you encouraged by that? Did you get an adrenaline shot when you… Norman Ornstein: No. And unfortunately. And here's the reason why. I mean, first of all, of course, we knew that the leverage was with President Obama in this case, not with people trying to hold something hostage, because inaction here would mean sharp tax increases across the board. And after that, the president can come back and say, "I want to propose the biggest tax cut in history for everybody except those making over $250,000 a year." So you could, it was clear there would be some kind of a deal that would emerge, whether before or after. One of the things that was discouraging about this is it happened very late in the game, of course, as we know. It was Joe Biden meeting with Mitch McConnell and coming up with a plan. But here's the plan that gets 89 votes in the Senate, including some of the icons of the conservative wing of the party which is really a radical wing of the party, from Pat Toomey to Jim Inhofe and Tom Coburn. And it goes to the House, and John Boehner, who may have the worst job in America could barely get a third of his own party to go along. Now, that's a modest deal. If you can't get more than a third of your House Republicans to support a deal like this, that doesn't speak well for the prospects of change. Bill Moyers: And you say that he, that Cantor more than any other politician helped to create the series of fiscal crises that you described just a moment ago? Thomas Mann: He really did. He hovered around John Boehner as Boehner was getting into negotiations with the president over the course of 2011 to head off the debt ceiling crisis. Bob Woodward… Bill Moyers: The Watergate Bob Woodward. Thomas Mann: Yeah. Thomas Mann: Watergate Bob Woodward has written… Norman Ornstein: Now the post-Watergate Bob Woodward. Thomas Mann: …written a book about these negotiations and did a lot of talking to the Republicans. And ended up saying Boehner and Obama reached a deal and Obama walked away from it. Well, Eric Cantor, in his interview with Ryan Lizza of The New Yorker couple of months ago basically corrected him. He said, Well, I talked to Boehner and said it really wouldn't be a good idea to reach a deal now because then the issue evaporates, the president gets the credit, and he has a better chance of being reelected. Better to keep it alive and fight it out in the in the election. Bill Moyers: And it didn't pay off for them, did… Thomas Mann: It didn't pay off at all. Bill Moyers: Except they held the House but it didn't pay off for them in the Senate. He lost two seats in the Senate. Didn't pay off for him in winning the presidency? Norman Ornstein: It was a, call it a riverboat gamble, I suppose you could say. Because what Cantor said in that interview was, if we win it all, then we don't have to compromise. They didn't; but the reaction wasn't, all right, now we have to compromise. Instead it was, we're still not going to compromise. Bill Moyers: You've said you have some hope for the Senate. There is some seeming to have to someone from afar movement on immigration. Is that must be hopeful to you? Thomas Mann: It is, but it's so different than everything else. The reason there is movement on immigration is because Republicans have such a powerful incentive to move on immigration. Bill Moyers: Because they lost the Latino vote…politics. Thomas Mann: They're on the verge of being marginalized in presidential politics. They are losing overwhelmingly the Latinos, Asian Americans, other immigrant groups the young voters. The growing parts of the electorate are moving away from the Republicans to the Democrats. They have a reason to do it. Hardball politics, not grand, bipartisan consensus. And they've put it together well. It's a group of Republicans and Democrats who are working out this bill. Obama has… Bill Moyers: In the Senate, right? Thomas Mann: In the Senate. Obama stayed off to the side, as they requested, because it's very hard for Marco Rubio to support anything the president's campaigning for. So his absence is what they needed to move this along. Norman Ornstein: But we shouldn't just focus on the members themselves. There are, in the House, at least a few people who'd like to work to solve some of these problems and Boehner among them, I think. And… Bill Moyers: You really believe that? Norman Ornstein: …some others well, I think, you know, he's sees himself as the Speaker of the House. And some of it is political as well. He's being pushed by other forces. But it's really important that we focus as much on the outside forces as the inside ones. Bill Moyers: Such as? Norman Ornstein: Well, when the fiscal cliff debate came up and we get this bill coming over with 89 votes in the Senate, and you had around that time, before those negotiations, Boehner trying to get a little traction, knowing there would be a tax increase. Coming up with his very poorly named Plan B, you know? I think maybe some of his members rejected it because they thought they didn't want an over-the-counter drug here. But it was, give me some traction. I'd propose a million dollars as the level here, and then we can negotiate. And some of his members were ready to support him, just to give him that traction. The Club for Growth, Heritage Action step up and basically said, you members, you lift your heads out of that foxhole and support any tax increase, and you've got a target on your backs and millions of dollars in a primary against you. Some of this is coming from the kinds of people who we're electing to office, through a nominating process that has gotten so skewed to the radical right. But some of it is an electoral magnet that pulls them away from voting for anything that might have a patina of bipartisan support because they'll face extinction. Thomas Mann: Bill, this is such an important point. Nowadays, political parties are not organizations, they're networks. We talk sometimes about parties versus outside groups. No, no, no. The outside groups are part of the political parties, and so too are the media outlets. The large funders. It's a broad system. Super PACs don't exist as independent forces. They in fact are run by former party operatives and leaders of one kind or another. And right now, you have a conjunction of forces that you can see in the conservative media, in the funding organizations, and in the Grover Norquist and the Koch brothers. And it all comes together to provide such overwhelming pressure on individual Republicans to toe the line, to oppose even when they want to engage in problem solving. Bill Moyers: So when you mention The Club for Growth, you're talking about essentially Wall Street finance group of private citizens who will take on a Republican in the primary to defeat him if he doesn't toe the line on what the financial interests want? Norman Ornstein: And these are financial interests who don't just focus on financial interests. Many of them are themselves radical either libertarians or who have a very strong ideology. And so The Club for Growth will intervene not just on tax issues, but on others. And they're joined by other groups. You know, when Jim DeMint left the Senate Bill Moyers: To head The Heritage… Norman Ornstein: Head the Heritage Foundation, you know… Bill Moyers: Right. A very conservative organization. Norman Ornstein: Which used to be a think tank. Now, of course, it has a 501(c)4 called Heritage Action. They're raising money. They're aggressively participating in the political debates, and will in campaigns. Because you can have as much impact as Tom said, it's all part of a party apparatus now. From the outside, if you use the leverage of money, and you can also use the leverage of the social media, the talk radio hosts, and others, who have such a dominant impact on the party now, that it takes the problem solvers and puts them in a really, really tricky situation. Bill Moyers: You say, in the book, that what we all know: President Obama made great efforts to work cooperatively with the Republicans during his first term. Didn't get him anything in terms of legislation; got him maybe a second term. But in The New York Times this week, Michael Shear and Peter Baker say, call him, "A president who hesitates to twist arms." Can you not be president without twisting arms? Thomas Mann: Oh, I think that's a myth. Bill Moyers: Do you? Thomas Mann: I just think the press is now overrun with President Obama's personal shortcomings. That he doesn't engage, that he doesn't put pressure on members, doesn't tell them what to do. He doesn't give them bourbon and branch water and he and he doesn't raise hell with them. And the reality is that presidential leadership is contextual. He's operating with a Republican Party that's part of this broad apparatus. What can he do to any one of those Republicans? He can't do anything. He's not in a position to do it. He tried negotiating early, that was his brand, right? The post-partisan President. He realized what he was up against, and then he said, you know, I've got to maneuver, position myself with the Democrats in a way that we can get some things done. Norman Ornstein: You know, I would say on the gun issue too we're premature here. It's not only that you can't twist arms in the same way that it might have been available to you before. And the few arms that he could twist on the Democratic side were almost all, with one exception, people who were up for reelection in really tough places. You're always going to tread a little bit more carefully there. And on the Republican side, it's not clear what either schmoozing or arm twisting would do. But my guess is you're going to see this, the issue of a background check come back. You're also going to see some executive actions, we're already beginning to see them, to make sure that people who shouldn't have access to guns have to go through a process to make it happen. So it's not only that, this meme in the press: "Why can't he be like Lyndon Johnson or like Bill Clinton?" As if all the schmoozing that Bill Clinton did got him a single Republican vote for his economic plan. And it took seven months to get the Democrats helped his health care plan, or kept him from being impeached. Bill Moyers: Yeah, I'm not impressed when people say, well, Barack Obama's not Lyndon Johnson. Lyndon Johnson is… Norman Ornstein: Today he couldn't be Lyndon Johnson… Bill Moyers: Couldn't be Lyndon Johnson. Bill Moyers: This is not the 1960s when Congress had a huge bevy, a large bevy of moderate Republicans. Bill Moyers: So who wins, and who loses, when we have this deadlock and dysfunction? Thomas Mann: Well, first of all, the public and future generations really do lose. We have serious problems, short and long term, in the country. We're going to have to figure out how we can compete in a global economy where not just low value but high value jobs may end up elsewhere. We're going to have a radically different workforce as the population changes, not only in terms of having more African American, Asian American and Hispanic Americans making up a part of that workforce, but as the population gets older and lives longer. We've got challenges in terms of energy and the environment, how you compete in a globe where the threats are very different ones. If you have a government that can't function, or that gets caught up in a war of the roses where what's most important is doing short-term damage to the other side, shed a little blood so that you can take over and implement a revolution, we're all going to lose. But I think in political terms, I just don't see a Republican Party that continues down this path. And I'm not alone in that. The Jeb Bushes of the world, and the Haley Barbours of the world, and the Mitch Daniels of the world, and the Chris Christies of the world see it too. If you move off the mainstream and pursue a radical ideology, and if you say, "We're just not going to make any movement at all," in some of these issues, eventually voters are going to say, "Enough of this." Thomas Mann: Bill, we've been living through now years of stagnant wages, of high unemployment, of growing economic inequality. So the work of our legislature, our governments makes a big difference. And right now, those issues are not being addressed in any substantial way because of the dysfunctional politics, and because the Republican Party has drifted so far from the mainstream of our politics. If there's optimism, it's one that the old democratic accountability still works.

***Nuclear war***

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Today, **economic** and fiscal **trends pose the *most severe*** long-term ***threat* to the U**nited **S**tates’ **position as global leader**. While the United States suffers from fiscal imbalances and low economic growth, the economies of rival powers are developing rapidly. The **continuation of** these two **trends could lead to a shift from American primacy toward a multi-polar global system, leading in turn to increased *geopolitical rivalry* and** even ***war* *among*** the ***great powers***. The current recession is the result of a deep financial crisis, not a mere fluctuation in the business cycle. Recovery is likely to be protracted. The crisis was preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of debt throughout the U.S. economy — ultimately totaling almost 350 percent of GDP — and the development of credit-fueled asset bubbles, particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed, and unemployment rose to over 10 percent. The decline of tax revenues and massive countercyclical spending put the U.S. government on an unsustainable fiscal path. Publicly held national debt rose from 38 to over 60 percent of GDP in three years. Without faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual interest payments — which already are larger than the defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require substantial tax increases that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, **the U**nited **S**tates **would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would *almost certainly* compel a *radical retrenchment* of the U**nited **S**tates **internationally**. **Such scenarios would *reshape the international order***. It was the **economic devastation** of Britain and France **during World War II**, as well as the rise of other powers, that **led** both **countries to relinquish their empires**. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, **the U**nited **S**tates **would be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shed**ding **international commitments**. We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though **countries** such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their **economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power.** **These trends could** in the long term **produce a multi-polar world**. ***If U.S. policymakers fail to act*** and other powers continue to grow, ***it is not a question of whether but when* a new international order will emerge**. **The closing of the gap** between the United States and its rivals **could *intensify geopolitical competition among major powers*, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to *preclude* or respond to *international crises* because of the *higher risk of escalation*.** **The stakes are high**. In modern history, ***the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership***. By contrast**, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers**. **Failures of multi-polar international systems produced *both world wars***. **American retrenchment could have *devastating consequences*.** **Without an American security blanket, regional powers could *rearm* in an attempt to balance against emerging threats**. Under this scenario, **there would be a heightened possibility of *arms races*, *miscalc***ulation, **or *other crises spiraling into all-out conflict*.** Alternatively, **in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the U**nited **S**tates. Either way, **hostile states would be emboldened to make *aggressive moves* in their regions**.

## Solvency

### Solvency

#### Signal arguments are wrong – nations won’t perceive it

Kriner, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, 10

(Douglas, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 81-2, google books)

First, in many cases congressional signals will likely **have** only a modest influence on the calculations of the target state at the conflict conduct phase. Uses of force involving the United States are different from most other uses of force occurring in the international system because of the tremendous asymmetric advantages in military capabilities that the United States enjoys over almost every adversary. By the time that the military policymaking process enters the conflict conduct phase, the target state's leader has already decided that his or her interests are best served by refusing to capitulate to American demands, even at the risk of almost certain tactical defeat at the hands of a superior military force. Having made this cost-benefit calculation, congressional signals during the course of a conflict should have only a modest impact on the target state leader's subsequent behavior at the conflict conduct phase." Moreover, the types of states whose leaders are most likely to make this calculation—weak states (including those harboring non-state actors who are the true target of a proposed use of force), failed states, and vulnerable dictatorships—are in many cases very different from most other members of the international community. For these actors, the costs of capitulating to American demands are so high that their cost-benefit calculations should be more impervious to congressional signals.

#### The plan isn’t meaningfully different from the status quo --- it’s super easy to get authorizations --- declarations are key

GARANCE FRANKE-RUTA is a senior editor covering national politics at The Atlantic, “All the Previous Declarations of War”. Aug 31st 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/08/all-the-previous-declarations-of-war/279246/

As we head into a period of vigorous congressional debate over whether to authorize the use of force against Syria, it's instructive to look back at America's history of congressional war declarations. The Congressional Research Service put together a great mini-history in 2011, "Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications," by Jennifer Elsea and Richard Grimmett, which is worth a read at this juncture. The obvious take-home is that America has done a better job of winning its declared wars in the last century than achieving clear-cut victories in ventures authorized under legislative measures that fell short of a formal declaration of war. The United States Congress has not formally declared war since World War II. All of our wars in the Middle East have been authorized using other means, which rather goes to the heart of the nature of those different conflicts. U.S. entry into World War I and World War II took place through joint congressional resolutions stating "a state of war exists between the Government of Country X and the Government and People of the United States," where country X was, variously, Germany, Japan, Italy, and so on. It would be impossible to write such a sentence about Syria today. In what meaningful way does a state of war exist between the United States and Syria? None. That's why Congress, if it approves anything, will approve an authorization for the use of force. And if history is any guide, that's going to be a rather open-ended commitment, as fuzzy on the back-end as on the front.

#### Congress fails and can’t play a role in war-making

Posner ’11, Eric Posner is Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Aaron Director Research Scholar at the University of Chicago, 3-21-11, Volokh Conspiracy, Why Congress Played No Role in the Libya Intervention, <http://www.volokh.com/2011/03/21/why-congress-played-no-role-in-the-libya-intervention/>, jj

President Obama is following a long line of precedents in which the executive launched a foreign war without congressional authorization. The president disavowed these precedents during his campaign; he may or may not attempt to distinguish his campaign statement by invoking the UN security council resolution authorizing the attack, as Truman did for Korea. But this legal wrangling is all superstructure. Congress is disabled in numerous ways from making practical contributions to a war effort. It cannot prevent the president from starting a war, and it is nearly impossible to halt an ongoing war. Wars, then, simply become an opportunity for members of Congress to stake their reputations as hawks or doves for the sake of future elections.¶ The Libya intervention provides an instructive example of the disabilities hampering Congress. Events in Libya unfolded with extraordinary rapidity, while the proper American stance depended on numerous constantly changing factors—the security situation in Libya, the attitudes of neighboring states and their populations, and the positions of foreign powers such as the UK, France, China, and Russia. A major source of complexity is that these various attitudes and positions depended in part on what other people thought the United States would do. The rebels might hold out if they believed that the United States would intervene, and by holding out possibly prevail without American intervention. The UK and France might sound the tocsins of war only as long as they believed that the United States would support them if they obtained the acquiescence of other countries, which in turn would care about American attitudes as well. As these various actors calculated their moves, they sent out feelers to the U.S. executive and received responses—promises, hints, suggestions. Eventually, international opinion coalesced and military intervention followed.¶ Congress could not play a role. Lacking a leader who could commit it to a course of action, Congress could not make promises. Lacking a single mouthpiece, it could not be consulted. Foreign countries naturally turned to the president. Nor is it realistic for Congress to formally ratify the president’s decision if formal ratification involves the possibility of rejection. Then the next time that the United States is involved in a foreign policy crisis, other countries won’t know who to speak to, and who to believe.¶ We live in a system of executive primacy, as Adrian Vermeule and I have argued in our new book, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic. It is a consequence of natural institutional developments and necessities. The contrary view, which was written into the U.S. Constitution, could survive only as long as the United States was protected by two oceans from foreign threats and could focus on territorial expansion within a continent populated only by Indians, who were never a major threat—and even then it was honored more in the breach than in the observance. Those who are skeptical about the Libya intervention should address their policy arguments to the executive, and stop complaining that Congress has not authorized the war. Here is Jack Goldsmith arguing that Obama will invoke the UN Security Council resolution as his legal justification (why this is necessary after Clinton’s Kosovo intervention, which had no such resolution, is not explained); here is Andrew Sullivan arguing that Congress should do something, anything (“A congressional vote is also important to rein in the imperial presidency that Obama has now taken to a greater height then even Bush.”); and here is Ilya Somin’s post on the topic yesterday describing the protests of “several” (nine!) members of Congress.

#### Statutory restrictions on war-making fail

Posner & Vermeule ’11, Eric Posner is Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Aaron Director Research Scholar at the University of Chicago. Adrian Vermeule - John H. Watson, Jr. Professor of Law – Harvard Law School, The Executive Unbound [electronic resource] : After the Madisonian Republic, Oxford University Press, USA, 2011. 01/01/2011 1 online resource (256 p.) Language: English, pg 10, jj

The same holds for statutory constraints on the executive—unsurprisingly, ¶ as these constraints are the product of the very Madisonian system whose ¶ failure is apparent at the constitutional level. In the terms of the legal theorist David Dyzenhaus, the APA creates a series of legal “black holes” and ¶ “grey holes” that either de jure or de facto exempt presidential and administrative action from ordinary legal requirements, and hence from (one ¶ conception of) the rule of law. 19 The scope of these exemptions waxes and ¶ wanes with circumstances, expanding during emergencies and contracting ¶ during normal times, but it is never trivial, and the administrative state has ¶ never been brought wholly under the rule of law; periodically the shackles ¶ slip off altogether.¶ As we will also try to show, the subject-specific framework statutes ¶ intended to control delegations and to constrain presidential emergency ¶ powers have fallen into abeyance, de facto; the War Powers Resolution, for ¶ example, is said to have died when President Clinton, in clear defiance of ¶ its terms, conducted a 68-day bombing campaign in Kosovo—a conflict ¶ that was itself impossible to square with prevailing rules of international ¶ law. When the hour of crisis tolls, Congress has little incentive or capacity ¶ to enforce such attempted precommitments, which typically arise from ¶ an ephemeral political consensus and lose their base of political support ¶ over time.

#### Unique link --- the current balance of war powers is time-tested and extremely effective --- the plan’s radical reassertion of congressional control destroys U.S. national security and causes nuclear war

Yoo 12

(John Yoo, American attorney, law professor, and author. He served as a political appointee, the Deputy Assistant US Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice (OLC), during the George W. Bush administration. “War Powers Belong to the President”¶ Posted Feb 1, 2012,¶ <http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/war_powers_belong_to_the_president>)

This time, President Obama has the Constitution about right. His exercise of war powers rests firmly in the tradition of American foreign policy. Throughout our history, neither presidents nor Congresses have acted under the belief that the Constitution requires a declaration of war before the U.S. can conduct military hostilities abroad. We have used force abroad more than 100 times but declared war in only five cases: the War of 1812, the Mexican-American and Spanish-American wars, and World War I and II.¶ Without any congressional approval, presidents have sent forces to battle Indians, Barbary pirates and Russian revolutionaries; to fight North Korean and Chinese communists in Korea; to engineer regime changes in South and Central America; and to prevent human rights disasters in the Balkans. Other conflicts, such as the 1991 Persian Gulf war, the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 Iraq war, received legislative “authorization” but not declarations of war. The practice of presidential initiative, followed by congressional acquiescence, has spanned both Democratic and Republican administrations and reaches back from President Obama to Presidents Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Jefferson and George Washington.¶ Common sense does not support replacing the way our Constitution has worked in wartime with a radically different system that mimics the peacetime balance of powers between president and Congress. If the issue were the environment or Social Security, Congress would enact policy first and the president would faithfully implement it second. But the Constitution does not duplicate this system in war. Instead, our framers decided that the president would play the leading role in matters of national security.¶ Those in the pro-Congress camp call upon the anti-monarchical origins of the American Revolution for support. If the framers rebelled against King George III’s dictatorial powers, surely they would not give the president much authority. It is true that the revolutionaries rejected the royal prerogative, and they created weak executives at the state level. Americans have long turned a skeptical eye toward the growth of federal powers. But this may mislead some to resist the fundamental difference in the Constitution’s treatment of domestic and foreign affairs. For when the framers wrote the Constitution in 1787 they rejected these failed experiments and restored an independent, unified chief executive with its own powers in national security and foreign affairs.¶ The most important of the president’s powers are commander in chief and chief executive. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 74, “The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength, and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority.” Presidents should conduct war, he wrote, because they could act with “decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch.” In perhaps his most famous words, Hamilton wrote: “Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. ... It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks.”¶ The framers realized the obvious. Foreign affairs are unpredictable and involve the highest of stakes, making them unsuitable to regulation by pre-existing legislation. Instead, they can demand swift, decisive action—sometimes under pressured or even emergency circumstances—that is best carried out by a branch of government that does not suffer from multiple vetoes or is delayed by disagreements. Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. Our framers replaced the Articles of Confederation, which had failed in the management of foreign relations because they had no single executive, with the Constitution’s single president for precisely this reason. Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch, Congress’ loose, decentralized structure would [hamper] ~~paralyze~~ American policy while foreign threats grow.¶ Congress has no political incentive to mount and see through its own wartime policy. Members of Congress, who are interested in keeping their seats at the next election, do not want to take stands on controversial issues where the future is uncertain. They will avoid like the plague any vote that will anger large segments of the electorate. They prefer that the president take the political risks and be held accountable for failure.¶ Congress’ track record when it has opposed presidential leadership has not been a happy one. Perhaps the most telling example was the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Congress’ isolationist urge kept the United States out of Europe at a time when democracies fell and fascism grew in their place. Even as Europe and Asia plunged into war, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States out of the conflict. President Franklin Roosevelt violated those laws to help the Allies and draw the nation into war against the Axis. While pro-Congress critics worry about a president’s foreign adventurism, the real threat to our national security may come from inaction and isolationism.¶ Many point to the Vietnam War as an example of the faults of the “imperial presidency.” Vietnam, however, could not have continued without the consistent support of Congress in raising a large military and paying for hostilities. And Vietnam ushered in a period of congressional dominance that witnessed American setbacks in the Cold War and the passage of the ineffectual War Powers Resolution. Congress passed the resolution in 1973 over President Richard Nixon’s veto, and no president, Republican or Democrat, George W. Bush or Obama, has ever accepted the constitutionality of its 60-day limit on the use of troops abroad. No federal court has ever upheld the resolution. Even Congress has never enforced it.¶ Despite the record of practice and the Constitution’s institutional design, critics nevertheless argue for a radical remaking of the American way of war. They typically base their claim on Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to “declare war.” But these observers read the 18th century constitutional text through a modern lens by interpreting “declare war” to mean “start war.” When the Constitution was written, however, a declaration of war served diplomatic notice about a change in legal relations between nations. It had little to do with launching hostilities. In the century before the Constitution, for example, Great Britain—where the framers got the idea of the declare-war power—fought numerous major conflicts but declared war only once beforehand.¶ Our Constitution sets out specific procedures for passing laws, appointing officers and making treaties. There are none for waging war because the framers expected the president and Congress to struggle over war through the national political process. In fact, other parts of the Constitution, properly read, support this reading. Article I, Section 10, for example, declares that the states shall not “engage” in war “without the consent of Congress” unless “actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.” This provision creates exactly the limits desired by anti-war critics, complete with an exception for self-defense. If the framers had wanted to require congressional permission before the president could wage war, they simply could have repeated this provision and applied it to the executive.¶ Presidents, of course, do not have complete freedom to take the nation to war. Congress has ample powers to control presidential policy, if it wants to. Only Congress can raise the military, which gives it the power to block, delay or modify war plans. Before 1945, for example, the United States had such a small peacetime military that presidents who started a war would have to go hat in hand to Congress to build an army to fight it. Since World War II, it has been Congress that has authorized and funded our large standing military, one primarily designed to conduct offensive, not defensive, operations (as we learned all too tragically on 9/11) and to swiftly project power worldwide. If Congress wanted to discourage presidential initiative in war, it could build a smaller, less offensive-minded military.¶ Congress’ check on the presidency lies not just in the long-term raising of the military. It can also block any immediate armed conflict through the power of the purse. If Congress feels it has been misled in authorizing war, or it disagrees with the president’s decisions, all it need do is cut off funds, either all at once or gradually. It can reduce the size of the military, shrink or eliminate units, or freeze supplies. Using the power of the purse does not even require affirmative congressional action. Congress can just sit on its hands and refuse to pass a law funding the latest presidential adventure, and the war will end quickly. Even the Kosovo war, which lasted little more than two months and involved no ground troops, required special funding legislation.¶ The framers expected Congress’ power of the purse to serve as the primary check on presidential war. During the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention, Patrick Henry attacked the Constitution for failing to limit executive militarism. James Madison responded: “The sword is in the hands of the British king; the purse is in the hands of the Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist.” Congress ended America’s involvement in Vietnam by cutting off all funds for the war.¶ Our Constitution has succeeded because it favors swift presidential action in war, later checked by Congress’ funding power. If a president continues to wage war without congressional authorization, as in Libya, Kosovo or Korea, it is only because Congress has chosen not to exercise its easy check. We should not confuse a desire to escape political responsibility for a defect in the Constitution.¶ A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security. In order to forestall another 9/11 attack, or to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations, the executive branch needs flexibility. It is not hard to think of situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act. Time for congressional deliberation, which leads only to passivity and isolation and not smarter decisions, will come at the price of speed and secrecy.¶ The Constitution creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security. Presidents can take the initiative and Congress can use its funding power to check them. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the framers left war to politics. As we confront the new challenges of terrorism, rogue nations and WMD proliferation, now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.

## Warming

### Turn

#### Rising CO2 is key to rice yields—this solves famine, fresh water availability, and biodiversity

IDSO 2010 (Unclear which ones, but they are all esteemed scientists with PhDs, “Rice Production and the Looming Water Crisis,” May 19, http://www.co2science.org/articles/V13/N20/B2.php)

Shimono et al. write that "by 2050, the world's population will have increased by about 37%, from the current level of 6.7 billion to an estimated 9.2 billion (UN, 2009), with a corresponding increase in global food demand." They also state that "about 0.6 billion Mg of rice is produced annually from an area of 1.5 million km2, making rice one of the most important crops for supporting human life," especially, as noted by Pritchard and Amthor (2005), since it supplies the planet's human population with an estimated 20% of their energy needs (on a caloric basis) and 14% of their protein requirements (on a weight basis). Within this context, the six scientists further note that "rice production depends heavily on water availability," stating that "irrigated lowlands account for 55% of the total area of harvested rice and typically produce two to three times the crop yield of rice grown under non-irrigated conditions (IRRI, 2002)." And because the demand for ever greater quantities of water will continue to rise, due to our need to adequately feed our growing numbers, they conclude that "efficient use of water will thus be essential for future rice production." What was done In an attempt to determine how the agricultural enterprise may be impacted in this regard by the ongoing rise in the air's CO2 content, the Japanese researchers conducted a two-year free-air CO2 enrichment or FACE study in fields at Shizukuishi, Iwate (Japan) to learn how elevated CO2 may reduce crop water use via its impact on the leaf stomatal conductance (gs) of three varieties of rice (Oryza sativa L.): early-maturing Kirara397, intermediate-maturing Akitakomachi, and latest-maturing Hitomebore. What was learned In response to the 53% increase in daytime atmospheric CO2 concentration employed in their experiments, Shimono et al. report that "the reduction in gs due to elevated CO2 was similar across measurements, averaging around 20% in the morning, 24% around noon and 23% in the afternoon across all growth stages." And they add that "there was no significant CO2 x cultivar interaction." What it means With the concomitant increase in grain yield that also results from atmospheric CO2 enrichment (see Rice in the Plant Growth Data section of our website), it should be apparent to all that a continuation of the historical and still-ongoing rise in the air's CO2 content will play a major role in enabling us to meet our food needs at the mid-point of the current century, without having to lay claim to all of the planet's remaining fresh water resources and much of its undeveloped land and thereby driving many of the species with which we share the terrestrial biosphere to extinction for lack of land and water to meet their needs, as is also explained in greater detail in several of the items we have archived under the heading of Food in our Subject Index.

#### Solves Asian famine

IDSO 2004 (Sherwood, Craig, Keith, Carbon Science Magazine, Jan 13. “Atmospheric CO2 Enrichment: Boosting Rice Yields of Asia.” http://www.co2science.org/articles/N2/B2.php)

“On the basis of both area and tonnage harvested,” according to the authors, “Oryza sativa L. (rice) is the most important crop in Asia, providing a significant proportion of the people’s dietary needs (Alexandratos, 1995).” Hence, they say that “in view of the expected growth in Asia’s population, there is a need to determine how the predicted increase in the levels of atmospheric CO2 will affect rice yield.” What was done In order to determine the interactive effects of elevated CO2 and nitrogen (N) availability on the grain yield of rice crops grown under temperate flooded paddy conditions, Kim et al. grew rice crops from the seedling stage to maturity at atmospheric CO2 concentrations of ambient and ambient plus 200 ppm using FACE technology and three levels of applied nitrogen – low (LN, 4 v N M-2), medium (MN, 8 and 9 g N m-2), and high (HN, 15 g N m-2) – for three cropping seasons (1998-2000) What was learned The authors report that “the yield response to elevated CO2 in crops supplied with MN (+14.6$) or HN (+15.2%) was about twice that of crops supplied with LN (+7.4%), “confirming the importance of N availability to the response of rice to atmospheric CO2 enrichment previously determined by Kim et al. (2001) and Kobaysahi et al. (2001). What it means In terms of the more common increase in CO2 concentration used to express plant responses to atmospheric CO2 enrichment, i.e., 300ppm, the results of Kim et al. suggest we could likely expect something on the order of a 22% increase in rice yields for the MN treatment, which they say is “similar to that recommended to local farmers.” Such a yield increase courtesy of the ongoing rise in the air’s CO2 content would go a long way towards helping the people of Asia meet the future dietary needs of their expanding population.

#### The impact is billions of deaths, war, and poverty

CANTRELL 2002 (Ronals, General Director of the International Rice Research Institute, Economic Perspectives, May http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0502/ijee/rice.htm)

What's so special about rice production? Put simply, no other economic activity feeds so many people, supports so many families, is so crucial to the development of so many nations, and has more impact on so much of our environment. Rice production feeds almost half the planet each day, provides most of the main income for millions of poor rural households, can topple governments, and covers 11 percent of the earth's arable area. But there is something else about rice that many may see as even more impressive and important. That is the enormous success we have had in using rice to improve the lives of world's poor and deprived. By providing rice farmers with options and new technologies -- and so helping them boost production -- extraordinary things have been achieved. In much of Asia, plentiful, cheap rice has been the propelling force behind the region's economic, political, and social stability. Rice has kept the continent nourished, employed, and peaceful. THE ASIAN MIRACLE The true Asian miracle hasn't been stunning economic development; it's been keeping people fed and societies stable. This vast continent grows -- and eats -- more than 90 percent of all the world's rice on more than 250 million tiny farms, with most Asians eating rice two or three times a day. Half of every harvest never even leaves the farm: it feeds the family that planted it. Hundreds of millions of poor people spend half to three-fourths of their incomes on rice -- and nothing else. For these people, rice anchors their precarious lives.

**Warming frontline**

***1) The environment is resilient but nuclear war turns it***

**Schweickart 10** – David Schweickart 10 is Professor at Loyola University Chicago. He holds a Ph.D. in Mathematics (University of Virginia), and a Ph.D. in Philosophy (Ohio State University). “Is Sustainable Capitalism Possible?” Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 41 (2010) 6739–6752

**It is *not true*** either **that the various ecological crises we are facing will bring about “the end of the world**.” Consider the projections of the Stern Review, the recently released report commissioned by the British Government. If nothing is done, we risk “major disruption to economic and social activity, later in this century and the next, on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars and economic depression of the first half of the 20th century.”¶ This is serious. Some **sixty million people died in World War Two. The Stern Review estimates as many as 200 million people could be** permanently **displaced by rising sea level and drought**. But **this is not “the end of the world.” Even if the effects are far worse, resulting in billions of deaths—a highly unlikely scenario**—**there would still be lots of us left**. **If three-quarters of the present population perished, that would still leave us with 1.6 billion people—the population of the planet in 1900.** ¶ **I say this** not to minimize the potentially horrific impact of relentless environmental destruction, but **to caution against exaggeration. We are not talking about thermonuclear war—which could have *extinguish***ed ***us*** as a species. (It still might.) And we shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that **millions of people** on the planet right now, **caught up in savage civil wars or terrorized by U.S. bombers** (which dropped some 100,000 lbs. of explosives on a Baghdad neighborhood during one ten-day period in January 2008—the amount the fascists used to level the Basque town of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War), **are faced with conditions more terrible than anyone here is likely to face in his or her lifetime due to environmental degradation.**

***2) No extinction from warming***

**NIPCC 11** – the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change, an international panel of nongovernment scientists and scholars, March 8, 2011, “Surviving the Unprecedented Climate Change of the IPCC,” online: http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html

On the other hand, they indicate that some **biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change** (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos et al., 2008), **and yet biotic communities have remained *remarkably resilient*** (Mayle and Power, 2008) **and in some cases thrived** (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although **the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records."**

Going on to do just that, **Willis et al. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity**." And **what emerges from those studies**, as they describe it, **"is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another**." And, **most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world."**

In concluding, **the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable *biotic resilience* to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."**

#### 3) Warming is slowing

Yulsman, 3/1/13 (Tom, co-director of the Center for Environmental Journalism at the University of Colorado, “Volcanoes, Not Pollution, Slow Global Warming,” http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/imageo/2013/03/01/volcanoes-not-pollution-slow-global-warming/, bgm)

If you pay attention to global warming skeptics, you’ve probably heard the oft-repeated meme: [global warming has stopped](http://wattsupwiththat.com/2009/09/10/svensmark-global-warming-stopped-and-a-cooling-is-beginning-enjoy-global-warming-while-it-lasts/). It’s not really true, of course. (More on that in a minute.) But there is evidence that over the past 10 or so years, the underlying rate of warming has slowed.¶ What gives?¶ One hypothesis has pointed to a 60 percent upswing in sulfur dioxide air pollution from coal burning in China and India. Sulfur dioxide aerosols act like a parasol to reflect some of the sun’s energy back into space, and thereby cause cooling.¶ But new research published today shows that sulfur dioxide aerosols spewed into the stratosphere by moderate volcanic eruptions have been a significant reason why warming has slowed.

***4) No tipping points***

**IHRR 12** (Institute of Hazard, Risk and Resilience, “Moving beyond ‘the tipping point of climate change,’” 5/4, <http://ihrrblog.org/2012/05/04/moving-beyond-the-tipping-point-of-climate-change/>)

To begin, we are now observing **climate change** solely from the period of **today** or in the relatively recent past, which **is a very small part of what came before it millions of years ago**. Antony Long found the use of tipping point to describe climate change potentially nihilistic or disempowering for thinking about climate change when in fact we should be moving the other way. Also, **tipping points may not necessarily be irreversible which is how climate change is often portrayed**. While less complex than the climate problem ozone depletion was seen as veering towards a tipping point, but **as production of CFCs ceased the ozone layer restored over time.**

***5) Not anthropogenic***

**Bast and Taylor 11** – \*CEO of the Heartland Institute, author of Rebuilding America’s Schools (1990), Why We Spend Too Much on Health Care (1992) Eco-Sanity: A Common-Sense Guide to Environmentalism (1994) Education & Capitalism (2003), Climate Change Reconsidered (2009), and The Patriot’s Toolbox (2010, rev. ed. 2011), \*\* managing editor of Environment & Climate News, Senior Fellow for The Heartland Institute, bachelors degree from Dartmouth College and law degree from the Syracuse University College of Law, (Joseph and James, “Global Warming: Not a Crisis,” The Heartland Institute, 8/2/11, http://heartland.org/ideas/global-warming-not-crisis)

Natural or Man-Made? **The** Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change **(IPCC),** an agency of the United Nations, **claims the warming that has occurred since the mid-twentieth century “is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations**” (IPCC, 2007). Many climate scientists disagree with the IPCC on this key issue. As Idso and Singer wrote in 2009, **The IPCC does not apply generally accepted methodologies to determine what fraction of current warming is natural, or how much is caused by the rise in** greenhouse gases (**GHG**). **A comparison of “fingerprints” from best available observations with the results of state-of-the-art GHG models leads to the conclusion that the (human-caused) GHG contribution is minor. This fingerprint evidence, though available, was ignored by the IPCC. The IPCC continues to undervalue the overwhelming evidence that**, on decadal and century-long time scales, **the Sun and associated atmospheric cloud effects are responsible for much of past climate change. It is** therefore **highly likely that the Sun is also a major cause of twentieth-century warming, with anthropogenic GHG making only a minor contribution**. In addition, the IPCC ignores, or addresses imperfectly, other science issues that call for discussion and explanation (Idso and Singer, 2009). Scientists who study the issue say it is impossible to tell if the recent small warming trend is natural, a continuation of the planet’s recovery from the more recent “Little Ice Age,” or unnatural, the result of human greenhouse gas emissions. **Thousands of peer-reviewed articles point to natural sources of climate variability that could explain some or even all of the warming in the second half of the twentieth century** (Idso and Singer, 2009). S. Fred Singer and Dennis Avery **documented natural climate cycles of approximately 1,500 years going back hundreds of thousands of years** (Singer and Avery, second edition 2008). It is clear from climate records that **the Earth was warmer than it is now in recorded human history, before man-made greenhouse gas emissions could have been the cause.** We know enough about how the Earth’s climate works to know that biological and physical processes remove CO2 from the atmosphere at a faster rate when concentration levels are higher and release more heat into space when temperatures rise. These feedback factors and radiative forcings are poorly modeled or missing from the computer models that alarmists use to make their forecasts. The arguments are complex, but the debate over natural versus man-made climate change is unquestionably still ongoing. The more we learn, the less likely it becomes that human greenhouse gas emissions can explain more than a small amount of the climate change we witness.

***6) Alt causes---Yellowstone, China, India***

**Kreutzer** 12-14-**10** (David, Senior Policy Analyst in Energy Economics and Climate Change at The Heritage Foundation's Center for Data Analysis, Heritage, “EPA Can’t Regulate Volcanoes or China” <http://blog.heritage.org/2010/12/14/epa-can%e2%80%99t-regulate-volcanoes-or-china/>, jj)

An ongoing study in Yellowstone National Park seeks to measure the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) as a response to geologic activity and as a possible predictor of some geologic events. A [story covering this study](http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/article_0d6cd494-ebad-502d-88bc-0cb6eea6898b.html) notes that **researchers estimate that Yellowstone emits 45,000 tons of CO2 per day. That is about 16.5 million tons per year. The** [**EPA estimates**](http://www.epa.gov/oms/consumer/f00013.htm) **that the average car emits between five and six tons of CO2 per year. So natural geologic activity in Yellowstone contributes CO2 equivalent to about 3 million cars.** The current **attempts** by the EPA **to limit CO2 emissions** would [be dangerous for the American economy](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2010/05/EPA-Global-Warming-Regs-Dangerous), but they **would have no impact on the millions of tons Yellowstone emits every year**. More seriously, the EPA **regulations would also have little impact on the billions of additional tons of CO2 that China, India, and the developing world will emit each year in the decades ahead.** As a result, the regulations would have damaging impacts on the American economy, but just like cap-and-trade restrictions, **they would have** [**negligible impact on world temperatures**](http://www.masterresource.org/2009/05/part-i-a-climate-analysis-of-the-waxman-markey-climate-bill%E2%80%94the-impacts-of-us-actions-alone/).

**Frontline – A2: Oceans**

***Massive size of oceans checks snowball and ensures slow timeframe.***

Bjørn **Lomborg,** Director, Environmental Assessment Institute, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST, 20**01**p. 189

But the **oceans are so incredibly big that our impact on them has been astoundingly insignificant** **- the oceans contain more than 1,000 billion liters of water**. The UN’s overall evaluation of the oceans concludes: “**The open sea is still relatively clean**. **Low levels** of lead, synthetic compounds and artificial radionuclides, though widely detectable, **are biologically insignificant**. Oil slicks and litter are common among sea leans, but are, at present, **a minor consequences to communities of organisms living in ocean waters.**

***Alt causes and no impact***

Alt causes --- overfishing, etc

pH variation is inevitable --- has no impact

empirically denied by underwater springs --- they’re super acidic yet calcification happens

**Ridley 12** (Matt Ridley has been a scientist, journalist and businessman. With BA and DPhil degrees from Oxford University, he worked for the Economist for nine years as science editor, Washington correspondent and American editor, before becoming a self-employed writer and businessman. He was founding chairman of the International Centre for Life in Newcastle, January 7 2012, “Taking Fears of Acid Oceans With a Grain of Salt”, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203550304577138561444464028.html>)

**Coral reefs around the world are suffering badly from overfishing and various forms of pollution. Yet many experts argue that the greatest threat to them is the acidification of the oceans from the dissolving of man-made carbon dioxide emissions. The effect of acidification, according to J.E.N. Veron,** an Australian coral scientist, **will be "nothing less than catastrophic**.... What were once thriving coral gardens that supported the greatest biodiversity of the marine realm will become red-black bacterial slime, and they will stay that way." **This is a common view**. The Natural Resources Defense Council has called ocean acidification "the scariest environmental problem you've never heard of." Sigourney Weaver, who narrated a film about the issue, said that "the scientists are freaked out." The head of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration calls it global warming's "equally evil twin." **But do the scientific data support such alarm? Last month scientists** at San Diego's Scripps Institution of Oceanography and other authors **published a study showing how much the pH level** (measuring alkalinity versus acidity) **varies naturally between parts of the ocean and at different times of the day, month and year. "On both a monthly and annual scale, even the most stable open ocean sites see pH changes many times larger than the annual rate of acidification**," say the authors of the study, adding that because good instruments to measure ocean pH have only recently been deployed, "**this variation has been under-appreciated." Over coral reefs, the pH decline between dusk and dawn is almost half as much as the decrease in average pH expected over the next 100 years. *The noise is greater than the signal.* Another recent study**, by scientists from the U.K., Hawaii and Massachusetts, **concluded that "marine and freshwater assemblages have always experienced variable pH conditions," and that "in many freshwater lakes, pH changes that are orders of magnitude greater than those projected for the 22nd-century oceans can occur over periods of hours." This adds to other hints that the ocean-acidification problem may have been exaggerated. For a start, the ocean is alkaline and in no danger of becoming acid** (despite headlines like that from Reuters in 2009: "Climate Change Turning Seas Acid"). **If the average pH of the ocean drops to 7.8 from 8.1 by 2100 as predicted, it will still be well above seven, the neutral point where alkalinity becomes acidity. The central concern is that lower pH will make it harder for corals, clams and other "calcifier" creatures to make calcium carbonate skeletons and shells. Yet this concern also may be overstated. Off Papua New Guinea** and the Italian island of Ischia, where natural carbon-dioxide bubbles from volcanic vents make the sea less alkaline, and off the Yucatan, **where underwater springs make seawater actually acidic, studies have shown that at least some kinds of calcifiers still thrive—at least as far down as pH 7.8.** In a recent experiment in the Mediterranean, reported in Nature Climate Change, **corals and mollusks were transplanted to lower pH sites, where they proved "able to calcify and grow at even faster than normal rates when exposed to the high [carbon-dioxide] levels** projected for the next 300 years." In any case, freshwater mussels thrive in Scottish rivers, where the pH is as low as five. **Laboratory experiments find that more marine creatures thrive than suffer when carbon dioxide lowers the pH level to 7.8. This is because the carbon dioxide dissolves mainly as bicarbonate, which many calcifiers use as raw material for carbonate. Human beings have indeed placed marine ecosystems under terrible pressure, but the chief culprits are overfishing and pollution.** By comparison, **a very slow reduction in the alkalinity of the oceans, well within the range of natural variation, is a modest threat, and it certainly *does not merit apocalyptic headlines.***

### Bio-d

***Biodiversity resilient – ecosystems will quickly recover from damage***

**McDermott** 20**09** (Mat, Editor for Business and Energy sections; Master Degree from NYU’s Center for Global Affairs in environment and energy policy. May, 27, 2009: “Good News: Most Ecosystems Can Recover in One Lifetime from Human-Induced or Natural Disturbance”; <http://www.treehugger.com/natural-sciences/good-news-most-ecosystems-can-recover-in-one-lifetime-from-human-induced-or-natural-disturbance.html>)

**There's a reason the phrase "let nature take its course" exists**: New research done at the Yale University School of Forestry & Environmental Science reinforces the idea that **ecosystems are quiet resilient and can rebound from pollution and environmental degradation**. Published in the journal PLoS ONE, the study shows that **most damaged ecosystems worldwide can recover within a single lifetime**, if the source of pollution is removed and restoration work done. The analysis found that **on average forest ecosystems can recover in 42 years, while in takes only about 10 years for the ocean bottom to recover**. If an area has seen multiple, interactive disturbances, it can take on average 56 years for recovery. In general, most ecosystems take longer to recover from human-induced disturbances than from natural events, such as hurricanes.

To reach these recovery averages, the researchers looked at data from peer-reviewed studies over the past 100 years on the rate of ecosystem recovery once the source of pollution was removed.

Interestingly, the researchers found that **it appears that the rate at which an ecosystem recovers may be independent of its degraded condition: Aquatic systems may recover more quickly than, say, a forest, because the species and organisms that live in that ecosystem turn over more rapidly than in the forest.**

As to what this all means, Oswald Schmitz, professor of ecology at Yale and report co-author, says that this analysis shows that an increased effort to restore damaged ecosystems is justified, and that:

Restoration could become a more important tool in the management portfolio of conservation organizations that are entrusted to protect habitats on landscapes.

We recognize that **humankind has and will continue to actively domesticate nature to meet its own needs**. The message of our paper is that **recovery is possible and can be rapid for many ecosystems**, giving much hope for a transition to sustainable management of global ecosystems.

### Ag

***No droughts impact***

**Idso & Idso**, June 15th, 20**11** (Craig D, PhD, Sherwood B, CO2 Science, “Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Carbon Dioxide and Earth’s Future Pursuing the Prudent Path” <http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/prudentpath/prudentpath.pdf>, jj)

**So with megadroughts occurring at cooler-than-present temperatures and with no-analog megadroughts occurring at warmer-than-present temperatures, one must consider the possibility that something other than temperature is the driving force behind their occurrence. And there are a number of scientists who feel that that “something other” is solar variability**, such as Black et al. (1999), who stated that “small changes in solar output may influence Atlantic variability on centennial time scales,” Yu and Ito (1999), who felt forced “to consider solar variability as the major cause of century-scale drought frequency in the northern Great Plains,” Dean and Schwalb (2000), who concluded “**it seems reasonable that the cycles in aridity and eolian activity over the past several thousand years recorded in the sediments of lakes in the northern Great Plains might also have a solar connection,**” Verschuren et al. (2000), who indicated that **variations in solar activity “may have contributed to decade-scale rainfall variability in equatorial east Africa**,” Hodell et al. (2001), who wrote that “**a significant component of century-scale variability in Yucatan droughts is explained by solar forcing,**” Mensing et al. (2004), who concluded that “**changes in solar irradiance may be a possible mechanism influencing century-scale drought in the western Great Basin” of the United States**, Asmerom et al. (2007), who suggest that a solar link to Holocene climate operates “through changes in the Walker circulation and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation and El Niño-Southern Oscillation systems of the tropical Pacific Ocean,” Garcin et al. (2007), who emphasize that the positive correlation of Lake Masoko hydrology with various solar activity proxies “implies a forcing of solar activity on the atmospheric circulation and thus on the regional climate of [a] part of East Africa,” and Springer et al. (2008), who say their findings “corroborate works indicating that millennial-scale solar-forcing is responsible for droughts and ecosystem changes in central and eastern North America,” In one final and exceptionally perceptive paper dealing with North American droughts, Cook et al. (2009) wrote that “IPCC Assessment Report 4 model projections suggest that the subtropical dry zones of the world will both dry and expand poleward in the future due to greenhouse warming,” and that “the US southwest is particularly vulnerable in this regard and model projections indicate a progressive drying there out to the end of the 21st century.” However, they then wrote that “**the USA has been in a state of drought over much of the West for about 10 years now,” and that “while severe, this turn of the century drought has not yet clearly exceeded the severity of two exceptional droughts in the 20th century**,” so that “while the coincidence between the turn of the century drought and projected drying in the Southwest is cause for concern, **it is premature to claim that the model projections are correct**.” We begin to understand this fact when we compare the “turn of the century drought” with the two “exceptional droughts” that preceded it by a few decades. Based on gridded instrumental Palmer Drought Severity indices for tree ring reconstruction that extend back to 1900, Cook et al. calculated that the turn-of-the-century drought had its greatest Drought Area Index value of 59% in the year 2002, while the Great Plains/Southwest drought covered 62% of the US in its peak year of 1954, and the Dust Bowl drought covered 77% of the US in 1934. In terms of drought duration, however, things are not quite as clear. Stahle et al. (2007) estimated that the first two droughts lasted for 12 and 14 years, respectively; Seager et al. (2005) estimated them to have lasted for 8 and 10 years; and Andreadis et al. (2005) estimated them to have lasted for 7 and 8 years, yielding means of 9 and 11 years for the two exceptional droughts, which durations are to be compared to 10 or so years for the turn-of-the-century drought, which again makes the latter drought not unprecedented compared to those that occurred earlier in the 20th century. **Real clarity, however, comes when the turn-of-the-century drought is compared to droughts of the prior millennium.** Cook et al. write that “**perhaps the most famous example is the ‘Great Drouth’** (sic) of AD 1276-1299 described by A.E. Douglass (1929, 1935).” **Yet this 24-year drought was eclipsed by the 38-year drought that was found by Weakley** (1965) **to have occurred in Nebraska from AD 1276 to 1313**, which Cook et al. say “may have been a more prolonged northerly extension of the ‘Great Drouth’.” **But even these multi-decade droughts truly pale in comparison to the “two extraordinary droughts discovered by Stine** (1994) **in California that lasted more than two centuries before AD 1112 and more than 140 years before AD 1350**.” And each of these megadroughts, as Cook et al. describe them, occurred, in their words, “in the so-called Medieval Warm Period.” And they add that “**all of this happened prior to the strong greenhouse gas warming that began with the Industrial Revolution** [authors’ italics].” In further ruminating about these facts in the “Conclusions and Recommendations” section of their paper, Cook et al. again state that **the medieval megadroughts “occurred without any need for enhanced radiative forcing due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas forcing**.” And, therefore, they go on to say “**there is no guarantee that the response of the climate system to greenhouse gas forcing will result in megadroughts of the kind experienced by North America in the pas**t**.” In summation, these and many other studies conducted at various locations throughout North America -**- Laird et al. (1998), Woodhouse and Overpeck (1998), Cronin et al. (2000), Fritz et al. (2000), Hidalgo et al. (2000), Benson et al. (2002), Knapp et al. (2002), Ni et al. (2002), Gray et al. (2003), Gedalof et al. (2004), Gray et al. (2004a,b), Mauget (2004), Mensing et al. (2004), Quiring (2004), Daniels and Knox (2005), Forman et al. (2005), Shapley et al. (2005), Rasmussen et al. (2006), Malamud-Roam et al. (2006), Tian et al. (2006), Woodhouse et al. (2006), Woodhouse and Lukas (2006), MacDonald and Tingstad (2007), Meko et al. (2007), MacDonald et al. (2008) and Springer et al. (2008) -- **dispute the climate-alarmist claim that warming must always result in more frequent and more severe drought, while studies conducted on other continents have led to the same conclusion**. However, to not unnecessarily lengthen this section of our report, we conclude it by merely providing the journal references to some of these studies in the following paragraph.

### NPT Alt-Cause---1NC

#### NPT credibility is high

CFR 13 – Council on Foreign Relations, 6/25/13, “The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” http://www.cfr.org/arms-control-disarmament-and-nonproliferation/global-nuclear-nonproliferation-regime/p18984

But nonproliferation as an international issue has recently benefited from revived attention. The United States and Russia signed a legally binding replacement agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expired in December 2009. New START entered into force in February 2011. President Obama has made nuclear issues a centerpiece of his international agenda, convening a high-level Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010, dedicating serious political effort to strengthen the NPT at the NPT Review in May 2010, and building consensus in the UN Security Council and elsewhere for new economic sanctions targeting Iran. The Obama administration has also pledged to win U.S. Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense doctrine. Recently, it initiated discussions with the Pentagon about potential deep cuts to the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Yet even with these renewed efforts, major challenges and threats remain, namely with regard to Iran and North Korea.

Establishing a normative and legal framework: Fairly comprehensive, but with significant gaps

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is the core component of the global nonproliferation regime, and establishes a comprehensive, legally binding framework based on three principles: (1) states without nuclear weapons as of 1967—a year before the treaty opened for signature—agree not to acquire them; (2) the five states known to have tested nuclear weapons as of 1967—the nuclear weapon states (NWS)—agree to not assist other states in acquiring them and to move toward eventual disarmament; and (3) the nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS) are guaranteed access to civilian nuclear technology and energy development.

NNWS are subject to safeguards to ensure that materials and technology from civilian activities are not diverted to weapons programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the implementing body for the NPT, monitoring compliance with the treaty and assisting NNWS in developing civilian technology. Although the scope and mandate of the NPT and the IAEA are relatively broad, there is a critical gap in coverage: 189 states are party to the treaty, but three of the world's nine nuclear powers—India, Israel, and Pakistan—have never joined, and a fourth—North Korea—withdrew in 2003. Thus, even if enforcement of the existing regime were not an issue, nearly half of the world's nuclear-armed states are excluded from its provisions.

By design, the NPT does not address proliferation by nonstate actors. After the September 11 attacks, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1540, a legally binding instrument requiring all UN member states to enact and enforce measures to prevent nonstate actors from acquiring WMD. Many states in the UN General Assembly, however, have argued that the UNSC did not have the authority to impose a binding resolution in this area. Partly as a result, some states have resisted cooperation with the 1540 Committee established to oversee implementation of the resolution. The UNSC, however, recommitted itself to1540 in April 2011 with Resolution 1977, extending the mandate of the 1540 Committee by ten years. In addition to resistance facing the implementation of Resolution 1540, the legally binding Convention on Nuclear Terrorism—which defines nuclear terrorism and requires international cooperation to prevent and punish such acts—had only seventy-nine parties as of June 2012.

Moreover, two important elements of the nonproliferation regime have never come into effect, largely because of resistance by the United States and other nuclear weapon states. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996 has been signed by 183 countries but cannot enter into force until all forty-four states with significant military or civilian nuclear capacity ratify it. China, India, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States have not yet done so. Efforts to conclude a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) to ban the production of weapons-grade material have also stalled. The United States has been criticized for blocking progress on both issues, but the Obama administration has signaled that it will move to again ask the Senate's advice and consent on ratification of the CTBT (the body rejected the treaty in 1999) and to revive negotiations on an FMCT with verification measures.

A review of the NPT in 2010 concluded with modest success. The final outcome document recommits signatories to the principles of the treaty, provides some specific action plans for nonproliferation and disarmament, and calls for the elimination of nuclear weapons from the Middle East through the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the region. The need for unanimous agreement resulted in some new U.S. initiatives, such as stronger verification requirements, being eliminated from the final document.

Preventing proliferation by state actors: Poor record on compliance Poor compliance, continued risk of breakout

Despite the broad legal coverage of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), a string of failures since the early 1990s have highlighted the ineffectiveness of existing nonproliferation instruments to deter would-be nuclear weapon states. In theory, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can refer countries that do not comply with the NPT to the UN Security Council (UNSC), which in turn can impose sanctions or other punitive measures. In practice, however, political calculations have often caused deadlock at the UNSC, enabling nuclear rogues such as Iran to defy successive, fairly weak UN sanctions resolutions with virtual impunity. The IAEA did however, refer Syria to the UNSC in June 2011 due to an "absence of confidence that Syria's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes."

Another problem is the lack of adequate verification and enforcement mechanisms available to the IAEA, whose budget, intelligence capabilities, and technological resources fall far short of what would be needed to detect, prevent, or punish NPT violations. In 2010, the IAEA's inspections budget was approximately $164 million. Not surprisingly, even discounting nuclear facilities the IAEA does not have access to, such as those in Iran and North Korea, nuclear materials have reached the black market from installations under IAEA safeguards, namely from several in Pakistan. One positive step has been the adoption of IAEA Additional Protocols, which strengthen the agency's inspections mandate and is in force in 115 countries, including all five recognized nuclear weapon states and, as of 2009, India. Nonetheless, more than half of all NPT member states—including Syria and Iran (which has ratified but not implemented the protocol)—have yet to agree to the toughened inspections regime. A review of the NPT in 2010 failed to reach consensus on U.S. efforts to make the additional protocols mandatory.

Other multilateral, informal organizations also play a role in implementing and enforcing the NPT, notably the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Made up of forty-six advanced nuclear states, the NSG prohibits the transfer of civilian nuclear materials or technology to states outside the NPT, or those that do not fully comply with IAEA safeguards. However, the NSG's export bans are not legally binding, and members (including the United States, Russia, and China) have taken advantage of the weakness of the NSG regime to pursue civilian nuclear projects with non-NPT members.

#### Their Mueller ev is about the NPT, not preemptive counterprolif by force --- proven by CX

John Mueller 8, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State, July 16, 2008, “THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF EFFORTS TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION,” online: http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSA08.pdf

Nonproliferation efforts worldwide also hamper worldwide economic development by increasing the effective costs of developing nuclear energy--sometimes even making them prohibitive for some countries. As countries grow, they require ever increasing amounts of power. Any measure that limits their ability to acquire this vital commodity--or increases its price--effectively slows economic growth and essentially kills people by reducing the gains in life expectancy commonly afforded by economic development. The Non-Proliferation Treaty specifically guarantees to signing nonnuclear countries "the fullest possible exchange of technology" for the development of peaceful nuclear power. However, as Richard Betts points out, this rationale has been undermined by the development of a "nuclear suppliers cartel" which has worked to "cut off trade in technology for reprocessing plutonium or enriching uranium," thereby reducing the NPT to "a simple demand to the nuclear weapons have-nots to remain so."49

**General – New Plant Construction Fails – Frontline**

***Nuclear expansion is structurally impossible:***

***1) NG prices will be low for decades – makes nuclear impossible***

**Crawford, 7/24/2012** (Jonathan, SNL Generation Markets Week: “Former Senator, DOE Official Urge Continued Federal Support for Nuke Support,” LexisNexis, ts)

Beyond these recommendations, the report called for federal support to assist a nuclear energy industry besieged by low natural gas prices. **Together with depressed electricity demand and heightened safety and security requirements, low natural gas prices have led to the suspension in the past few years of up to 20, or more, proposed reactors.** **The report said the ability to tap vast shale gas reserves through hydraulic fracturing is likely to keep natural gas prices low for decades**. **This, in turn, is expected to make financing for new reactors "very difficult for at least the next decade, if not longer**," it said. "Market signals alone are unlikely to result in a diverse fuel mix, so helping to maintain and improve a range of electricity supply options remains a role for federal policy. In particular, U.S. policy should be aimed at helping to preserve nuclear energy as an important technology option for near or longer-term deployment," the report said**. The hurdles presented by low natural gas prices and tepid growth in electricity demand are compounded by an aging nuclear fleet**. According to the report, 73 reactors, representing well over half of the nation's reactor fleet, have received a 20-year extension on top of their original 40-year operating license, while 13 additional license-extension applications are under review. The report estimates that in 2029 and thereafter, about one-third of the fleet will reach its 60-year operation limit, with a "significant fraction" likely to retire and be replaced by newer-generation resources.

***2) Supply chain bottlenecks, skills atrophy and labor shortage***

**Squassoni ‘09**

Sharon Squassoni is a senior associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment and has been analyzing nonproliferation, arms control, and national security issues for two decades. Her research focuses on nuclear nonproliferation and national security. Ms. Squassoni came to Carnegie from the Congressional Research Service (CRS). As a specialist in weapons of mass destruction proliferation, she provided expert analyses on proliferation trends and expert advice on policy and legislation to members of the United States Congress. Prior to joining CRS, she served for nine years in the executive branch, beginning her government career as a nuclear safeguards expert in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Her last position at the State Department was director of Policy Coordination in the Nonproliferation Bureau. Squassoni has contributed to journals, magazines, and books on nuclear proliferation and defense. Recent relevant publications include: “The Iranian Nuclear Program,” a chapter in Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy (University of Georgia Press, 2009),“Looking Back: The 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act,” Arms Control Today, December 2008, and “Risks and Realities: The ‘New Nuclear Revival,’” Arms Control Today, May 2007.

2009, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nuclear Energy: Rebirth or Resuscitation? <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/nuclear_energy_rebirth_resuscitation.pdf>, jj

**Assuming that all these significant hurdles could be surmounted, could the nuclear industry infrastructure sustain the kinds of expansion envisioned?** In the last twenty years, there have been fewer than ten new reactor construction starts in any given year worldwide. Table 8, reproduced from the Power Reactor Information System of the IAEA, shows annual construction starts and connections to the grid from 1955 to 2006. A 2007 Keystone Center report pointed out that to build 700 GW of nuclear power capacity “would require the industry to return immediately to the most rapid period of growth experienced in the past (1981– 1990) and sustain this rate of growth for 50 years.”72 Even China’s command economy is only envisioning building four reactors a year through 2020. Some analysts are skeptical that this is possible, and that such growth could be accomplished with manufacturing safety standards that others would find acceptable. **A significant expansion will narrow bottlenecks in the global supply chain, which today include ultra-heavy forgings, large manufactured components, engineering, and craft and skilled construction labor**. **All these constraints are exacerbated by the lack of recent experience in construction and by aging labor forces**. Though these may not present problems for limited growth, **they will certainly present problems for doubling or tripling reactor capacity**.73 **In the United States, the problems may be particularly acute.** The chief operating officer of Exelon told a nuclear industry conference in early 2008 that **the lack of any recent U.S. nuclear construction experience, the atrophying of U.S. nuclear manufacturing infrastructure, production bottlenecks created by an increase in worldwide demand, and an aging labor force could all prove to be constraints on major expansion**.74 **Lack of construction experience translates into delays, which mean much higher construction costs**. For example, AREVA has had trouble pouring concrete for its new reactors in Olkiluoto, Finland, and Flammanville, France. The eighteen-month delay caused by faulty construction of Olkiluoto-3 was estimated to cost 1.5 billion in overruns in a project with a fixed cost of 3 billion.75 This was before a fire occurred in July 2008 that probably caused further delays.76 In an analysis for a nuclear industry conference, the consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton prioritized fifteen different risks in new reactor construction. The most serious ones entailed engineering, procurement and construction performance, resource shortages, and price escalation.77 **The atrophying of nuclear manufacturing infrastructure is significant** not only in the United States but also **worldwide**, except in Japan. The ultraheavy forgings for reactor pressure vessels and steam generators are the most significant chokepoint. Japan Steel Works (JSW) is currently the only company worldwide with the capacity to make the ultralarge forgings (using 600-ton ingots) favored by new reactor designs. Other companies—such as Sfarsteel (formerly Creusot Forge) in France and Doosan Industry in South Korea—have smaller capacities. The purchase of Creusot Forge by AREVA in 2005 means that Creusot’s former customers reportedly are shifting to JSW, lengthening the twoyear waiting list. According to World Nuclear Industry Status 2007, AREVA has stated that . . . the annual capacity at the Chalon plant is limited to 12 steam generators plus “a certain number of vessel heads” and small equipment, or the equivalent of between 2 and 2.5 units per year, if it did manufacture equipment for new plants only. In reality, the Chalon capacities are booked out, in particular for plant life extension measures—steam generator and vessel head replacement—also for the U.S. market. In July 2007 AREVA announced that the heavy forgings it had ordered in 2006 from JSW for a US-EPR had begun to arrive at its Chalon facility. AREVA claims that the order of forgings made the company the only vendor to have “material in hand to support certainty of online generation in 2015.”78 Recently, AREVA negotiated with JSW to ensure that its orders through 2016 would be filled. AREVA also reportedly invested in JSW to help with the costs of expansion. According to JSW officials, it now produces 5.5 sets of forgings per year; this will expand to 8.5 sets in 2010. Even then, nuclear forgings at JSW compete with orders for forgings and assembly from other heavy industries—for example, oil and gas industries, which can be more profitable. In time, new suppliers are likely to emerge to support nuclear expansion. According to JSW officials, the availability of alternative ultraheavy forging supply is not necessarily a question of manufacturing capabilities but rather of business decisions to focus on more profitable industrial projects. Currently, Toshiba reportedly can produce one nuclear steam supply system (the “nuclear” part of the reactor that includes the reactor pressure vessels, moisture separator/reheater, steam generator, steam turbine generators, fuel assemblies, and so on) per year, and Doosan Heavy Industries in South Korea can produce one and a half systems per year.79 Doosan will assemble reactor pressure vessels for the four Westinghouse reactors (AP-1000s) under construction in China. Russia’s Uralmash-Izhora Group (or OMZ) reportedly stated in October 2007 that it would double its production of large and ultralarge forgings for the VVER-440 and VVER-1000 pressurized water reactors from two to four per year. However, it is not clear whether these reactors have certification from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, which can take five to ten years and is desirable for exports.80 **A few factors will influence how quickly and successfully nuclear reactor construction capacity could expand: technical challenges, quality assurance and certification requirements, and the uncertainty of new business**. In forging, **there are considerable technical challenges in melting, forging, heat treatment, and machining operations that new entrants into the ultralarge forging business would need to overcome**. 81 Quality assurance could play an important role in whether or not new ultralarge forging capabilities succeed. According to Nuclear Regulatory Commission chairman Dale Klein, quality assurance by Chinese firms in producing other nuclear-related components has been a concern.82 Finally, the nuclear industry appears wary of expanding too quickly, lest expansion not proceed as planned. JSW suffered financially ten years ago when Germany canceled its orders for new nuclear power plants.83 China was set to open new ultraheavy forging plants in 2008, to produce possibly as many as six sets per year. If its own production takes up four per year, this could allow the Chinese to supply two others for reactor projects abroad through 2020. In the meantime, it is possible to use smaller-capacity forgings, but this means more components, with more weld seams, and therefore will require more safety inspections. Here again, time is money, and one estimate is that the cost of shutdowns for inspections or other reasons is $1 million a day.84 In addition to the major nuclear reactor vendors, supporting industries will also either need to be rebuilt or recertified to nuclear standards. In the United States, the decline of supporting industries is significant. In the 1980s, the United States had 400 nuclear suppliers and 900 holders of N-stamp certificates from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.85 Today, there are just 80 suppliers and 200 N-stamp holders.86 In addition, certain commodities used in reactor construction may also present supply problems, such as alloy steel, concrete, and nickel. The costs of these inputs, according to Moody’s, have risen dramatically in recent years.

***3) Peak uranium***

**Tech Review ‘09**

Technology Review – Published by MIT, 11-17, The Coming Nuclear Crisis <http://www.technologyreview.com/view/416325/the-coming-nuclear-crisis/>, jj

Perhaps **the most worrying problem is the misconception that uranium is plentiful**. **The world's nuclear plants today eat through some 65,000 tons of uranium each year**. **Of this, the mining industry supplies about 40,000 tons. The rest comes from secondary sources such as civilian and military stockpiles, reprocessed fuel and re-enriched uranium**. "But without access to the military stocks, the **civilian western uranium stocks will be exhausted by 2013**, concludes Dittmar. **It's not clear how the shortfall can be made up since nobody seems to know where the mining industry can look for more.** That means **countries that rely on uranium imports** such as Japan and many western countries **will face uranium .shortages**, possibly **as soon as 2013**. **Far from being the secure source of energy that many governments are basing their future energy needs on, nuclear power looks decidedly rickety. But what of new technologies such as fission breeder reactors which generate fuel and nuclear fusion? Dittmar is pessimistic** about fission breeders. "**Their huge construction costs, their poor safety records and their inefficient performance give little reason to believe that they will ever become commercially significant,**" he says. And the future looks even worse for nuclear fusion: "**No matter how far into the future we may look, nuclear fusion as an energy source is even less probable than large-scale breeder reactors."** Dittmar paints a bleak future for the countries betting on nuclear power. And his analysis doesn't even touch on issues such as safety, the proliferation of nuclear technology and the disposal of nuclear waste. **The message if you live in one of these countries is to stock up on firewood and candles.**

***4) Waste siting blocks solvency – nuclear development is illegal in many states and regulatory issues will prevent reactor construction***

**HOLT 7** -CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, (Mark, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS SYMPOSIUM; SUBJECT: "AMERICAN NUCLEAR ENERGY IN A GLOBALIZED ECONOMY" SESSION II: WHAT IS THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY?; June 18, L/n

**We talked a little bit about nuclear waste** last night. **Obviously, a big factor** **too in the viability of nuclear power, primarily because a number of states still do have laws on the books that unless there's a repository for nuclear waste** that -- and including -- and California being the notable one -- **that they will not allow a nuclear power plant to be built**. So that factor is out there. I think the Keystone report they do make the point that **most experts do not see it as a major physical problem dealing with the physical waste** -- at least in the short term. So if there's no Yucca Mountain, if Yucca Mountain is delayed for decades even, that's a relatively short period of time as far as interim storage goes. **It's not really a technical and safety issue,** but the concern about surface storage being permanent, meaning -- we talked also last night about the millions of years. Once you get into that time frame, obviously, surface storage is not nearly as secure as a repository. So that would be a concern there. **But as far as the near-term policymaking issue, it often is more of a legal and regulatory problem than perhaps a real physical safety problem.**

### Nuclear no solve warming

***1) Nuclear energy doesn’t solve warming --- too slow and doesn’t address all emissions***

**Squassoni ‘09**

Sharon Squassoni, Senior Associate, Nuclear Policy Program, 12-10-09, Who's Right?: Climate Change Experts Debate Nuclear Energy <http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/12/10/who-s-right-climate-change-experts-debate-nuclear-energy/1lii>, jj

First, Squassoni questions the practicality of switching to nuclear energy. **Building sufficient nuclear capacity would take many years, while the need to reduce *g*reen*h*ouse *g*asses is immediate**, she says. She argues **the key to reducing energy consumption lies not just in replacing fuel but in improving energy efficiency.** **Switching to nuclear power would not immediately address emissions from other sources, such as cars, homes, businesses and industries.** While she agrees that a sense of panic won’t speed the process of replacing fossil fuels with nuclear power, Squassoni believes **the climate change issue is urgent enough to require faster solutions —** the leaders of the G8 countries have set 2015 as the year when carbon dioxide emissions cannot rise any higher. She also argues that **private financial investors have shown little interest in funding the high cost of nuclear plants and are more focused on smaller renewable projects that offer a faster return**. In addition, the hazards of nuclear waste and the possible proliferation of nuclear fuel for weapons are major concerns. **Efficiency**, she says, **is the fastest and safest way to reduce emissions.** Finally, **even if the world had 30 years to bring carbon dioxide emissions down, immediate action still would be the most methodical and logical approach**, Squassoni argues. **Since free markets favor coal as the cheapest energy source, governments still would have to act as soon as possible to make fast and low-cost changes that offer the least overall risk.** **Energy efficiency is not an abstract concept, but one that consumers easily can see in homes and offices. Ways to use less energy are not hard to find and are the fastest routes to reducing emissions.** Also, **using a mix of energy sources is better than relying on a single source, such as nuclear power**. Even if **nuclear energy** is included in the mechanism that rewards developed countries for investing in clean technologies in developing countries, it likely **would be too expensive even for the wealthiest of developed countries.**

***2) Nuclear power plant construction and uranium mining emits as much carbon as a natural gas plant***

**Sovacool, 07** - Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia Tech (Benjamin, “What's Really Wrong With Nuclear Power?,” 11/30,

<http://scitizen.com/stories/Future-Energies/2007/11/What-s-Really-Wrong-With-Nuclear-Power/>)

Third and finally, **nuclear power plants are not carbon neutral. The Oxford Research Group concludes that the nuclear fuel cycle is responsible for emitting 84 to 122 grams of carbon dioxide per every kWh, mostly from uranium mining, plant construction, and plant decommissioning**. The report also notes that **these emissions are around half of that as natural gas plants (so we are talking about some serious carbon).**

In addition, the International Atomic Energy Agency notes that **uranium is getting harder to mine, meaning that** **the carbon emissions related to nuclear will get worse as more uranium gets depleted, not better**. This is because **mining uranium ores of relatively low grades and greater depth is much more energy intensive**. If world nuclear generating share remains what it is today, the Oxford Research Group concludes that **by 2050 nuclear power would generate as much carbion dioxide per kWh as a comparable gas-fired power station**.

***3) Nuclear power produces no net energy – the difficulty of uranium extraction means CO2 emissions are the same***

**Caldicott, 6** – Founder and President of the Nuclear Policy Research Institute

(Helen, Nuclear Power is not the answer, pg. viii-ix)

**While currently the creation of nuclear electricity emits only one-third the amount of CO**2 **emitted from a similar-sized, conventional gas generator, this is a transitory statistic**. Over several decades, **as the concentration of available uranium ore declines, more fossil fuels will be required to extract the ore from less­ concentrated ore veins**. **Within ten to twenty years,** **nuclear reac­tors will produce no net energy because of the massive amounts of fossil fuel that will be necessary to mine and to enrich the remain­ing poor grades of uranium.** (The nuclear power industry contends that large quantities of uranium can be obtained by .reprocessing radioactive spent fuel. However, this process is extremely expen­sive; medically dangerous for nuclear workers, and releases large amounts of radioactive material into the air and water; it is there­fore not a pragmatic consideration.) By extension, **the operation of nuclear power plants will then produce exactly the same amounts of greenhouse gases and air pollution as standard power plants.** Contrary to the nuclear industry claims, **smoothly running nuclear power plants are also not emission free**. Government regula­tions allow **nuclear plants "routinely**" to **emit hundreds of thousands of curies of radioactive gases and other radioactive elements into the environment every year.** Thousands of tons of solid radioactive waste are presently accumulating in the cooling pools beside the 103 operating nuclear plants in the United States and hundreds of others throughout the world. **This waste contains extremely toxic elements that will inevitably pollute the environment and human food chains, a legacy that will lead to epidemics of cancer, leukemia, and genetic disease in populations living near nuclear power plants or radioactive waste facilities for many generations to come.**

## Great power war

### Frontline

***Yes great power wars***

**Ferguson ’08** (Niall, Harvard University, Spring, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, “Earning from history? Financial markets and the approach of world wars” project muse, jj)

Nevertheless, **it would be a mistake to conclude from all this that the potential for a major geopolitical shock is nonexistent**. The same report [End Page 434] goes on to observe that “**a larger portion of the global community of states is involved** [in **war] now than in any other time in the past six decades**. And the historic low of 19 ongoing armed conflicts in 2004 was followed by an increase to 25 in 2005. . . . Moreover, an unusually large number of ‘new’ conflicts began in 2005–2006.”[12](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.wayne.edu/journals/brookings_papers_on_economic_activity/v2008/2008.1.ferguson.html" \l "f12) The most likely theater for a major conflict, the Middle East, is the world’s principal source of oil. **An escalation and spread of Iraq’s internecine strife, or an American confrontation with Iran over the latter’s nuclear program, would have a substantial and immediate impact** on already stretched energy prices. Likewise, **the possibility cannot wholly be ruled out of a military clash between the United States and China over Taiwan**, if the People’s Republic were to attempt to use force to snuff out Taipei’s aspirations to formal independence. Given its present military supremacy, the United States plainly could not lose such a war, but the economic consequences would be highly disruptive, in view of the continuing reliance of many Chinese exporters on the American market, and the continuing benefit derived by the United States from China’s accumulation of dollar-denominated bonds and bills in its international reserves. Finally, **one unintended geopolitical consequence of** **globalization has been to enrich a number of states that cannot be regarded as innately friendly to the United States: not only fundamentalist Iran but also Communist China, authoritarian Russia, and populist Venezuela.**

***Even conventional strikes would unintentionally spark a global nuclear exchange.***

**Drum**, Staff Writer, **‘10**

[Kevin, Mother Jones, Smart, Fearless Journalism, “The Non-Nuclear Nuke,” 4/23, http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/04/non-nuclear-nuke AD: 4/23/10]

For years the Pentagon has been wrestling with a problem: when you get intel telling you that a high-value terrorist has been located somewhere, how do you take him out? They aren't likely to stick around at the target location for long, so you need something that can (a) get there quickly and (b) cause a lot of damage once it does. Bombers and cruise missiles take hours. Local forces, even if they're in place, aren't always lethal enough. What to do? One answer is to use ICBMs. Not nuclear-tipped ICBMs, but missiles with a big conventional payload. The Obama administration is apparently planning to revive this idea, and Noah Shachtman explains why it's crazy: Over and over again, the Bush administration tried to push the idea of these **conventional ICBMs**. Over and over again, Congress refused to provide the funds for it. The reason was pretty simple: those anti-terror missiles **look and fly exactly like the nuclear missiles we’d launch at Russia or China, in the event of Armageddon.** “For many minutes during their flight patterns, these missiles might appear to be headed towards targets in these nations,” a congressional study notes. **That could have world-changing consequences. “The launch of such a missile,”** then-Russian president Vladimir Putin said in a state of the nation address after the announcement of the Bush-era plan, “**could provoke a full-scale counterattack using strategic nuclear forces.”** I guess I can imagine possible ways to fix this. I just can't imagine any good ways. **Even if the Russians and Chinese and Indians and Pakistanis are provided with some reliable way of identifying non-nuclear ICBM launches, they could never be sure that the United States hadn't figured out some way to fool them**. So they'd always be on a short fuse. And do we really want to make that particular fuse even shorter than it already is? Sometimes bad ideas are just bad ideas. This really seems like one of them.

***Yes extinction—consensus of recent studies—Robock indicts don’t apply***

**Farnsworth 2011** – editor and a contributor for Arms Control Now (2/18, Tim, Arms Control Now, “Thinking Existentially about the Worldwide Threat”, <http://armscontrolnow.org/2011/02/18/thinking-existentially-about-the-worldwide-threat/>, WEA)

A **panel of scientists** provided a useful update today on the latest thinking about the climatic consequences of nuclear weapons use. The presentation provided a grim reminder that the nuclear Sword of Damocles still hangs over all nations of the earth, nuclear and non-nuclear powers alike – notwithstanding the significant achievement of New START ratification by the United States and Russia.¶ At the annual meeting in Washington of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Georgiy Stenchikov (King Abdullah University of Science and Technology), Luke Oman (NASA Goddard Space Flight Center), and Michael Mills (National Center for Atmospheric Research) **shared results** of their research, benefiting from **extensive studies** of related phenomenon in recent decades, such as massive forest fires, volcanic eruptions, and oil well fires. **Unlike the “nuclear winter” studies of the 1980s**, which focused on the impact of an all-out US-Soviet nuclear exchange, the latest research looked at the environment effects of a more **limited nuclear war** between India and Pakistan.¶ The speakers reported on their estimates of the environmental consequences resulting from theoretical detonation of 100 15kt-yield nuclear weapons over Indian and Pakistani cities. In such an exchange, millions of tons of soot in the smoke plumes from urban fires would be lofted into the stratosphere, circulating around the earth within days, but adversely affecting the ozone layer, world temperatures, and precipitation for years.

***Nuclear war accelerates warming***

**Jacobson 8** \*Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Director of the Atmosphere/ Energy Program at Stanford University. He has received a B.S. in Civil Engineering a B.A. in Economics (1988, Stanford), an M.S. in Environmental Engineering (1988 Stanford), an M.S. in Atmospheric Sciences (, UCLA), and a PhD in Atmospheric Sciences [UCLA (Mark, 1991 1994, “Review of solutions to global warming, air pollution, and energy security†”]

Because the production of nuclear weapons material is occurring only in countries that have developed civilian nuclear energy programs, the risk of a limited nuclear exchange between countries or the detonation of a nuclear device by terrorists has increased due to the dissemination of nuclear energy facilities worldwide. As such, it is a valid exercise to estimate the potential number of immediate deaths and carbon emissions due to the burning of buildings and infrastructure associated with the proliferation of nuclear energy facilities and the resulting proliferation of nuclear weapons. The number of deaths and carbon emissions, though, must be multiplied by a probability range of an exchange or explosion occurring to estimate the overall risk of nuclear energy proliferation. Although concern at the time of an explosion will be the deaths and not carbon emissions, **policy makers today must weigh all the potential future risks of mortality and carbon emissions** when comparing energy sources. Here, we detail the link between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons and estimate the emissions of nuclear explosions attributable to nuclear energy. The primary limitation to building a nuclear weapon is the availability of purified fissionable fuel (highly-enriched uranium or plutonium).68 Worldwide, nine countries have known nuclear weapons stockpiles (US, Russia, UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea). In addition, Iran is pursuing uranium enrichment, and 32 other countries have sufficient fissionable material to produce weapons. Among the 42 countries with fissionable material, 22 have facilities as part of their civilian nuclear energy program, either to produce highly-enriched uranium or to separate plutonium, and facilities in 13 countries are active.68 Thus, the ability of states to produce nuclear weapons today follows directly from their ability to produce nuclear power. In fact, producing material for a weapon requires merely operating a civilian nuclear power plant together with a sophisticated plutonium separation facility. The Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been signed by 190 countries. However, international treaties safeguard only about 1% of the world’s highly-enriched uranium and 35% of the world’s plutonium.68 Currently, about 30 000 nuclear warheads exist worldwide, with 95% in the US and Russia, but enough refined and unrefined material to produce another 100 000 weapons.69 The explosion of fifty 15 kt nuclear devices (a total of 1.5 MT, or 0.1% of the yields proposed for a full-scale nuclear war) during a limited nuclear exchange in megacities could burn 63–313 Tg of fuel, adding 1–5 Tg of soot to the atmosphere, § Marked 19:24 § much of it to the stratosphere, and killing 2.6–16.7 million people.68 The soot emissions would cause significant short- and medium-term regional cooling.70 **Despite short-term cooling, the CO2 emissions would cause long-term warming**, as they do with biomass burning.62 The CO2 emissions from such a conflict are estimated here from the fuel burn rate and the carbon content of fuels. Materials have the following carbon contents: plastics, 38–92%; tires and other rubbers, 59–91%; synthetic fibers, 63–86%;71 woody biomass, 41–45%; charcoal, 71%;72 asphalt, 80%; steel, 0.05–2%. We approximate roughly the carbon content of all combustible material in a city as 40–60%. Applying these percentages to the fuel burn gives CO2 emissions during an exchange as 92–690 Tg CO2. The annual electricity production due to nuclear energy in 2005 was 2768 TWh yr\_1. If one nuclear exchange as described above occurs over the next 30 yr, the net carbon emissions due to nuclear weapons proliferation caused by the expansion of nuclear energy worldwide would be 1.1–4.1 g CO2 kWh\_1, where the energy generation assumed is the annual 2005 generation for nuclear power multiplied by the number of yr being considered. This emission rate depends on the probability of a nuclear exchange over a given period and the strengths of nuclear devices used. Here, we bound the probability of the event occurring over 30 yr as between 0 and 1 to give the range of possible emissions for one such event as 0 to 4.1 g CO2 kWh\_1. This emission rate is placed in context in Table 3.

***Most recent evidence proves that even a limited nuke war turns their impacts and results in extinction.***

**Starr 12**

[Steven Starr - Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri-Columbia, Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, has been published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, his writings appear on the websites of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Scientists for Global Responsibility, and the International Network of Scientists Against Proliferation, “What is nuclear darkness?,” <http://www.nucleardarkness.org/web/whatisnucleardarkness/>]

**In a nuclear war, burning cities would create millions of tons of thick, black smoke**. **This smoke would rise above cloud level, into the stratosphere, where it would quickly spread around the planet. A large nuclear war would produce enough smoke to block** most **sunlight from reaching the Earth's surface. Massive absorption of warming sunlight by a global stratospheric smoke layer would rapidly create Ice Age temperatures on Earth** . The cold would last a long time; NASA computer models predict **40% of the smoke would still remain in the stratosphere ten years after a nuclear war. Half of 1% of the explosive power of US-Russian nuclear weapons can create enough nuclear darkness to impact global climate**. 100 Hiroshima-size weapons exploded in the cities of India and Pakistan would put up to 5 million tons of smoke in the stratosphere . **The smoke would destroy much of the Earth's protective ozone layer and drop temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere to levels last seen in the Little Ice Age. Shortened growing seasons could cause up to 1 billion people to starve to death.** A large nuclear war could put 150 million tons of smoke in the stratosphere and make global temperatures colder than they were 18,000 years ago during the coldest part of the last Ice Age. Killing frosts would occur every day for 1-3 years in the large agricultural regions of the Northern Hemisphere. Average global precipitation would be reduced by 45%. Earth's ozone layer would be decimated. Growing seasons would be eliminated. **A large nuclear war would utterly devastate the environment and cause most people to starve to death . Deadly climate change, radioactive fallout and toxic pollution would cause already stressed ecosystems to collapse. The result would be *a mass extinction event that would wipe***

# 2NC

## CP

### 2NC A2: Agent CP’s Bad

#### 1) Agent CP’s are a pre-req to war powers education --- executive action is key to test the desirability of statutory or judicial restrictions

Crocker ’12, Thomas P. Crocker, Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. J.D. Yale Law School; Ph.D. Vanderbilt University, July, 2012¶ Connecticut Law Review¶ 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1511, COMMENTARY: NATIONAL SECURITY: RESPONSE: Who Decides on Liberty?, Lexis, jj

Whether approached as a matter of executive discretion, judicial role, or individual rights, questions about security are never far removed from questions about liberty. We are often told that there must be a tradeoff between liberty and security. As Jeremy Waldron described the ubiquity of this claim, "[t]alk of a liberty/security balance has become so common that many view it as just an ambient feature of our political environment." n1 Despite the purported equivalence of these two values, this tradeoff is seldom framed with reasons to adopt policies that make us more insecure to achieve the benefits of greater freedom. If "it has become part of the drinking water in this country that there has been a trade off of liberty for security," n2 this is because talk of tradeoffs is unidirectional. Scholarly defenses of national security expertise will argue not that we must take care to preserve civil liberties, but "that the government must make tradeoffs, that policy should become less libertarian during emergencies, and that courts should stay out of the way." n3¶ This question of tradeoffs cannot be approached without asking the question of who decides on the proper allocation of liberty and security. n4 Defenders of unbounded executive power argue that security relies on experts to whom citizens and courts alike must defer. n5 Especially during emergencies, executive officials are presumed to have superior information [\*1513] about what is necessary to preserve security. n6 According to the deference thesis, to impose constitutional limits on executive discretion risks creating security harms rather than enhancing freedoms. Deference to experts means "that the executive branch, not Congress or the judicial branch, should make the tradeoff between security and liberty." n7 When citizens, scholars, or judges attempt to intervene in debates over the proper measure of security, defenders of unchecked executive power claim that "they are amateurs playing at security policy, and there is no reason to expect that courts can improve upon government's emergency policies in any systemic way." n8 On this view, citizens and courts lack sufficient specialized knowledge to make optimal decisions about security. According to Judge Richard Posner, critics of executive expertise risk erroneous tradeoffs, because "civil libertarians tend to exaggerate the costs . . . and to ignore or slight the benefits" of security policy. n9 To interpose legal principles protecting rights and liberties as barriers to security policy risks producing "tangible harms," n10 while adding nothing relevant to expert decision making.

### XO

#### Restraint fails – won’t listen to congress and doesn’t access any signaling arguments

Posner, 9/3 (Eric, professor at the University of Chicago Law School, “Obama is only making his War Powers mightier”, Slate, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/view\_from\_chicago/2013/09/obama\_going\_to\_congress\_on\_syria\_he\_s\_actually\_strengthening\_the\_war\_powers.html)

President Obama’s surprise announcement that he will ask Congress for approval of a military attack on Syria is being hailed as a vindication of the rule of law and a revival of the central role of Congress in war-making, even by critics. But all of this is wrong. Far from breaking new legal ground, President Obama has reaffirmed the primacy of the executive in matters of war and peace. The war powers of the presidency remain as mighty as ever. It would have been different if the president had announced that only Congress can authorize the use of military force, as dictated by the Constitution, which gives Congress alone the power to declare war. That would have been worthy of notice, a reversal of the ascendance of executive power over Congress. But the president said no such thing. He said: “I believe I have the authority to carry out this military action without specific congressional authorization.” Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed that the president “has the right to do that”—launch a military strike—“no matter what Congress does.” Thus, the president believes that the law gives him the option to seek a congressional yes or to act on his own. He does not believe that he is bound to do the first. He has merely stated the law as countless other presidents and their lawyers have described it before him. The president’s announcement should be understood as a political move, not a legal one. His motive is both self-serving and easy to understand, and it has been all but acknowledged by the administration. If Congress now approves the war, it must share blame with the president if what happens next in Syria goes badly. If Congress rejects the war, it must share blame with the president if Bashar al-Assad gases more Syrian children. The big problem for Obama arises if Congress says no and he decides he must go ahead anyway, and then the war goes badly. He won’t have broken the law as he understands it, but he will look bad. He would be the first president ever to ask Congress for the power to make war and then to go to war after Congress said no. (In the past, presidents who expected dissent did not ask Congress for permission.) People who celebrate the president for humbly begging Congress for approval also apparently don’t realize that his understanding of the law—that it gives him the option to go to Congress—maximizes executive power vis-à-vis Congress. If the president were required to act alone, without Congress, then he would have to take the blame for failing to use force when he should and using force when he shouldn’t. If he were required to obtain congressional authorization, then Congress would be able to block him. But if he can have it either way, he can force Congress to share responsibility when he wants to and avoid it when he knows that it will stand in his way. This approach also empowers the president relative to Congress by giving him the ability to embarrass members of Congress when he wants to. Just ask Hillary Clinton, whose vote in favor of the 2003 Iraq War damaged her chances against Barack Obama in 2008, and the Democratic senators who could not enter the 1992 campaign for the presidency because their votes against the 1991 Iraq War rendered them unelectable. The best thing for individual members of Congress is to be able to carp on the sidelines—to complain about not being consulted and to blame the president if the war goes badly. That is why David Axelrod said, “Congress is now the dog that caught the car.” This is hardball politics, not a rediscovery of legal values.

## Solvency

### A2: Signal Solves/Sufficient

#### Signal arguments are wrong – nations won’t perceive it

Kriner, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, 10

(Douglas, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 81-2, google books)

First, in many cases congressional signals will likely **have** only a modest influence on the calculations of the target state at the conflict conduct phase. Uses of force involving the United States are different from most other uses of force occurring in the international system because of the tremendous asymmetric advantages in military capabilities that the United States enjoys over almost every adversary. By the time that the military policymaking process enters the conflict conduct phase, the target state's leader has already decided that his or her interests are best served by refusing to capitulate to American demands, even at the risk of almost certain tactical defeat at the hands of a superior military force. Having made this cost-benefit calculation, congressional signals during the course of a conflict should have only a modest impact on the target state leader's subsequent behavior at the conflict conduct phase." Moreover, the types of states whose leaders are most likely to make this calculation—weak states (including those harboring non-state actors who are the true target of a proposed use of force), failed states, and vulnerable dictatorships—are in many cases very different from most other members of the international community. For these actors, the costs of capitulating to American demands are so high that their cost-benefit calculations should be more impervious to congressional signals.

#### Non-democratic states like Iran and North Korea won’t respond to signals from Congress—the aff won’t produce a bargain---prefer empirical evidence

Nzelibe & Yoo ’06, JIDE NZELIBE AND JOHN YOO, Jide Nzelibe is Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law School. John Yoo is Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall), and Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute. The Yale Law Journal¶ 2006¶ 115 Yale L.J. 2512, THE MOST DANGEROUS BRANCH? MAYORS, GOVERNORS, PRESIDENTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW: A SYMPOSIUM ON EXECUTIVE POWER: ESSAY: Rational War and Constitutional Design, Lexis, jj

This Section addresses a factor that often goes unexamined in arguments supporting congressional participation in war: the costs. We can understand the costs by asking whether the signaling value of congressional authorization varies with the regime type of an opposing nation. If it does, then a rule that Presidents must seek congressional permission ought to vary as well.

The non-cooperative bargaining model of international conflict assumes that the actors of concern are rational, self-interested nation-states. Recent developments in the international system may require that we relax this assumption. Taking rogue states or international terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda into account may distinguish cases in which the benefits of signaling do not outweigh the benefits of executive speed, secrecy, and flexibility. Threats to American national security now come not only from the hostile intentions of other nation-states, but from three other sources: the easy availability of the knowledge and technology to create weapons of mass destruction; the emergence of rogue nations; and the rise of international [\*2533] terrorism of the kind practiced by the al Qaeda terrorist organization. n55 The al Qaeda terrorist network and similar organizations may pose a threat that does not lend itself to resolution through bargaining. n56 In particular, signaling may prove ineffective when applied against these nations or groups because they are unlikely to have the proper incentives to respond to the information conveyed by such signals.

Significantly, the informational value of the signaling mechanism among democracies depends heavily on the existence of transparency and domestic political accountability, both of which are usually lacking in terrorist organizations and rogue states. In a sense, the very logic of the signaling mechanism assumes that because democracies are aware that other democracies are less likely to back down in an escalating international crisis, democracies will be less reluctant to get involved in wars against each other in the first place. n57

On the other hand, because rogue states and terrorist organizations face little or no political accountability for their foreign policy failures, they can afford to ignore their domestic audiences and take more aggressive stances in initiating international conflicts. n58 Conversely, once they enter into an escalating international crisis, rogue states can more easily afford to back out of the crisis without paying a political price for seeming inconsistent or weak. In sum, the crisis bargaining model suggests that rogue states are neither likely to signal credible commitments of their resolve in an international crisis, nor likely to appreciate costly signals made by other states.

The existing empirical evidence largely supports the view that rogue or autocratic states are much more willing to discount the risks of military failure than democracies. For instance, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph Siverson have shown that democratic regimes tend to initiate conflicts of lower [\*2534] risk than nondemocracies, n59 and other studies have shown that they also tend to suffer fewer battle deaths and fight much shorter wars. n60 In sum, these studies strongly suggest that democracies tend to be much more cautious in the kinds of wars they fight; an obvious corollary is that democracies are more likely to be sensitive to signals that relay information about the willingness of a foreign adversary to engage in a high-risk conflict.

A related argument is that because democracies tend to benefit from a more robust marketplace of ideas and information than nondemocracies, n61 they are better able to understand the institutional context in which the President and Congress interact on war powers issues. Even if terrorist organizations or rogue states did understand the meaning of legislative signals, however, common ground that could produce a bargain might still be absent. Al Qaeda demanded, for example, that the United States withdraw from the Middle East and cease its support of moderate Arab regimes and of Israel, and that a fundamentalist Islamic caliphate replace those regimes. n62 Assuming that the United States will not alter its foreign policy in such a dramatic fashion, there is no possibility of a bargain.

### Ext – Declaration Key

#### The difference between a declaration of war and authorization of force is not semantics --- takes out all solvency

Tom Mullen ‘11 MA from NY College @ Buffalo, author of A Return to Common Sense: Reawakening Liberty in the Inhabitants of America, 5-7-11, What’s So Important About a Declaration of War?, http://www.tommullen.net/featured/whats-so-important-about-a-declaration-of-war/

Presidential hopeful Ron Paul insists that the U.S. government shouldn’t go to war without a declaration of war. His son Rand has also taken this position, as have several libertarian-leaning Tea Party candidates. According to the U.S. Constitution, the congress is invested with the power to declare war. These constitutionalists say that this declaration should be a requirement before military action is authorized. I’m not sure that this is resonating with those that are unfamiliar with what a declaration of war means. For most people, the declaration of war is a formality whereby the president makes sure that it is agreeable to the Congress that he utilizes the military. Some might even go so far as to say it is the president “asking permission” from the Congress to do so. By this reasoning, both Presidents Bush and Obama have complied, especially considering H.J. Res. 114 (October 16, 2002). With that resolution, Congress authorized the president to use military force in the war on terror. What is the difference between that and a declaration of war? The answer is both intuitive and supported by history. First, a “declaration” has nothing to do with “permission.” Neither is it the same thing as creation or initiation. One can only declare something that already exists. Therefore, a declaration of war does not create a war or initiate a war. A declaration of war is a resolution passed by Congress recognizing that the United States is already at war. The intent of the declaration of war power is for the government to have an adjudication process for war analogous to a criminal trial for domestic crimes. Evidence must be presented that the nation in question has committed overt acts of war against the United States. The Congress must deliberate on that evidence and then vote on whether or not a state of war exists. The actual declaration of war is analogous to a conviction at a criminal trial. The Congress issues the “verdict” and the president is called upon to employ the military. To wage war without a declaration of war is akin to a lynching: there has been no finding of guilt before force has been employed in response. Herein lies the difference between H.J. Res. 114 and a declaration of war. In order for President Bush to have obtained a declaration of war against Iraq, he would have had to present his case that Iraq had already committed overt acts of war against the United States. Like a prosecutor, he would have had to convince the “jury” (Congress) that Iraq was guilty – not of “possessing weapons of mass destruction” but of having already aggressed against the United States. Obviously, he would not have been able to do this. In fact, the absence of any overt acts of war by the nations in question is the reason that there were no declarations of war against Korea, Viet Nam, Bosnia, or any other nation that the U.S. government has waged war against since WWII.

### \*AT: Political Costs

#### Political costs are exaggerated – this card will smoke them

Schauer, Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia, 12

(Frederick, “ARTICLE: THE POLITICAL RISKS (IF ANY) OF BREAKING THE LAW,” 4 J. of Legal Analysis 83, lexis, accessed 10-22-13, CMM)

Consider, for example, the legality of American involvement in Libya. Factually, the issue arises from the situation in which the Obama Administration directed strikes against Libyan air defenses, some by aircraft and some by remotely operated drones, in conjunction with NATO, but without prior consultation with Congress and without approval by Congress, either in advance or to this day (Morrison 2011). In defending its refusal to consult with Congress or secure its approval, the Administration relied, in part, on now-routine presidential claims to have independent constitutional authority, under the explicit commander-in-chief and executive powers and under the implicit war-making and national defense and foreign policy and emergency powers, to engage in such actions. But in seeking to explain its disregard of the plain mandates of the War Powers Resolution, the Administration also claimed, in the face of a clear Office of Legal Counsel opinion to the contrary, that the military actions in Libya did not constitute "hostilities", as that term is used in the Resolution, because no American ground troops were placed in Libya and also because the likelihood of American casualties was essentially nonexistent.¶ The claim that the War Powers Resolution is in some or all dimensions an unconstitutional infringement on the President's independent powers is seriously debatable, and in fact this is the position that has been taken, in one form or another, by every President, regardless of party, since the Resolution was first enacted in 1973 (Posner & Vermeule 2011). The claim that the Resolution did not even apply to this situation because of the absence of hostilities, however, was widely mocked as legally implausible (Ackerman 2011; Ackerman & Hathaway 2011; Fisher 2012; Morrison 2011), especially in the several days after the Administration's written statement to this effect was issued, and after the claim was defended before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Harold H. Koh, Legal Advisor to the State Department.¶ For purposes of this article, it seems more than plausible to treat the legal defense of the actions over and against Libyan forces as so weak as to permit the claim that the actions simply violated the law in a straightforward way. Yet although the actions violated the law, they were plainly preferred by the Administration on policy and, presumably, political grounds. And as events have ensued, it is clear that the Administration's policy and political positions have largely been borne out. The air attacks were successful, the forces of a very [\*91] bad person were defeated, the regime seems to have changed, at least for now, for the better, and there were no American casualties. The entire scenario, therefore, seems a good example of one in which, faced with a choice between the law-independent policy preferences and the clear constraints of the law, the Administration chose the former.¶ What makes the example especially interesting, however, is not just the favorable policy outcome, but the fact that the policy and political success, even in the face of relatively plain illegality, has produced virtually no negative political consequences. Public and press attention to the illegality has disappeared (Wang 2011), and the political evaluation of the action has been largely positive. As the events have played out, the illegality has played essentially no role in the larger politics of the situation. To put it differently, not only has the illegality produced no formal legal sanctions, as it could not (short of impeachment), but it also seems to have produced virtually no political or reputational sanctions for the Administration. As of this writing, it remains logically possible that the Administration's violation of the law will be a campaign issue in 2012, but the likelihood of such an eventuality seems vanishingly small.¶ ¶ As I have discussed in previous writings (Schauer 2007, 2010c, 2011b), there are many other examples of illegal policy actions or positions that have seemingly produced no or few negative political consequences. One such example is the decision by the mayors of San Francisco and of New Paltz, New York, to marry same-sex couples in violation of the then-applicable state law. With sympathies in both States in the direction of legalizing same-sex marriage, however, the illegality was taken then, and is taken now, as being somewhere between inconsequential and courageous. And on the same issue, when Governor Deval Patrick of Massachusetts explicitly urged members of the legislature to disregard a decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court mandating that they vote on a referendum proposal to amend the state constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage, his actions have produced no negative political fallout. In numerous other instances, from New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin's public call for immediate federal military assistance in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, to Mayor (now Senator) Ray Menendez's support for Americans who would have illegally launched military actions against the Cuban regime, to the violation of New York's Taylor Law by leaders of the Transit Workers Union and other public employee unions, the fact of illegality in the face of popular policy initiatives or positions has yielded few or no negative political or reputational consequences. Less saliently, the frequent willingness of Congress to ignore the law of law-making seems a matter of virtually no political consequence and thus a practice that has produced no negative political consequences for anyone (Bar-Simon-Tov 2010).

### Courts

#### The courts aren’t an effective check – circumvention’s likely.

Wheeler, associate professor of political science at Ball State University, 9

**(**Darren A., “Checking Presidential Detention Power in the War on Terror: What Should We Expect from the Judiciary?” Presidential Studies Quarterly 39.4 (Dec 2009): 677-700, ebsco, accessed 10-19-13, CMM)

This article argues that there are four specific reasons why those expecting the Supreme Court to be a significant check on presidential detention power in the war on terror are likely to be disappointed. The first reason is that the judiciary makes decisions in what can be referred to as "judicial time." In short, the courts are slow. The judicial decision-making process is often one that takes years to complete (Rehnquist 1998). Few political actors conceptualize the decision-making process in such an extended manner. If the president can respond more quickly to matters of policy than the courts, it might be difficult for the judiciary to act as a check on the president. The second factor that limits the judiciary's ability to check presidential detention power is the fact that courts usually answer specific narrow legal questions as opposed to larger, "big picture" policy questions (Baum 2007; Rehnquist 1998; Rosenberg 1991). As a result, even when the Court makes a decision on a matter, it is often a narrow one that addresses only a small part of the overall policy picture. This can limit the impact that the courts have on the policymaking process, as other policy makers often find different means to accomplish their desired goals regardless of the roadblocks presented by the courts on particular details. The third factor that potentially limits judicial impact on the president's desired detention policies is the fact that the judicial implementation process is fraught with uncertainty (Baum 2007; Canon and Johnson 1999; Carp, Stidham, and Manning 2004; Stumpf 1998). Even when the courts make a decision, it is possible for other political actors (including the president) to shape the implementation process in such a way as to minimize the impact that the particular decision might have on the president's preferred policies. Finally, the judiciary, especially since the second half of the twentieth century, has adopted a general posture of deference to the executive in matters of war powers and foreign affairs (Fisher 2005; Howell 2003; Rossiter and Longaker 1976). This deference might lead the Court to refuse to even hear challenges to presidential detention power. Even when the Court does hear cases, it may dispose of them in ways that illustrate this historical pattern of deference. Any combination of these factors **may limit the ability of the judiciary to check presidential initiatives**, **especially in** a policy area - **the war on terror** - in which the Bush administration clearly demonstrated an intense willingness and desire to exert unilateral control over matters (Fisher 2004; Goldsmith 2007; Kassop 2007; Savage 2007; Wheeler 2008).

### 2NC – Congress Fails

#### Congress will punt

Drum ’12, Kevin Drum, political blogger, The inventor of Friday catblogging, Kevin was a blogosphere pioneer when, after a stint in marketing, he went online as Calpundit in 2003. Prior to joining MoJo, he blogged at the Washington Monthly's Political Animal. He lives with his wife and two cats in Irvine. Apr. 11, 2012, Mother Jones, The Maddow Doctrine: We Need to Make War Hard Again, <http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2012/04/maddow-doctrine-we-need-make-war-hard-again>, jj

Maddow's argument is that we need to start rolling back these changes of the past two decades. When we go to war, we should raise taxes to pay for it. We should get rid of the secret military. The reserves should go back to being reserves. We should cut way back on the contractors and let troops peel their own potatoes. And above all, Congress should start throwing its weight around again. It's fine to criticize presidents for accreting ever more power to themselves, but what do you expect when Congress just sits back and allows it to happen? Our real problem is congressional cowardice: They don't want the responsibility of declaring war, but they also don't want the responsibility of stopping it. So they punt, and war becomes ever more a purely executive function.

#### Congress are doormats

Dayen ’11, David Dayen has been writing about politics since 2004. He spent three years writing for the FireDogLake News Desk; he's also written for The Washington Monthly, The American Prospect, The Washington Independent, Salon, Democracy Journal and Capitol Weekly, as well as multiple well-trafficked progressive blogs and websites. His work has been cited by the LA Times, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post, and he has been a guest on MSNBC, Al Jazeera English, Current TV, Russia Today, NPR, Pacifica Radio and Air America Radio. He has contributed to two anthology books, on the Wisconsin uprising and the fight over SOPA in Congress. He lives in Los Angeles, where prior to writing about politics he had a 15-year career as a television producer and editor. May 20, 2011, FireDogLake, ¶ Congress as Much to Blame for Lack of War Powers Resolution on Libya, <http://news.firedoglake.com/2011/05/20/congress-as-much-to-blame-for-lack-of-war-powers-resolution-on-libya/>, jj

That’s absolutely right (Ackerman and Oona Hathaway expanded on this in an op-ed earlier this week). But it sets a worse precedent for Congress, who simply want to be treated like a bunch of doormats on this issue. For two months there has been virtually no sense of urgency on war powers, outside of a few lonely outposts, mostly Dennis Kucinich and a gang of six Constitutionalist Senate Republicans. The leadership doesn’t want to deal with the issue. They don’t want to be on the record authorizing a war. They want to be “consulted” and they want to carp from the sidelines, but they don’t actually want the responsibility.¶ I don’t know how you get around that. You’re practically inviting the executive to wage war unilaterally. Congress is full of members who simply don’t care to attend to their Constitutional duties when it comes to foreign policy. Obama may be moving past his predecessors in terms of war powers (though I don’t see this as much different than Kosovo), but Congress is certainly moving past its usual spinelessness with its silence. Executives will always try to take power; Congress is supposed to be the branch of government with enough muscle to take it away from them.

#### Congress won’t assert authority

Lemieux ’11, Scott Lemieux is an assistant professor of political science at the College of Saint Rose. He contributes to the blogs Lawyers, Guns, and Money and Vox Pop. APRIL 5, 2011, The American Prospect, Checks and Imbalances, <http://prospect.org/article/checks-and-imbalances>, jj

The modern rise of unilateral presidential power is the subject a recent provocative book by legal scholars Eric Posner and Adrian Vermuele, The Executive Unbound. In Posner and Vermuele's view, James Madison's constraints on executive power -- the "checks and balances" you're always hearing so much about -- are essentially no longer operative; by and large, it's the president, not a majority of both houses of Congress, that decides to go to war.¶ Whether or not this is what the framers intended, this is the reality. So the question we need to ask now is how we got so far from the essential structure of the Constitution.¶ Surprisingly, it's not that the president has systematically ignored or overridden Congress. In fact, the presidency has become the dominant war-making power precisely because this is how a majority of legislators want it. The president initiated major wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq (twice), and in all of these cases -- sometimes before the fact, sometimes after -- Congress has passed the buck, delegating to the president the power to authorize force rather than declaring war itself. Senators and congressmen and women are similarly happy to pass on the blame when things go bad. Hillary Clinton's assertion that her vote for the 2002 authorization for President George W. Bush to use force in Iraq was not an authorization for the preemptive war Bush actually fought is an instructive illustration of how Congress tries to have it both ways.¶ Even courts have found that Congress has abdicated its power to the executive. In his famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer, a case that involved President Harry Truman's seizure of steel mills during the Korean War, Justice Robert Jackson noted that the Court "may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers." Statutes passed by Congress matter only if Congress asserts its power in showdowns with the president. Generally, it hasn't.¶ As Posner and Vermuele point out, Congress has occasionally reacted after the fact to presidential abuses of power. The post-Vietnam War Powers Resolution, for example, only authorizes the president to send troops abroad for up to 60 days without congressional approval. But these legislative exercises have been toothless, if not dead letters. Without any enforcement mechanism, the War Powers Resolution and other congressional acts are essentially symbolic. More recently, the reaction to the airstrikes against Libya is quite typical: Individual legislators may grumble, but there's no legislative action.¶ It's hard to escape the conclusion that the centralization of military power in the executive branch does not hew to the letter of the Constitution. But is that necessarily a bad thing? On some level, arguing that war-making power should rest primarily with Congress, a defensible interpretation of the text of the Constitution, is as anachronistic as libertarians arguing that the 20th-century regulatory state should be ruled unconstitutional. Attempting to entirely overturn established practices of executive military authority is almost as unlikely as overturning the economic regulations that have become necessary since we moved from an agrarian economy to an industrial one.

### 2NC – Statutory Restrictions Fail

#### Framing issue --- it doesn’t matter what Congress requires beforehand if they won’t back it up after the fact

Posner & Vermeule ’11, Eric Posner is Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Aaron Director Research Scholar at the University of Chicago. Adrian Vermeule - John H. Watson, Jr. Professor of Law – Harvard Law School, The Executive Unbound [electronic resource] : After the Madisonian Republic, Oxford University Press, USA, 2011. 01/01/2011 1 online resource (256 p.) Language: English, pg 87-89, jj

Why did these statutes prove less effective than their proponents hoped¶ or, in the extreme, become dead letters? In all the cases, the basic pattern is¶ similar. The statutes were enacted during a high-water mark of political¶ backlash against strong executive power, which supermajorities in Congress¶ attempted to translate into binding legal constraints. However, once¶ the wave of backlash receded and the supermajorities evaporated, there¶ was insufficient political backing for the laws to ensure their continued¶ vigor over time. Later Congresses have not possessed sufficient political¶ backing or willpower to employ the override mechanisms that the statutes¶ create, such as the override of presidential declarations of emergency created¶ by the National Emergencies Act.¶ Even where the statutes attempt to change the legal default rule, so that¶ the president cannot act without legislative permission—as in the case of¶ the War Powers Resolution, after the 60- or 90-day grace period has¶ passed—the president may simply ignore the statutory command, and will¶ succeed if he has correctly calculated that Congress will be unable to¶ engage in ex post retaliation and the courts will be unwilling to engage in¶ ex post review. President Clinton’s implicit decision to brush aside the resolution¶ during the Kosovo conflict (albeit with the fig leaf of a compliant¶ legal opinion issued by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel) 16¶ shows that what matters is what Congress can do after the fact, not what it¶ says before the fact.¶ Here a major problem for framework statutes is the “presidential power¶ of unilateral action” 17 to which we referred in the introduction. Statutory¶ drafters may think they have cleverly closed off the executive’s avenues of¶ escape when they set the legal status quo to require legislative permission.¶ Because the president can act in the real world beyond the law books,¶ however—the armed forces did not threaten to stand down from their¶ Kosovo mission until Congress gave its clear approval, but instead simply¶ obeyed the President’s orders—the actual status quo may change regardless¶ of whether the legal situation does. Once armed forces are in action,¶ the political calculus shift s and legislators will usually be unable to find¶ enough political support to retaliate—especially not on the basis of an¶ arcane framework statute passed years or decades before.¶ To be sure, if the framework statutes are very specific, then violating them¶ may itself create a political cost for the president, whose political opponents¶ will denounce him for Caesarism. This cost is real, but in the type of¶ high-stakes matters that are most likely to create showdowns between the¶ president and Congress in the first place, the benefits are likely to be greater¶ than the costs so long as the president’s action is popular and credible—the¶ crucial constraints we will discuss in chapter 4 . Moreover, if the president¶ can credibly claim to the public that the violation was necessary, then the¶ public will be unlikely to care too much about the legal niceties. As legal¶ theorist Frederick Schauer argues for constitutional violations 18 (and, we¶ add, the argument holds a fortiori for statutory violations), there is an¶ interesting asymmetry surrounding illegality: if the underlying action is unpopular,¶ then citizens will treat its illegality as an aggravating circumstance,¶ but if the underlying action is popular, its illegality usually has little independent¶ weight. Finally, if the president credibly threatens to violate the¶ statute, then Congress will have strong incentives to find some face-saving¶ compromise that allows the president to do what he wishes without forcing¶ a showdown that, legislators anticipate, may well end badly.¶ The upshot is that subject-specific framework statutes have a Potemkin¶ quality: they stand about in the landscape, providing an impressive facade¶ of legal constraint on the executive, but actually blocking very little action¶ that presidents care about. In some cases presidents will have strictly political¶ incentives to obtain congressional permission before acting, even in¶ the domain of foreign affairs and national security. Yet this is not a consequence¶ of the legal structures erected by Madisonian theory, either through¶ constitutional rules or framework statutes. Rather, as an important recent¶ model suggests, it actually implies a very different regime in which presidents¶ may, but need not, obtain congressional consent. 19 The intuition¶ behind this result is that a regime of optional separation of powers puts¶ presidents to a revealing choice between proceeding unilaterally or instead¶ through Congress, and thus gives imperfectly informed voters the maximum¶ possible information and the greatest possible scope for rewarding or punishing presidents and legislators for their actions. Needless to say,¶ however, this political mechanism gives cold comfort to Madisonian liberal¶ legalists, who would blanch at the idea that an optional version of the¶ separation of powers is superior to a mandatory version.¶ Political scientist Andrew Rudalevige is correct to describe the collapse¶ of the constrained post-Watergate executive as the most significant contributor¶ in the growth of a “New Imperial Executive.” 20 Framework statutes¶ are one of liberal legalism’s principal instruments of executive constraint,¶ in a world of litt le constitutional constraint. But having been tried, they¶ have been found wanting.

#### Empirics prove

Gene Healy, vice president at the Cato Institute, “Reclaiming the War Power”, 9/2009, http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2009/9/hb111-10.pdf

It’s worth thinking about how best to tie Ulysses to the mast. But the problem with legislative schemes designed to force Congress to ‘‘do the right thing’’ is that Congress seems always to have one hand free. Statutory schemes designed to precommit legislators to particular procedures do not have a terribly promising track record. Historically, many such schemes have proved little more effective than a dieter’s note on the refrigerator. No mere statute can truly bind a future Congress, and in areas ranging from agricultural policy to balanced budgets, Congress has rarely hesitated to undo past agreements in the pursuit of short-term political advantage.

### Circum

#### 1. Obama will circumvent the plan – the past 5 years prove.

Cohen, Fellow at the Century Foundation, 12

(Michael, 3-28-12, “Power Grab,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/28/power\_grab?page=full, accessed 10-19-13, CMM)

This month marks the one-year anniversary of the onset of U.S. military engagement in the Libyan civil war. While the verdict is still out on the long-term effects of the conflict for U.S. interests in the region, it's closer to home where one can point to the war's greater lasting impact -- namely in further increasing the power of the executive branch to wage war without congressional authorization. But don't expect to hear much about that issue on the campaign trail this election year. Rather the erosion of congressional oversight of the executive branch's war-making responsibilities has been something of a bipartisan endeavor -- and one that is unlikely to end any time soon.¶ It might seem like a bit of ancient history now, but one of the more creative arguments to come out of the U.S. military intervention in Libya was the Obama administration's assertion that the war did not actually represent "hostilities." Indeed, according to the president's argument to Congress, U.S. operations in Libya "do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve U.S. ground troops" -- thus making them something less than war. On the surface this appears patently absurd. The United States was flying planes over Libyan air space and dropping bombs. Missiles were being fired from off-shore. An American military officer (Adm. James Stavridis) commanded the NATO effort. There were reports of forward air controllers on the ground spotting targets for U.S. bombers. In all, NATO planes flew more than 26,000 sorties in Libya, nearly 10,000 of which were strike missions. By what possible definition is this not considered "hostilities"?¶ As it turns out the ambiguity over whether the war represented "hostilities" is one codified in U.S. law -- namely the War Powers Resolution (WPR). Under the provisions of the WPR the President was required to notify Congress within 48 hours of the beginning of U.S. military involvement. He then had 60 days to receive authorization from Congress and if he failed to do he would have 30 days to end the fighting. (Of course, if U.S. military actions do not rise to the level of "hostilities," then the president does not have to go through this rigmarole and receive congressional approval.)¶ Now on the surface, such an elastic view of what the word hostilities means is hardly unusual. Indeed, it is rather par for the course in discussions of the War Powers Resolution. In 1975, the Ford administration claimed that "hostilities" only refers to a scenario in which U.S. forces are "actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units." Similar efforts at defining down hostilities were attempted by the Carter, Reagan, and Clinton administrations when they sought to use military force. Still, these generally were in reference to peacekeeping missions like in Lebanon and Bosnia -- not offensive operations like those waged in Libya.¶ In a political vacuum, Obama's stance on "hostilities" in Libya might represent the traditional push and pull of executive-legislative branch disagreements about presidential war-fighting prerogatives.¶ But of course, on this issue we are far from being in a political vacuum. Obama's broadening of executive power comes with the backdrop of the George W. Bush administration's efforts to expand the president's ability to wage war. Indeed, the position taken by the Obama administration bears uncomfortable similarities to the one taken by John Yoo when he served at the Justice Department and argued -- in the wake of 9/11 -- that the Constitution granted the president practically unquestioned executive power to wage war. Yet, even Bush sought congressional approval for military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq; Obama didn't bother to do the same for Libya. In addition, Obama also overruled the opinion of his own Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) on the question of whether the president must abide by the War Powers Resolution in regard to the Libyan intervention. The OLC said he did; the White House assembled legal opinions that said he didn't -- and the latter view won out. As Bruce Ackerman, a law professor at Yale University, noted at the time, "Mr. Obama's decision to disregard that office's opinion [the OLC] and embrace the White House counsel's view is undermining a key legal check on arbitrary presidential power."¶ So at a time when the door has been opened rather wide on unaccountable war-waging by the executive branch -- with minimal legislative checks and balances -- the Obama administration has opened it even further. What is perhaps most surprising is that it is being promulgated by a president who pledged as a candidate to put an end to such practices.¶ As Ackerman said to me, Obama came into office with a golden opportunity to reestablish some modicum of restraint over the actions of the executive branch in the pursuit of national security. Ironically, in a Boston Globe questionnaire in December 2007, Obama specifically rejected the argument that he used, in part, to justify going around Congress on Libya. "The President," wrote candidate Obama, "does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation ... History has shown us time and again, however, that military action is most successful when it is authorized and supported by the Legislative branch."¶ While Obama has hardly gone as far down the road on expanding executive power as Bush did, it is also true that he "consolidated many of the principles of executive power that were first described in the Bush administration," says Ackerman. In effect, "Obama has done nothing to stop the return of another John Yoo." Indeed, with his actions on Libya, Obama has done more than consolidate Bush administration positions -- he has expanded them.¶ These are negative developments, but it gets worse. In the president's initial letter to Congress, the airstrikes in Libya, "will be limited in their nature, duration, and scope. Their purpose is to support an international coalition as it takes all necessary measures to enforce the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973." The U.N. resolution specifically did not call for regime change and yet in July 2011, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta made clear that the U.S. "objective" in Libya "is to do what we can to bring down the regime of Qaddafi." Moreover, as Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said to me, NATO forces looked the other way at flights by the French government, among others, that re-supplied the Libyan rebels (in violation of the arms embargo mandated under Section 9 of Resolution 1970); sought to kill Qaddafi via airstrikes (eventually indirectly succeeding); helped to plan the operations that allowed the insurgents to capture Tripoli, and provided sensitive and secret satellite imagery to the rebels. In short, the United States went far beyond the mandate established by the Security Council and in effect lied when claiming that the operations in Libya were simply about protecting civilians. Putting aside the international law implications, the administration adopted a position of regime change of a foreign leader without any approval from Congress.¶ What is most surprising about the Obama administration's position is that it likely would not have been a heavy lift to get congressional backing for the operations in Libya in the early stages of the air campaign. But by disregarding Congress's role on Libya -- and shifting the intent of the U.S. mission without any congressional input into the decision -- the president has set a new and potentially troubling precedent. In contrast, by seeking congressional authorization Obama would have, ironically, restored some of the balance between the legislative and executive branch on issues of use of American military force.¶ Running roughshod over Congress has becoming something of a norm within the Obama administration. As one foreign-policy analyst close to the White House said to me "they generally don't do a good job of keeping people in the Hill in the loop on what they are doing. They see congressional oversight as a nuisance -- even within their own party." Another analyst I spoke to had a one-word response to the question of the administration's attitude toward Congress's role in foreign policy: "Dismissive." Whether the lack of proper consultation over the closing of the detainee facility at Guantanamo Bay, the refusal to share with intelligence committees the rationale for targeted killings, or even brief Hill staffers on changes in missile defense deployment, this sort of ignoring of congressional prerogatives has often been the rule, not the exception.¶ What has been Congress's response to this disregarding of its role in foreign policy decision-making? The usual hemming and hawing, but little in the way of concrete action. During the Bush years, Republicans were more than happy to let the president expand his executive powers when it came to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the global war on terrorism. When Democrats took back the House and Senate from Republicans in 2006, they placed greater scrutiny on the Bush administration's conduct of the war in Iraq -- but still continued to fund the conflict. Even in Washington's highly partisan current environment, little has changed; it's mostly sound and fury signifying nothing.¶ Republicans eschewed a constitutional confrontation with the White House over Libya, though the House GOP did make a rather partisan effort to defund the Libya operations (a measure that failed) and still today House and Senate members raise their frustrations in committee hearings over their heavy-handed treatment by the White House.¶ But the actions of some Republicans point in a different direction. Last year, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Buck McKeon actually tried to expand the original Authorization for Use of Military Force that granted U.S. kinetic actions just three days after 9/11 -- which would have actually increased executive war-making power. While some on the Hill have long suspected the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, it was one of the few checks that Congress maintained over the president (aside from ability to defund operations, which in itself is a difficult tool to wield effectively). Now they have been complicit in its further watering down.¶ Aside from Ron Paul, there's been little mention of the president's overreach in Libya by the GOP's presidential aspirants. And why should there be? If any of them become president they too would want to enjoy the expanded executive power that Obama has helped provide for them. Quite simply, in a closely divided country in which each party has a fair shot to win the White House every four years, there is little political incentive for either Democrats or Republicans to say enough is enough.¶ And with a former constitutional law professor punting on the issue (along with the much abused and maligned Congress), we're now even further from chipping away at the vast power the executive branch has been husbanded on national security issues. In the end, that may be the greatest legacy of the U.S. intervention in Libya.

#### Obama doesn’t think he needs authorization – proves he would think the plan wouldn’t be constitutional – they have zero ev that he would.

Garrison, Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at Kutztown University, 12

(Dr. Arthur H. Garrison, “History of Executive Branch Legal Opinions on the Power of the President as Commander-in-Chief from Washington to Obama,” 43 Cumb. L. Rev. 375, lexis, accessed 10-19-13, CMM)

IV. CONCLUSION

Historically the State Department, 388 various Attorneys General, and the OLC, from the Washington through Obama Administrations, have issued formal and informal opinions supporting the broadest interpretation of the Article II Commander in Chief power of the President. Almost from the inception of the Constitution, presidents have been advised that they have plenary, if not exclusive, power over foreign policy and the use of military force with and without prior congressional approval. Historically, Congress has exercised a secondary role in the face of presidential decisionmaking regarding American foreign policy and has never successfully asserted that the power to declare war belonged primarily to the Legislative branch. The power to declare war has been a different power than the power to make war or respond to war inflicted upon the United States.3 From Lincoln to the modern Presidency, all presidents have asserted the power to deploy the military, even if that could entail military combat to protect American interests, and that congressional approval is not constitutionally required for such deployments to be lawful 390 The Obama Administration continued this traditional view and has continued to defend the theory of plenary power in foreign and military affairs as Commander in Chief.391

#### Vagueness guarantees circumvention

Mitchell, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, 9

(Jonathan, Jan, “Legislating Clear-Statement Regimes in National- Security Law,” http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=jonathan\_mitchell, accessed 9-17-13, CMM)

The challenge for these efforts to strengthen the War Powers Resolution and FISA¶ is that any future ambiguous statute will provide rope for executive-branch lawyers to¶ concoct congressional “authorization” for the President’s actions, no matter what¶ restrictions or interpretive instructions Congress provides in framework legislation. None¶ of these proposed reforms will disable the executive from using its expansive theories of¶ constitutional avoidance and implied repeal to provide a veneer of legality for the¶ President’s actions, and to minimize the prospect of future criminal sanctions and¶ political reprisals against executive-branch employees.

## DA

### 2NC Impact Overview

***By******itself terrorism causes extinction.***

Owen B. **Toon**, 4-19-**2007**, is professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences and a fellow at the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics (LASP) at the University of Colorado received his Ph.D. from Cornell University, in cloud physics, atmospheric chemistry and radiative transfer, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conﬂicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” Atmosphere Chemistry Physics

**To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities** with popula- tions exceeding 10 million individuals. **At the same time,** ad- vanced **technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported** in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that **a sin- gle detonation** in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fa- talities **approaching one million** in some cases, **and casualties exceeding one million**. Thousands of small weapons still ex- ist **in** the arsenals of the U.S. and **Russia**, and **there are** at least six other countries with **substantial** nuclear weapons **invento- ries**. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts **of** highly **enriched uranium or plutonium** to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involv- ing 50-100 weapons with yields of 15kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamina- tion. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana sug- gests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and inter- national economic consequences. **Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks** because low yield det- onations **are** most **effective against city centers** where busi- ness and social activity as well as population are concen- trated. Rogue nations and **terrorists would be most likely to strike there**. Accordingly, an organized attack on the www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/1973/2007/ Atmos. Chem. Phys., 7, 1973–2002, 2007 Page 28 2000 O. B. Toon et al.: **Consequences of** regional scale nuclear conflicts U.S. by a small nuclear state, or **terrorists** supported by such a state, **could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a *superpower conflict*.** Remarkably, the estimated **quantities of smoke generated** by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives **could lead to significant global climate perturbations** (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not ex- tend our casualty and damage predictions to include poten- tial medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchin- son, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

#### A2 inev

#### Statutory limitations on war powers increase the costs of presidential action ~ the plan induces executive over-caution out of fear of congressional reprisal

Pevehouse & Howell ’08, Jon C. Pevehouse, Professor – Poli Sci – UW-Madison, William G. Howell, Sydney Stein Professor in American Politics in the Harris School, a professor in the Department of Political Science and the College, and a co-director of the Program on Political Institutions. While Dangers Gather : Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press, 2008. p 9-10. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/wayne/Doc?id=10478247&ppg=12>, jj

Strong informational advantages coupled with the unique ability to act unilaterally in the international arena make the president, by Paul Peterson’s account, “the most potent political force in the making of foreign policy,” while Congress remains “a secondary political player.” 21 There is no escaping this fact. The primary questions that this book intends to answer are not whether congressional power effectively matches presidential power, or whether Congress has met its constitutional obligations over foreign policy making. On both of these fronts, answers obviously assume the negative. Rather, the interesting questions are uncovered when we examine those interbranch struggles that persist, when we try to determine whether Congress, in any material fashion, constrains the presidential use of force. Congress, Still Relevant Endowed with powers of unilateral action and immense informational advantages, why should the president worry about Congress? What can its members really do that has any bearing on his assessments of the potential risks and rewards of military action? A fair amount, we think. Its actions will not convince every president, every time, to change course. But through both legislative enactments and public appeals, Congress can increase the likely costs, financial and otherwise, of a planned military venture. The bills Congress introduces, the resolutions it passes, the hearings it holds, and the public declarations its members make can establish legal constraints on presidential war powers and increase the political costs of battlefield failures. In this section, we summarize past congressional efforts to influence presidential decision making through both legislative processes and public appeals: We then offer some lessons about how these activities shape the larger politics that precede military action.

#### Causes the executive to retreat

Pevehouse & Howell ’08, Jon C. Pevehouse, Professor – Poli Sci – UW-Madison, William G. Howell, Sydney Stein Professor in American Politics in the Harris School, a professor in the Department of Political Science and the College, and a co-director of the Program on Political Institutions. While Dangers Gather : Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press, 2008. p 18. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/wayne/Doc?id=10478247&ppg=12>, jj

We are not suggesting that the absence of congressional action is appropriately interpreted as evidence of the institution’s prepotency. Instead, we mean only to raise a cautionary point: the observed behaviors of either branch of government do not necessarily reveal who was in charge, or whose interests were best represented, when the military was deployed. As John Ferejohn and Frances Rosenbluth point out, “Depending on the distribution of costs and benefits associated with the use of power, heterogeneous interests might be inclined to exercise veto points built into American political institutions; and even if their use is not often observed to block military aggression, their influence is likely to be incorporated in anticipation of their use.” 51 When trying to gauge congressional influence over presidential war powers, it simply will not do to count the number of times that the War Powers Resolution has, or has not, been invoked. For as Ferejohn and Rosenbluth aptly note, one branch of government may wield considerable influence over another even when the historical record is quite sparse. Knowing that members of Congress will rail against what they perceive to be a seriously misguided military venture, presidents may scale back, or even abandon, their plans. In such instances, however, the proof of congressional influence is not to be found in the corpus of law that members enact. Rather, it is to be located in the silence accompanying a president who would like to respond militarily to some foreign conflagration, but who prudently abstains.

## Warming O

### 2NC Overview

***The impact is extinction***

Toshimura **Ogura**, Economics Professor -- Toyama University, MONTHLY REVIEW, April 19**97**, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m1132/is\_n11\_v48/ai\_19693242/pg\_8 Monthly Review, findarticles.com

North Korea, South **Korea, and Japan have achieved** quasi- or virtual **nuclear armament**. Although these countries do not produce or possess actual bombs, they possess sufficient technological know-how to possess one or several nuclear arsenals. Thus, **virtual armament creates a new nightmare in this region - nuclear annihilation. Given the concentration of economic affluence and military power in this region and its growing importance to the world system, any hot conflict among these countries would threaten to escalate into a global conflagration.**

### A2 4 degrees

#### the 4 degree distinction doesn’t make sense

Bjorn Lomborg 8, adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School, where he founded and directs its Copenhagen Consensus Center, August 15, 2008, “Warming warnings get overheated,” The Guardian, online: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/15/carbonemissions.climatechange>

Much of the global warming debate is perhaps best described as a constant outbidding by frantic campaigners, producing a barrage of ever-more scary scenarios in an attempt to get the public to accept their civilisation-changing proposals. Unfortunately, the general public – while concerned about the environment – is distinctly unwilling to support questionable solutions with costs running into tens of trillions of pounds. Predictably, this makes the campaigners reach for even more outlandish scares.

These alarmist predictions are becoming quite bizarre, and could be dismissed as sociological oddities, if it weren't for the fact that they get such big play in the media. Oliver Tickell, for instance, writes that a global warming causing a 4C temperature increase by the end of the century would be a "catastrophe" and the beginning of the "extinction" of the human race. This is simply silly.

His evidence? That 4C would mean that all the ice on the planet would melt, bringing the long-term sea level rise to 70-80m, flooding everything we hold dear, seeing billions of people die. Clearly, Tickell has maxed out the campaigners' scare potential (because there is no more ice to melt, this is the scariest he could ever conjure). But he is wrong. Let us just remember that the UN climate panel, the IPCC, expects a temperature rise by the end of the century between 1.8 and 6.0C. Within this range, the IPCC predicts that, by the end of the century, sea levels will rise 18-59 centimetres – Tickell is simply exaggerating by a factor of up to 400.

Tickell will undoubtedly claim that he was talking about what could happen many, many millennia from now. But this is disingenuous. First, the 4C temperature rise is predicted on a century scale – this is what we talk about and can plan for. Second, although sea-level rise will continue for many centuries to come, the models unanimously show that Greenland's ice shelf will be reduced, but Antarctic ice will increase even more (because of increased precipitation in Antarctica) for the next three centuries. What will happen beyond that clearly depends much more on emissions in future centuries. Given that CO2 stays in the atmosphere about a century, what happens with the temperature, say, six centuries from now mainly depends on emissions five centuries from now (where it seems unlikely non-carbon emitting technology such as solar panels will not have become economically competitive).

Third, Tickell tells us how the 80m sea-level rise would wipe out all the world's coastal infrastructure and much of the world's farmland – "undoubtedly" causing billions to die. But to cause billions to die, it would require the surge to occur within a single human lifespan. This sort of scare tactic is insidiously wrong and misleading, mimicking a firebrand preacher who claims the earth is coming to an end and we need to repent. While it is probably true that the sun will burn up the earth in 4-5bn years' time, it does give a slightly different perspective on the need for immediate repenting.

Tickell's claim that 4C will be the beginning of our extinction is again many times beyond wrong and misleading, and, of course, made with no data to back it up. Let us just take a look at the realistic impact of such a 4C temperature rise. For the Copenhagen Consensus, one of the lead economists of the IPCC, Professor Gary Yohe, did a survey of all the problems and all the benefits accruing from a temperature rise over this century of about approximately 4C. And yes, there will, of course, also be benefits: as temperatures rise, more people will die from heat, but fewer from cold; agricultural yields will decline in the tropics, but increase in the temperate zones, etc.

The model evaluates the impacts on agriculture, forestry, energy, water, unmanaged ecosystems, coastal zones, heat and cold deaths and disease. The bottom line is that benefits from global warming right now outweigh the costs (the benefit is about 0.25% of global GDP). Global warming will continue to be a net benefit until about 2070, when the damages will begin to outweigh the benefits, reaching a total damage cost equivalent to about 3.5% of GDP by 2300. This is simply not the end of humanity. If anything, global warming is a net benefit now; and even in three centuries, it will not be a challenge to our civilisation. Further, the IPCC expects the average person on earth to be 1,700% richer by the end of this century.

## Warming D

**\*\*\*2nc/1nr – No Impact – Resiliency**

***\*\*Environment can survive anything***

**Easterbrook 96** (Gregg, sr editor, The New Republic, former fellow at the Brookings Institute, A Movement on the Earth, p. 25)

"Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But **the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong**. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. **The environment** that contains them **is** close to **indestructible.** The living environment of **Earth has survived ice ages**; bombardments of **cosmic radiation** more deadly than atomic fallout; **solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion;** **thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory**; **reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains;** **fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets** bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; **and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still.** **Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape.** **Human assaults on the environment**, though mischievous, **are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.**

***\*\*Intervening actors check --- we know how to tackle warming and their impacts are long term --- let another policymaker deal with it***

(also answer to warming kills econ)

**Kenny 12** (Charles Kenny is a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, a Schwartz fellow at the New America Foundation, and author, most recently, of Getting Better: Why Global Development Is Succeeding and How We Can Improve the World Even More. "The Optimist," his column for ForeignPolicy.com runs weekly.

4-9-12, Foreign Policy, Not Too Hot to Handle, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/09/not_too_hot_to_handle?page=0,1>, jj

But for all international diplomats appear desperate to affirm the self-worth of pessimists and doomsayers worldwide, **it is important to put climate change in** a broader **context**. It is a vital global issue -- one that threatens to slow the worldwide march toward improved quality of life. Climate change is already responsible for more extreme weather and an accelerating rate of species extinction -- and may ultimately kill off as many as 40 percent of all living species. But **it is** also **a problem that we know how to tackle**, **and one to which we have some time to respond before it is likely to completely derail progress.** And that's good news, because the fact that it's manageable is the best reason to try to tackle it rather than abandon all hope like a steerage class passenger in the bowels of the Titanic.

Start with the economy. The Stern Review, led by the distinguished British economist Nicholas Stern, is the most comprehensive look to date at the economics of climate change. It suggests that, in terms of income, ***g*reen*h*ouse *g*asses are a threat to global growth, but hardly an immediate or catastrophic one.** Take the impact of climate change on the developing world. The most depressing forecast in terms of developing country growth in Stern's paper is the "A2 scenario" -- one of a series of economic and greenhouse gas emissions forecasts created for the U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It's a model that predicts slow global growth and income convergence (poor countries catching up to rich countries). But **even under this model, Afghanistan's GDP per capita climbs sixfold over the next 90 years, India and China ninefold, and Ethiopia's income increases by a factor of 10**. Knock off a third for the most pessimistic simulation of the economic impact of climate change suggested by the Stern report, and **people in those countries are still markedly better off -- four times as rich for Afghanistan, a little more than six times as rich for Ethiopia.**

It's worth emphasizing that the Stern report suggests that **the costs of dramatically reducing greenhouse-gas emissions is closer to 1 (or maybe 2) percent of world GDP -- in the region of $600 billion to $1.2 trillion today.** The economic case for responding to climate change by pricing carbon and investing in alternate energy sources is a slam dunk. But for all the likelihood that the world will be a poorer, denuded place than it would be if we responded rapidly to reduce greenhouse gases, **the global economy is probably not going to collapse over the next century even if we are idiotic enough to delay our response to climate change by a few years**. **For all the flooding, the drought, and the skyrocketing bills for air conditioning, the economy would keep on expanding, according to the data that Stern uses.**

And what about the impact on global health? Suggestions that malaria has already spread as a result of climate change and that malaria deaths will expand dramatically as a result of warming in the future don't fit the evidence of declining deaths and reduced malarial spread over the last century. The authors of a recent study published in the journal Nature conclude that **the forecasted future effects of rising temperatures on malaria "are at least one order of magnitude smaller than the changes observed since about 1900 and about two orders of magnitude smaller than those that can be achieved by the effective scale-up of key control measures**." In other words, **climate change is and will likely remain a small factor in the toll of malaria deaths into the foreseeable future.**

What about other diseases? Christian Zimmermann at the University of Connecticut and Douglas Gollin at Williams evaluate the likely impact of a 3-degree rise in temperatures on tropical diseases like dengue fever, which causes half a million cases of hemorrhagic fever and 22,000 deaths each year. **Most of the vectors for such diseases -- mosquitoes, biting flies, and so on -- do poorly in frost. So if the weather stays warmer, these diseases are likely to spread**. At the same time, **there are existing tools to prevent or treat most tropical diseases**, and Zimmerman and Gollin suggest "**rather modest improvements in protection efficacy could compensate for the consequences of climate change." We can deal with this one.**

**It's the same with agriculture. Global warming will have** many negative (and a few **positive) impacts on food supply**, but it is likely that other impacts -- both positive, including technological change, and negative, like the exhaustion of aquifers-- will have far bigger effects. The 2001 IPCC report suggested that climate change over the long term could reduce agricultural yields by as much as 30 percent. Compare that with the 90 percent increase in rice yields in Indonesia between 1970 and 2006, for example.

Again, **while climate change will make extreme weather events and natural disasters like flooding and hurricanes more common, the negative effect on global quality of life will be reduced if economies continue to grow**. That's because, as Matthew Kahn from Tufts University has shown, the safest place to suffer a natural disaster is in a rich country. **The more money that people and governments have, the more they can both afford and enforce building codes, land use regulations, and public infrastructure like flood defenses that lower death tolls.**

**Let's also not forget how human psychology works.** **Too many environmentalists suggest that dealing with climate change will take immediate and radical retooling of the global economy. It won't. It is affordable, practical, and wouldn't take a revolution**. Giving out the message that the only path to sustainability will require medieval standards of living only puts everyone else off. And once you've convinced yourself the world is on an inevitable course to disaster if some corner of the U.S. Midwest is fracked once more or India builds another three coal-fueled power plants, the only logical thing to do when the fracking or the building occurs is to sit back, put your Toms shoes on the couch, and drink micro-brewed herbal tea until civilization collapses. Climate change isn't like that -- or at the very least, isn't like that yet.

**So, if you're really just looking for a reason to strap on the "end of the world is nigh" placards and go for a walk, you can find better excuses -- like, say, the threat of global thermonuclear war or a rogue asteroid. The fight to curb greenhouse gas emissions is one for the hard-nosed optimist.**

**\*No Impact – Adaptation**

***\*\*No impact---mitigation and adaptation will solve---no tipping point or “1% risk” args***

Robert O. **Mendelsohn 9**, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human‐ induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). **Proponents argue there is no time to waste**. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006). **These statements are largely alarmist and misleading**. **Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences**. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that **emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences.** **The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century** (or two in the case of Stern 2006) **of no mitigation**. **Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation**. The **net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless**. **Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt**. **It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks**. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

### \*\*\*EXT – Aerosols

#### Warming slowing - volcanoes

Perkins, 3/5/13 (Sid, “Recent Global Warming Slowed by Volcanoes,” http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2013/03/climate-change-volcanoes/, bgm)

Global average temperatures have been rising in recent years, but not as much as they might have, thanks to a series of small-to-moderate-sized volcanic eruptions that have spewed sunlight-blocking particles high into the atmosphere. That’s the conclusion of a new study, which also finds that microscopic particles derived from industrial smokestacks have done little to cool the globe. Between 2000 and 2010, the average atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide — a planet-warming greenhouse gas — rose more than 5%, from about 370 parts per million to nearly 390 parts per million. If that uptick were the only factor driving climate change during the period, global average temperature would have risen about 0.2°C, says Ryan Neely III, an atmospheric scientist at the University of Colorado, Boulder. But a surge in the concentration of light-scattering particles in the stratosphere countered as much as 25% of that potential temperature increase, he notes.

#### Warming slowing – SO2 from volcanoes

redOrbit, 3/2/13 (“Volcanic Emissions Responsible For Slowing Global Warming From 2000 To 2010,” http://www.redorbit.com/news/science/1112795104/volcanoes-spewing-sulfur-dioxide-slow-global-warming-030213/, bgm)

Global warming was slowed between 2000 and 2010 because of sulfur dioxide spewed forth by volcanoes, researchers from the University of Colorado Boulder (CU-Boulder) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) claim in a new study. Some experts had blamed China and India for the phenomenon, as both countries increased their industrial sulfur dioxide emissions by an estimated 60 percent during that decade. The new findings essentially exonerates those two Asian nations, lead author Ryan Neely of the Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences (CIRES) said Friday in a statement.

#### Warming is slowing

Rojas, 1/8/13 (John-Paul Ford, “Global warming at a standstill, new Met Office figures show,” http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/climatechange/9787662/Global-warming-at-a-standstill-new-Met-Office-figures-show.html, bgm)

A new scientific model has revised previous figures for the next five years downwards by around a fifth. The forecast compares how much higher average world temperatures are likely to be than the “long-term average” from 1971-2000.It had been thought that this would be 0.54C during the period 2012 -2016 but new data puts the figure for the 2013-2017 period at 0.43C.

**\*\*\*2nc/1nr – No Warming/Yes Cooling**

***Non-unique --- cooling is the trend***

Warming science is junk --- the earth is cooling --- extend Star Tribune --- our ev cites a British astrophysicist --- China just had its coldest winter in 100 years, it snowed in Baghdad and Britain had its coldest winter since 1683 --- prefer our evidence because it cities empirical data, which can’t be manipulated like their computer models --- “climate” gate proves their ev can’t be trusted --- warming is cyclical.

**Star Tribune**, March 19th, 20**11** (“Jason Lewis: Climate change is natural, and we don’t have the data to predict it” <http://www.startribune.com/opinion/commentary/118270544.html>, jj)

All in the name of a [**global warming theory**](http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/gore-lecture_en.html) whose fundamental premise **looks weaker every day**. Not long ago, the [Heartland Institute asserted](http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/gleick/detail?entry_id=82761) that **NASA had "been artificially inflating U.S. temperatures by 0.15 degrees Celsius since the year 2000**" and as a result erroneously reported that readings over the last decade "were warmer than the 1930s, when in fact the opposite was true." Eventually, agency officials did recant 1998 as the hottest on U.S. record when the data were reanalyzed showing the pre-greenhouse-gas era year of 1934 to be slightly warmer. **Across the globe, the last few winters have been exceedingly harsh. China has endured its most severe winter in 100 years, snow has fallen in Baghdad, and the U**nited **K**ingdom **just suffered through its coldest December since 1683**, according to figures from the Met Office. **British astrophysicist** David **Whitehouse says that not only have temperatures leveled off since 1998, they may actually be cooling once again**. Of course, that doesn't mean it's so. In 1975, Newsweek cited the scientific consensus (heard that one before?) about the coming danger of global cooling. Temperatures had been declining since 1940 even as carbon dioxide levels rose. Regardless of who is correct, we would do well to remember that cold is far more calamitous for mankind than the purported 0.6 degrees Celsius rise in the last century. Besides, as a growing number of "[climate skeptics](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8694544.stm)" point out, **atmospheric variables tend to mitigate or reverse the effects of greenhouse gases**. **By not accurately accounting for the "negative feedback" of water vapor, ocean currents, ozone, aerosols, volcanoes and, most important, solar output** (as well as the diminishing effects of accumulated greenhouse gases) **global-warming proponents allow themselves to sanctimoniously pronounce that, all things being equal, a rise in CO2 will elicit a rise in temperature**. Of course, all things are never equal. And therein lies the problem. **The global-warming hysteria is based on computer models, not empirical data**, because the records simply don't go back far enough. **If Climategate taught us anything, it's that these models are subject to human manipulation.** **The famous "hockey stick" graph showing rapid warming in the 20th century was thoroughly debunked by Canadian researchers even before the purloined e-mails showed how global warming researchers were desperately trying to "hide the decline" in temperatures**. Which is not to say that the Earth doesn't warm at times and ice doesn't melt in the Arctic. **The Earth warms** (see the Medieval Warm Period), **then it cools** (see the Little Ice Age), **and then it warms and ... well, you get the picture.**

**2nc/1nr – No Tipping Points**

***No tipping point***

**McGrath 11** – 4 August 2011. “Arctic 'tipping point' may not be reached” By Matt McGrath (Science reporter, BBC World Service)http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-14408930

The team said they had found an indirect method to give a picture of the ice cover dating back 11,000 years Scientists say current concerns over a tipping point in the disappearance of Arctic sea ice may be misplaced. Danish researchers analysed ancient pieces of driftwood in north Greenland which they say is an accurate way to measure the extent of ancient ice loss. **Writing in the journal Science, the team found evidence that ice levels were about 50% lower 5,000 years ago. They say changes to wind systems can slow down the rate of melting. They argue, therefore, that a tipping point under current scenarios is unlikely.** While modern observations by ship and by satellite give us a very accurate picture of the recent state of the ice, historic information is limited. The ice comes and goes without leaving a permanent record. But a Danish team believes it has found an indirect method that gives a clear picture of the ice loss dating back 11,000 years. Dr Svend Funder from the Natural History Museum of Denmark led several expeditions to inhospitable regions of Northern Greenland. On these frozen shores the Danish team noticed several pieces of ancient driftwood. They concluded that it could be an important method of unlocking the secrets of the ancient ice. "Driftwood cannot float across the water, it has to be ferried across the ocean on ice, and this voyage takes several years, which means that driftwood is actually a signal of multi-year sea ice in the ocean and it is this ice that is at risk at the moment," said Dr Funder. Carbon dating was used to determine the age of the wood. And figuring out its origins also yielded important information. "It's so lovely that drift wood from Siberia is mainly larch and from North America is mainly spruce. So if we see there was more larch or spruce we can see that the wind system had changed and in some periods there was little spruce and in other periods there was lots," he said. Wind delay? As well as the driftwood, the scientists mapped beach ridges for 500km (310 miles) along the coast. This proved that at one time the waves had reached the shore unhindered by the ice. Dr Funder and his team say their data shows a clear connection between temperature and the amount of sea ice**. The researchers concluded that for about 3,000 years, during a period called the Holocene Climate Optimum, there was more open water and far less ice than today - probably less than 50% of the minimum Arctic sea ice recorded in 2007. But the researcher says that even with a loss of this size, the sea ice will not reach a point of no return. "I think we can say that with the loss of 50% of the current ice, the tipping point wasn't reached."** The idea of an Arctic tipping point has been highlighted by many scientists in recent years. They have argued that when enough ice is lost it could cause a runaway effect with disastrous consequences.

**Ocean Ext – Resilient**

***Massive size of oceans checks snowball and ensures slow timeframe.***

Bjørn **Lomborg,** Director, Environmental Assessment Institute, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST, 20**01**p. 189

But the **oceans are so incredibly big that our impact on them has been astoundingly insignificant** **- the oceans contain more than 1,000 billion liters of water**. The UN’s overall evaluation of the oceans concludes: “**The open sea is still relatively clean**. **Low levels** of lead, synthetic compounds and artificial radionuclides, though widely detectable, **are biologically insignificant**. Oil slicks and litter are common among sea leans, but are, at present, **a minor consequences to communities of organisms living in ocean waters.**

***Alt causes and no impact***

Alt causes --- overfishing, etc

pH variation is inevitable --- has no impact

empirically denied by underwater springs --- they’re super acidic yet calcification happens

**Ridley 12** (Matt Ridley has been a scientist, journalist and businessman. With BA and DPhil degrees from Oxford University, he worked for the Economist for nine years as science editor, Washington correspondent and American editor, before becoming a self-employed writer and businessman. He was founding chairman of the International Centre for Life in Newcastle, January 7 2012, “Taking Fears of Acid Oceans With a Grain of Salt”, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203550304577138561444464028.html>)

**Coral reefs around the world are suffering badly from overfishing and various forms of pollution. Yet many experts argue that the greatest threat to them is the acidification of the oceans from the dissolving of man-made carbon dioxide emissions. The effect of acidification, according to J.E.N. Veron,** an Australian coral scientist, **will be "nothing less than catastrophic**.... What were once thriving coral gardens that supported the greatest biodiversity of the marine realm will become red-black bacterial slime, and they will stay that way." **This is a common view**. The Natural Resources Defense Council has called ocean acidification "the scariest environmental problem you've never heard of." Sigourney Weaver, who narrated a film about the issue, said that "the scientists are freaked out." The head of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration calls it global warming's "equally evil twin." **But do the scientific data support such alarm? Last month scientists** at San Diego's Scripps Institution of Oceanography and other authors **published a study showing how much the pH level** (measuring alkalinity versus acidity) **varies naturally between parts of the ocean and at different times of the day, month and year. "On both a monthly and annual scale, even the most stable open ocean sites see pH changes many times larger than the annual rate of acidification**," say the authors of the study, adding that because good instruments to measure ocean pH have only recently been deployed, "**this variation has been under-appreciated." Over coral reefs, the pH decline between dusk and dawn is almost half as much as the decrease in average pH expected over the next 100 years. *The noise is greater than the signal.* Another recent study**, by scientists from the U.K., Hawaii and Massachusetts, **concluded that "marine and freshwater assemblages have always experienced variable pH conditions," and that "in many freshwater lakes, pH changes that are orders of magnitude greater than those projected for the 22nd-century oceans can occur over periods of hours." This adds to other hints that the ocean-acidification problem may have been exaggerated. For a start, the ocean is alkaline and in no danger of becoming acid** (despite headlines like that from Reuters in 2009: "Climate Change Turning Seas Acid"). **If the average pH of the ocean drops to 7.8 from 8.1 by 2100 as predicted, it will still be well above seven, the neutral point where alkalinity becomes acidity. The central concern is that lower pH will make it harder for corals, clams and other "calcifier" creatures to make calcium carbonate skeletons and shells. Yet this concern also may be overstated. Off Papua New Guinea** and the Italian island of Ischia, where natural carbon-dioxide bubbles from volcanic vents make the sea less alkaline, and off the Yucatan, **where underwater springs make seawater actually acidic, studies have shown that at least some kinds of calcifiers still thrive—at least as far down as pH 7.8.** In a recent experiment in the Mediterranean, reported in Nature Climate Change, **corals and mollusks were transplanted to lower pH sites, where they proved "able to calcify and grow at even faster than normal rates when exposed to the high [carbon-dioxide] levels** projected for the next 300 years." In any case, freshwater mussels thrive in Scottish rivers, where the pH is as low as five. **Laboratory experiments find that more marine creatures thrive than suffer when carbon dioxide lowers the pH level to 7.8. This is because the carbon dioxide dissolves mainly as bicarbonate, which many calcifiers use as raw material for carbonate. Human beings have indeed placed marine ecosystems under terrible pressure, but the chief culprits are overfishing and pollution.** By comparison, **a very slow reduction in the alkalinity of the oceans, well within the range of natural variation, is a modest threat, and it certainly *does not merit apocalyptic headlines.***

***Deep-sea floor checks.***

**SOUTH BEND TRIBUNE**, October 19, 19**95**, p. A10

Rough estimates for the number of species on the deep-sea floor have now soared to 10 million or even 100 million, hundreds of times larger than the old projections of 200,000 species for all types of marine life. The new figures also contrast starkly with the sum of the earth's plants, animals and microbes that scientists have so far named, about 1.4 million species in all. And they match the 10 million to 100 million that experts had projected as possible totals for the number of terrestrial species. "It's changing our whole view about biodiversity," said Dr. P. John D. Lambshead, a marine biologist at the Natural History Museum in London who studies the abundance of deep ocean species. "The quantity of life we've found is incredible," he added in an interview. "All sorts of ecologic theories that looked good, based on terrestrial models, suddenly fall apart. We're having to change all our ideas."

***No risk of extinction, species are abundant in the floors of the deep oceans***

**SOUTH BEND TRIBUNE**, October 19, **1995**, p. A10

Frigid and lightless, the floors of the deep oceans have long been considered a biological desert. So it is with no little astonishment that marine biologists are now discovering that the supposed desert seethes with a riot of life. The diversity of species is so high that it may rival that of tropical rain forests, often seen as the pinnacle of biological richness.

**Frontline – A2: Bio-D**

***Biodiversity resilient – ecosystems will quickly recover from damage***

**McDermott** 20**09** (Mat, Editor for Business and Energy sections; Master Degree from NYU’s Center for Global Affairs in environment and energy policy. May, 27, 2009: “Good News: Most Ecosystems Can Recover in One Lifetime from Human-Induced or Natural Disturbance”; <http://www.treehugger.com/natural-sciences/good-news-most-ecosystems-can-recover-in-one-lifetime-from-human-induced-or-natural-disturbance.html>)

**There's a reason the phrase "let nature take its course" exists**: New research done at the Yale University School of Forestry & Environmental Science reinforces the idea that **ecosystems are quiet resilient and can rebound from pollution and environmental degradation**. Published in the journal PLoS ONE, the study shows that **most damaged ecosystems worldwide can recover within a single lifetime**, if the source of pollution is removed and restoration work done. The analysis found that **on average forest ecosystems can recover in 42 years, while in takes only about 10 years for the ocean bottom to recover**. If an area has seen multiple, interactive disturbances, it can take on average 56 years for recovery. In general, most ecosystems take longer to recover from human-induced disturbances than from natural events, such as hurricanes.

To reach these recovery averages, the researchers looked at data from peer-reviewed studies over the past 100 years on the rate of ecosystem recovery once the source of pollution was removed.

Interestingly, the researchers found that **it appears that the rate at which an ecosystem recovers may be independent of its degraded condition: Aquatic systems may recover more quickly than, say, a forest, because the species and organisms that live in that ecosystem turn over more rapidly than in the forest.**

As to what this all means, Oswald Schmitz, professor of ecology at Yale and report co-author, says that this analysis shows that an increased effort to restore damaged ecosystems is justified, and that:

Restoration could become a more important tool in the management portfolio of conservation organizations that are entrusted to protect habitats on landscapes.

We recognize that **humankind has and will continue to actively domesticate nature to meet its own needs**. The message of our paper is that **recovery is possible and can be rapid for many ecosystems**, giving much hope for a transition to sustainable management of global ecosystems.

***Large scale species extinctions won’t happen---they can adapt***

**Michaels ’06** (Patrick J, senior fellow in environmental studies at the Cato Institute and professor of natural resources at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, former president of the American Association of State Climatologists and an author of the 2003 climate science “Paper of the Year” selected by the Association of American Geographers, Ph.D. in ecological climatology from the University of Wisconsin at Madison, Author of Meltdown: The Predictable Distortion of Global Warming by Scientists, Politicians, and the Media, CATO, “Is the Sky Really Falling? A Review of Recent Global Warming Scare Stories” <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6622>, jj)

Thomas used a variety of scenarios for future climate change. **The “low” scenario, with a global average warming of 0.8°C** (1.4°F) **resulted in an extinction of approximately 20 percent of the world’s species. Like many glib statements about global warming, this forms a testable hypothesis, which fails miserably. Surface temperature changed this amount in the 20th century, and there is simply no evidence for a massive climate- related extinction**. What seems remarkable, though, is that the peer-reviewers at Nature did not pick this up. In calculating extinctions, Thomas et al. simply noted the observed temperature envelope in which a species lives today, and if that environment no longer existed on the species’ landmass because of global warming, it was assumed to be “extinct.” This neglects the fact that **species often thrive beyond their gross climatic envelope**. **Almost all major tree species in North America have separate “disjunct” populations far away from their main climatic distribution. A fine example is the northern Christmas tree, Abies balsamea, whose main distribution is across Canada**. **But there is a tiny forest of the balsam fir naturally occurring in eastern Iowa**, hundreds of miles south (and several degrees (F) warmer) than the climatic envelope that Thomas et al. would assume.77 **Disjunct populations are the rule, not the exception, and are one reason why the most diverse ecosystem on earth—the tropical rainforest— managed to survive the ice age, by taking refuge in small disjuncts whose local climate was much different from the regional one. Variations in topography and landform create cul-de-sacs where species thrive far from their gross climate envelopes. It is logical to assume that a fractionating (changing) climate will produce more disjuncts, not fewer.**

***Ecosystems can adapt***

**CO2 Science 9-19**-12 (CO2 Science, Volume 15 Number 38: 19 September 2012, <http://www.co2science.org/issues/v15/v15n38_co2science.php>, jj)

Background

In introducing their huge collaborative study, the sixty-eight authors say "**it is well documented that plants** (Mooney et al., 1978; Berry and Bjorkman, 1980; Atkin and Tjoelker, 2003), **animals** (Parmesan, 2006), **and microbes** (Bradford et al., 2008) **acclimate and/or adapt to prevailing environmental conditions in a way that can optimize their functioning under varying temperatures**, which is collectively termed optimality (Parker and Maynard Smith, 1990)," and they hypothesize that "**the integrated response of an ecosystem, as an assemblage of interacting organisms, might also demonstrate thermal optimality under temperature change**," citing Loreau (2010).

What was done

In a study designed to test the merits of their hypothesis, Niu et al. "compiled data from 169 globally distributed sites of eddy covariance and quantified the temperature response functions of net ecosystem exchange (NEE), an ecosystem-level property, to determine whether NEE shows thermal optimality and to explore the underlying mechanisms."

What was learned

**The international team of researchers** - hailing from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States - **say they found that "the temperature response of NEE followed a peak curve, with the optimum temperature** (corresponding to the maximum magnitude of NEE) **being positively correlated with annual mean temperature over years and across sites**," and they say that "shifts of the optimum temperature of NEE were mostly a result of temperature acclimation of gross primary productivity (upward shift of optimum temperature) rather than changes in the temperature sensitivity of ecosystem respiration." In addition, however, they indicate that "**extended growing seasons, increased nitrogen mineralization, and enhanced root growth** (Penuelas and Filella, 2001; Churkina et al., 2005; Luo et al., 2009) may also **have contributed to the increased CO2 uptake under higher temperatures, leading to the upward shift in the optimum temperature of gross primary productivity in warmer years."**

What it means

**If the world begins to warm again, for whatever reason, we can probably expect the bulk of the planet's vast array of ecosystems to become even more productive than they are today.**

**Frontline – A2: Droughts**

***No droughts impact***

**Idso & Idso**, June 15th, 20**11** (Craig D, PhD, Sherwood B, CO2 Science, “Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Carbon Dioxide and Earth’s Future Pursuing the Prudent Path” <http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/prudentpath/prudentpath.pdf>, jj)

**So with megadroughts occurring at cooler-than-present temperatures and with no-analog megadroughts occurring at warmer-than-present temperatures, one must consider the possibility that something other than temperature is the driving force behind their occurrence. And there are a number of scientists who feel that that “something other” is solar variability**, such as Black et al. (1999), who stated that “small changes in solar output may influence Atlantic variability on centennial time scales,” Yu and Ito (1999), who felt forced “to consider solar variability as the major cause of century-scale drought frequency in the northern Great Plains,” Dean and Schwalb (2000), who concluded “**it seems reasonable that the cycles in aridity and eolian activity over the past several thousand years recorded in the sediments of lakes in the northern Great Plains might also have a solar connection,**” Verschuren et al. (2000), who indicated that **variations in solar activity “may have contributed to decade-scale rainfall variability in equatorial east Africa**,” Hodell et al. (2001), who wrote that “**a significant component of century-scale variability in Yucatan droughts is explained by solar forcing,**” Mensing et al. (2004), who concluded that “**changes in solar irradiance may be a possible mechanism influencing century-scale drought in the western Great Basin” of the United States**, Asmerom et al. (2007), who suggest that a solar link to Holocene climate operates “through changes in the Walker circulation and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation and El Niño-Southern Oscillation systems of the tropical Pacific Ocean,” Garcin et al. (2007), who emphasize that the positive correlation of Lake Masoko hydrology with various solar activity proxies “implies a forcing of solar activity on the atmospheric circulation and thus on the regional climate of [a] part of East Africa,” and Springer et al. (2008), who say their findings “corroborate works indicating that millennial-scale solar-forcing is responsible for droughts and ecosystem changes in central and eastern North America,” In one final and exceptionally perceptive paper dealing with North American droughts, Cook et al. (2009) wrote that “IPCC Assessment Report 4 model projections suggest that the subtropical dry zones of the world will both dry and expand poleward in the future due to greenhouse warming,” and that “the US southwest is particularly vulnerable in this regard and model projections indicate a progressive drying there out to the end of the 21st century.” However, they then wrote that “**the USA has been in a state of drought over much of the West for about 10 years now,” and that “while severe, this turn of the century drought has not yet clearly exceeded the severity of two exceptional droughts in the 20th century**,” so that “while the coincidence between the turn of the century drought and projected drying in the Southwest is cause for concern, **it is premature to claim that the model projections are correct**.” We begin to understand this fact when we compare the “turn of the century drought” with the two “exceptional droughts” that preceded it by a few decades. Based on gridded instrumental Palmer Drought Severity indices for tree ring reconstruction that extend back to 1900, Cook et al. calculated that the turn-of-the-century drought had its greatest Drought Area Index value of 59% in the year 2002, while the Great Plains/Southwest drought covered 62% of the US in its peak year of 1954, and the Dust Bowl drought covered 77% of the US in 1934. In terms of drought duration, however, things are not quite as clear. Stahle et al. (2007) estimated that the first two droughts lasted for 12 and 14 years, respectively; Seager et al. (2005) estimated them to have lasted for 8 and 10 years; and Andreadis et al. (2005) estimated them to have lasted for 7 and 8 years, yielding means of 9 and 11 years for the two exceptional droughts, which durations are to be compared to 10 or so years for the turn-of-the-century drought, which again makes the latter drought not unprecedented compared to those that occurred earlier in the 20th century. **Real clarity, however, comes when the turn-of-the-century drought is compared to droughts of the prior millennium.** Cook et al. write that “**perhaps the most famous example is the ‘Great Drouth’** (sic) of AD 1276-1299 described by A.E. Douglass (1929, 1935).” **Yet this 24-year drought was eclipsed by the 38-year drought that was found by Weakley** (1965) **to have occurred in Nebraska from AD 1276 to 1313**, which Cook et al. say “may have been a more prolonged northerly extension of the ‘Great Drouth’.” **But even these multi-decade droughts truly pale in comparison to the “two extraordinary droughts discovered by Stine** (1994) **in California that lasted more than two centuries before AD 1112 and more than 140 years before AD 1350**.” And each of these megadroughts, as Cook et al. describe them, occurred, in their words, “in the so-called Medieval Warm Period.” And they add that “**all of this happened prior to the strong greenhouse gas warming that began with the Industrial Revolution** [authors’ italics].” In further ruminating about these facts in the “Conclusions and Recommendations” section of their paper, Cook et al. again state that **the medieval megadroughts “occurred without any need for enhanced radiative forcing due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas forcing**.” And, therefore, they go on to say “**there is no guarantee that the response of the climate system to greenhouse gas forcing will result in megadroughts of the kind experienced by North America in the pas**t**.” In summation, these and many other studies conducted at various locations throughout North America -**- Laird et al. (1998), Woodhouse and Overpeck (1998), Cronin et al. (2000), Fritz et al. (2000), Hidalgo et al. (2000), Benson et al. (2002), Knapp et al. (2002), Ni et al. (2002), Gray et al. (2003), Gedalof et al. (2004), Gray et al. (2004a,b), Mauget (2004), Mensing et al. (2004), Quiring (2004), Daniels and Knox (2005), Forman et al. (2005), Shapley et al. (2005), Rasmussen et al. (2006), Malamud-Roam et al. (2006), Tian et al. (2006), Woodhouse et al. (2006), Woodhouse and Lukas (2006), MacDonald and Tingstad (2007), Meko et al. (2007), MacDonald et al. (2008) and Springer et al. (2008) -- **dispute the climate-alarmist claim that warming must always result in more frequent and more severe drought, while studies conducted on other continents have led to the same conclusion**. However, to not unnecessarily lengthen this section of our report, we conclude it by merely providing the journal references to some of these studies in the following paragraph.

**A2: Agriculture Impacts 1NC**

***Organic switch solves***

**Striepe 7/12** (Becky, writer for Eat Drink Better, an advocacy and support website for sustainable farming practices, citing peer-reviewed studies and a writer for HuffPo, “Could organic farming be the key to feeding a warming world?” 2012 http://eatdrinkbetter.com/2012/07/12/could-organic-farming-be-the-key-to-feeding-a-warming-world/)

Climate change is about more than just hotter summers. **As the world heats up, we’re** also **expected to see more** extreme weather and increased incidences of **drought**. **That presents challenges to the farmers producing our food,** and according to research from the Rodale Institute, **the answer may be organic farming**. According to Tom Philpott at Mother Jones: …**organically managed soils deal with water better**—both **in** conditions of **drought and heavy storms (the frequency of which is also expected to increase as the climate changes)**. Soil rich in **organic matter** (well-decayed remnants of plants and other living creatures) **bolster soil in weather extremes by helping store water in times of scarcity and by holding together and not eroding away during heavy rains**.¶ We can argue all day about whether GMOs are healthy for our bodies, but what the GMO debate really comes down to is feeding the world. This is a major argument that pro-GMO groups use, and studies like this one call that reasoning into question. **Rodale has been doing side-by-side testing of organic and GMO crops since the early 80s, and during times of drought they are finding that organics outperformed industrial farming techniques by 31 percent** (you can check out the Rodale report (pdf) here). During times of more normal weather, organic and industrial yields were comparable.¶ ¶ GMO advocates often accuse folks who speak out against GMOs and industrial ag as being anti-science, but Rodale’s **three decades of research looks like some pretty solid science to me.**

**Famine 1NC**

***Warming doesn’t cause famine***

**Goklany 2012** [Indur, Indur M. Goklany is a science and technology policy analyst for the United States Department of the Interior, where he holds the position of Assistant Director of Programs, Science and Technology Policy. He has represented the United States at the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and during the negotiations that led to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. He was a rapporteur for the Resource Use and Management Subgroup of Working Group III of the IPCC First Assessment Report in 1990, Economic Development in Developing Countries: Advancing Human Well‐Being and the Capacity to Adapt to Global Warming, <http://books.google.com/books?id=vO2ppGUrkEgC&pg=PA1&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q=157&f=false>] Awirth

Agricultural Productivity and Hunger. **Proponents of greenhouse gas controls frequently proclaim that global warming will reduce crop productivity in the developing world, thereby exacerbating hunger and famine** (e.g., Freeman and Guzman, p. 116 , fn 62). But contrary to GW hype, as shown in Figure 1, **crop productivity and production has actually increased in the least developed countries** (LDCs) **as well as globally**. Because of **the increase in agricultural productivity and trade in agricultural and food inputs and outputs** (Goklany 1998, 2007b), the portion of the developing world’s population suffering from **chronic hunger declined** for decades. From 1969‐1971 to 2003‐2005 it declined **from 33% to 16%** (FAO 2009a: 11). However, it has started to rise once again, at least temporarily (Figure 2; FAO 2009a). It increased to about 17% in 2008 and is projected to be higher for 2009. But, as shown in Figure 1, productivity clearly has not declined. Therefore, **the recent increase in hunger cannot be due to any loss of productivity due to global warming**. In fact, **the** Food and Agricultural Organization (**FAO) ascribes the increase in hunger to the surge in food prices, the global economic slowdown, insufficient investment in agriculture and biofuel production which has diverted crops from food to fuel production** (FAO 2009a, 2009b). Ironically, **the hype about GW is responsible for the mandates and subsidies that drive biofuel production.** Moreover, **as investments in agriculture have dropped, spending on GW has increased.**

## Gpw

**2NC – Yes Great Power War**

***\*\*War still likely --- the world is more dangerous now than during the Cold War.***

Paul **Miller**, 12/20/**2011.** Assistant professor of international security studies at the National Defense University, former director for Afghanistan on the National Security Council and political analyst in the U.S. intelligence community, specializing in South Asia. “[How Dangerous is the World? Part IV](http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/19/how_dangerous_is_the_world_part_iv),” Foreign Policy, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/19/how\_dangerous\_is\_the\_world\_part\_iv.

In my [previous](http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/16/how_dangerous_is_the_world_part_i_by_paul_miller) [three](http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/16/how_dangerous_is_the_world_part_ii) posts, I argued that the world today is more dangerous than it was during the Cold War because the threat from Russia and China is still present, on top of which we face new threats from new nuclear autocracies hostile to the United States, including North Korea, soon Iran, and possibly Pakistan.

In addition to the old-fashioned state-centric threats of hostile nuclear powers, the United States now faces a whole new category of threats that simply did not exist during the Cold War:  the threats that come when state failure meets globalization, when non-state actors can operate with impunity outside the write of any law but act with global reach because of new technology.  These are the threats that are the current fads of IR and security studies:  pirates, organized crime, drug cartels, human traffickers, WikiLeaks, hackers, the global Islamist "pansurgency," and, yes, terrorists.  (Throw in pandemic disease and ecological disaster and you get all the research funding you want.)

There is nothing new about the existence of many of these actors, of course.  Pirates and terrorists have existed for centuries.  However, their ability to present an immediate and large-scale threat to the United States is new, or at least greater than during the Cold War.  Travel and communication is easier and weapons technology is more lethal, state failure is more widespread (giving them more space to operate with impunity), while U.S. and allied border, port, and infrastructure security has not kept up.

I earlier argued that the faddish, new-fangled theories about non-state actors were overstated.  They are, but that doesn't mean they're completely wrong.  Osama bin Laden and Julian Assange clearly did massive and irrevocable harm to the United States in ways literally inconceivable for a non-state actor during the Cold War; the same may be true of the drug gangs in Mexico today.  Coupled with the United States' almost complete lack of homeland security, and there is a very real possibility of large-scale, massive, direct harm to the U.S. homeland from a globalized non-state actor.

The preeminent threat of this type is, of course, the global campaign by violent Islamist militants and terrorists to eject the "west" from "Muslim lands," overthrow secular governments and replace them with Islamic regimes, and establish the supremacy of their brand of Islam across the world.  (I agree here with David Kilcullen's [characterization](http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf) of the conflict as a global insurgency).  Violent Islamist movements have done most of their direct damage to people and states across the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia.  But those attacks certainly don't make the world safer for the United States, nor would their victory in, for example, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia.  And the movement has, of course, directly attacked the United States and our European allies.  Note that violent Islamist groups-whether al Qaida or Hamas or Hezbollah or al Shabaab or Lashkar-e Taiba-typically flourish in and around weak and failing states.

The only thing comparable to the global proliferation of Islamist insurgencies and terrorist movements over the last two decades was the Soviet Union's sponsorship of communist insurgencies around the world during the Cold War.  But the Islamist insurgencies are likely to be more resilient, harder to defeat, and more dangerous because they are decentralized, because their ideology is not linked to the fate of one particular regime, because globalization has made it easier for them to operate on a global scale, and because of the higher risk that Islamists will acquire and use weapons of mass destruction since they are not accountable to a deterable sponsoring power.

Even setting the threat from violent Islamism aside, a host of other non-state actors threaten the world order and make American leadership more costly.  In fact, the aggregate effect of state failure multiplied across scores of states across the world is so great that "failed states may eventually present a systemic risk to the liberal world order, of which the United States is the principal architect and beneficiary," as I argue in the [current issue of PRISM](http://www.ndu.edu/press/how-to-fix-failed-states.html).  State failure and the rise of non-state actors-a problem non-existent during the cold war-is a threat to American national security.

Conclusion

Essentially, the United States thus faces two great families of threats today:  first, the nuclear-armed authoritarian powers, of which there are at least twice as many as there were during the Cold War; second, the aggregate consequences of state failure and the rise of non-state actors in much of the world, which is a wholly new development since the Cold War.  On both counts, ***the world is more dangerous*** than it was before 1989.  Essentially take the Cold War, add in several more players with nukes, and then throw in radicalized Islam, rampant state failure, and the global economic recession, and you have today.

I recognize that the world doesn't feel as dangerous as it did during the Cold War.  During the Cold War we all knew about the threat and lived with a constant awareness-usually shoved to the back of ours minds to preserve our sanity-that we might die an instantaneous firey death at any moment.  We no longer feel that way.

Our feelings are wrong.  The Cold War engaged our emotions more because it was simple, easily understood, and, as an ideological contest, demanded we take sides and laid claim to our loyalties.  Today's environment is more complex and many-sided and so it is harder to feel the threat the same way we used to.  Nonetheless, ***the danger is real***.

***\*\*World war three is still a distinct possibility***

**Ferguson ’08** (Niall, Harvard University, Spring, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, “Earning from history? Financial markets and the approach of world wars” project muse, jj)

A period such as the present, of sporadic terrorism and small conventional wars—a period of immense asymmetry in the global military balance, to the advantage of the Western powers—might therefore be expected to foster the belief in financial circles that future wars will also be small, with inconsequential financial effects. The seeming indifference of today’s financial markets to geopolitical risk should therefore be regarded not as evidence that the world will likely avoid a major conflict in the foreseeable future, but merely as evidence that the world has avoided a major conflict in the recent past. Given the relative youth of most employees in the financial sector, and the relative shortness of most senior executives’ careers, “recent” may be taken to mean at most [End Page 473] the past twenty-five years.[94](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.wayne.edu/journals/brookings_papers_on_economic_activity/v2008/2008.1.ferguson.html" \l "f94) A major conflict would strike this generation of bankers and fund managers much as the war of 1914 struck their predecessors: like a bolt from the blue. So is the lesson of history simply that there are no lessons from history? Not quite. **No two prewar situations are identical, but some have closer resemblances than others. Today there is, to repeat, a danger of a nuclear attack on the cities of the developed world. It may actually be greater than in 1950 or 1962, because of the difficulty of deterring terrorist aggressors. There is also a danger of some kind of interstate conflict centered on the Middle East. A deterioration of Sino-American relations is also a possibility**. Most informed commentators today would see these as relatively low-probability scenarios, and most investors appear to regard them as close to zero-probability events. Yet **it is easy to imagine future historians retrospectively constructing plausible chains of causation to explain how a concatenation of these threats produced another world war.** The advocates of “war guilt” would blame an aggressive Iran or China, leaving others to lament the sins of omission of a weary American titan. **Scholars of international relations would no doubt identify the systemic origins of the war in the breakdown of nuclear nonproliferation, the scramble for natural resources, the crisis of the Atlantic alliance, the rise of religious fundamentalism, the weakening of the United Nations, and so on**. Couched in the language of historical explanation, **a major conflagration can start to seem unnervingly probable in our time, just as it turned out to be in 1914. Some may even be tempted to say that the surge of commodity prices in the period since 2003 reflects some unconscious anticipation of the coming conflict. One important lesson of history is that major wars can arise even when economic globalization is very far advanced and the hegemonic position of an English-speaking empire seems fairly secure. The second important lesson is that the longer the world goes without a major war, the harder one becomes to imagine (and, perhaps, the easier one becomes to start**). The third and final lesson is that when a crisis strikes complacent investors, it causes much more disruption than when it strikes battle-scarred ones. Interminable overtures may be dispiriting. For financial markets, however, bolts from the blue are worse. [End Page 474]

***\*\*\*Nuclear war is specifically likely***

**Perkins, 7** – Staff Writer @ My Wire (Sid, [http://www.mywire.com/a/ScienceNews/Sudden-chill-even-limitednuclear/2906831?page=2](http://www.mywire.com/a/ScienceNews/Sudden-chill-even-limited%0dnuclear/2906831?page=2))

"While there's a perception that a nuclear build down by the world's major powers in recent decades has somehow resolved the global nuclear threat, a more accurate portrayal is that we're at a perilous crossroads," says Brian Toon, an atmospheric scientist at the University of Colorado at Boulder and one of the researchers who first floated the idea of a nuclear winter. Today's threat stems from a variety of factors, Toon and his colleagues say. Nations are joining the nuclear club with unnerving regularity, others are suspected of having ambitions to do so, and dozens more have enough uranium and plutonium on hand to build at least a few Hiroshima-size bombs. The leaders of some of these nations may have no qualms about using such weapons, even against a nonnuclear neighbor. Increasingly, people are living in large cities, which make tempting targets. Finally, the results of today's climate simulations--which are **much more sophisticated** than those that were available in the 1980s--suggest that even a nuclear exchange of just a few dozen weapons could cool Earth **substantially** for a decade or more. The current combination of nuclear proliferation, political instability, and urban demographics "forms perhaps the greatest danger to the stability of human society since the dawn of man," warns Toon. Recognizing this danger, on Jan. 17, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the minute hand on its "doomsday clock" 2 minutes closer to midnight. "It's been 60 years since nuclear weapons have been used in war, but the psychological barriers that have helped limit the potential for the use of nuclear weapons in this country and others seems to be breaking down" says Lawrence M. Krauss, a member of the group and a physicist at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland. JOIN THE CLUB In 1950, there were two nuclear powers--the United States, whose Manhattan Project developed the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II, and the Soviet Union, which conducted its first nuclear test in August 1949. By 1968, when the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was proposed, France, the United Kingdom, and China had joined the pack. Outside that treaty from its beginning, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have developed weapons and conducted tests. Also, Israel is widely suspected of possessing nuclear weapons. A handful of nations once possessed nuclear weapons but abandoned them. Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan inherited warheads when the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991 but have since transferred those weapons to Russia. South Africa has admitted constructing, but later disassembling, six nuclear devices, possibly after one test, says Toon. In total, he says, at least 19 nations are now known to have programs to develop nuclear weapons or to have previously pursued that goal. Many more nations, through their power-generating and research nuclear reactor programs, have the raw materials for constructing nuclear devices, he and his colleagues reported in December 2006 at a meeting of the American Geophysical Union in San Francisco. Those raw materials aren't scarce: At least 40 nations have enough uranium and plutonium on hand to construct substantial nuclear arsenals. Disturbingly, some of the nations with abundant bomb material have or have recently had strained relations with their neighbors. At the end of 2003, for example, Brazil probably had enough plutonium on hand to make more than 200 Hiroshima-size bombs, while its former rival Argentina could have produced 1300 such bombs. Although North Korea probably has enough nuclear material to fabricate only a handful of the devices, South Korea has enough plutonium to construct at least 4,400. Pakistan could make 100 or more nuclear bombs, and its neighbor India could put together well over 10 times as many, the researchers estimate. Today, at least 13 nations operate facilities that enrich uranium, plutonium, or both, says Toon. Altogether, 45 nations are known to have previous nuclear weapons programs, current weapons stockpiles, or the potential to become nuclear states.

### Couterforce

***Shorter flight times and lack of second strike capacity make miscalculation more likely. Also, answers counterforce checking.***

**Cimbala 8** (Stephen, Political Science Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, March, “Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia” Comparative Strategy, Vol 27 No 2, p 113-132, InformaWorld)

The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. **States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war**. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, **the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists**, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia , or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible **adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes** about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another's vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The **short flight times** of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states **means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment** by the defender. **Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use**. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have **first strike-vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation.** This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale wars between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare. For theorists, the argument that the spread of nuclear weapons might be fully compatible with international stability, and perhaps even supportive of international security, may be less sustainable than hitherto.17 Theorists optimistic about the ability of the international order to accommodate the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the present century have made several plausible arguments based on international systems and deterrence theory. First, nuclear weapons may make states more risk averse as opposed to risk acceptant, with regard to brandishing military power in support of foreign policy objectives. Second, if states' nuclear forces are second-strike survivable, they contribute to reduced fears of surprise attack. Third, the motives of states with respect to the existing international order are crucial. Revisionists will seek to use nuclear weapons to overturn the existing balance of power; status quo-oriented states will use nuclear forces to support the existing distribution of power, and therefore, slow and peaceful change, as opposed to sudden and radical power transitions. These arguments, for a less alarmist view of nuclear proliferation, take comfort from the history of nuclear policy in the “first nuclear age,” roughly corresponding to the Cold War.18 Pessimists who predicted that some thirty or more states might have nuclear weapons by the end of the century were proved wrong. However, the Cold War is a dubious precedent for the control of nuclear weapons spread outside of Europe. The military and security agenda of the Cold War was dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, especially with regard to nuclear weapons**. Ideas about mutual deterrence based on second-strike capability and the deterrence “rationality” according to American or allied Western concepts might be inaccurate guides** to the avoidance of war outside of Europe.19

***Even conventional strikes would unintentionally spark a global nuclear exchange.***

**Drum**, Staff Writer, **‘10**

[Kevin, Mother Jones, Smart, Fearless Journalism, “The Non-Nuclear Nuke,” 4/23, http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/04/non-nuclear-nuke AD: 4/23/10]

For years the Pentagon has been wrestling with a problem: when you get intel telling you that a high-value terrorist has been located somewhere, how do you take him out? They aren't likely to stick around at the target location for long, so you need something that can (a) get there quickly and (b) cause a lot of damage once it does. Bombers and cruise missiles take hours. Local forces, even if they're in place, aren't always lethal enough. What to do? One answer is to use ICBMs. Not nuclear-tipped ICBMs, but missiles with a big conventional payload. The Obama administration is apparently planning to revive this idea, and Noah Shachtman explains why it's crazy: Over and over again, the Bush administration tried to push the idea of these **conventional ICBMs**. Over and over again, Congress refused to provide the funds for it. The reason was pretty simple: those anti-terror missiles **look and fly exactly like the nuclear missiles we’d launch at Russia or China, in the event of Armageddon.** “For many minutes during their flight patterns, these missiles might appear to be headed towards targets in these nations,” a congressional study notes. **That could have world-changing consequences. “The launch of such a missile,”** then-Russian president Vladimir Putin said in a state of the nation address after the announcement of the Bush-era plan, “**could provoke a full-scale counterattack using strategic nuclear forces.”** I guess I can imagine possible ways to fix this. I just can't imagine any good ways. **Even if the Russians and Chinese and Indians and Pakistanis are provided with some reliable way of identifying non-nuclear ICBM launches, they could never be sure that the United States hadn't figured out some way to fool them**. So they'd always be on a short fuse. And do we really want to make that particular fuse even shorter than it already is? Sometimes bad ideas are just bad ideas. This really seems like one of them.

***Yes extinction—consensus of recent studies—Robock indicts don’t apply***

**Farnsworth 2011** – editor and a contributor for Arms Control Now (2/18, Tim, Arms Control Now, “Thinking Existentially about the Worldwide Threat”, <http://armscontrolnow.org/2011/02/18/thinking-existentially-about-the-worldwide-threat/>, WEA)

A **panel of scientists** provided a useful update today on the latest thinking about the climatic consequences of nuclear weapons use. The presentation provided a grim reminder that the nuclear Sword of Damocles still hangs over all nations of the earth, nuclear and non-nuclear powers alike – notwithstanding the significant achievement of New START ratification by the United States and Russia.¶ At the annual meeting in Washington of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Georgiy Stenchikov (King Abdullah University of Science and Technology), Luke Oman (NASA Goddard Space Flight Center), and Michael Mills (National Center for Atmospheric Research) **shared results** of their research, benefiting from **extensive studies** of related phenomenon in recent decades, such as massive forest fires, volcanic eruptions, and oil well fires. **Unlike the “nuclear winter” studies of the 1980s**, which focused on the impact of an all-out US-Soviet nuclear exchange, the latest research looked at the environment effects of a more **limited nuclear war** between India and Pakistan.¶ The speakers reported on their estimates of the environmental consequences resulting from theoretical detonation of 100 15kt-yield nuclear weapons over Indian and Pakistani cities. In such an exchange, millions of tons of soot in the smoke plumes from urban fires would be lofted into the stratosphere, circulating around the earth within days, but adversely affecting the ozone layer, world temperatures, and precipitation for years.

***Nuclear war accelerates warming***

**Jacobson 8** \*Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Director of the Atmosphere/ Energy Program at Stanford University. He has received a B.S. in Civil Engineering a B.A. in Economics (1988, Stanford), an M.S. in Environmental Engineering (1988 Stanford), an M.S. in Atmospheric Sciences (, UCLA), and a PhD in Atmospheric Sciences [UCLA (Mark, 1991 1994, “Review of solutions to global warming, air pollution, and energy security†”]

Because the production of nuclear weapons material is occurring only in countries that have developed civilian nuclear energy programs, the risk of a limited nuclear exchange between countries or the detonation of a nuclear device by terrorists has increased due to the dissemination of nuclear energy facilities worldwide. As such, it is a valid exercise to estimate the potential number of immediate deaths and carbon emissions due to the burning of buildings and infrastructure associated with the proliferation of nuclear energy facilities and the resulting proliferation of nuclear weapons. The number of deaths and carbon emissions, though, must be multiplied by a probability range of an exchange or explosion occurring to estimate the overall risk of nuclear energy proliferation. Although concern at the time of an explosion will be the deaths and not carbon emissions, **policy makers today must weigh all the potential future risks of mortality and carbon emissions** when comparing energy sources. Here, we detail the link between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons and estimate the emissions of nuclear explosions attributable to nuclear energy. The primary limitation to building a nuclear weapon is the availability of purified fissionable fuel (highly-enriched uranium or plutonium).68 Worldwide, nine countries have known nuclear weapons stockpiles (US, Russia, UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea). In addition, Iran is pursuing uranium enrichment, and 32 other countries have sufficient fissionable material to produce weapons. Among the 42 countries with fissionable material, 22 have facilities as part of their civilian nuclear energy program, either to produce highly-enriched uranium or to separate plutonium, and facilities in 13 countries are active.68 Thus, the ability of states to produce nuclear weapons today follows directly from their ability to produce nuclear power. In fact, producing material for a weapon requires merely operating a civilian nuclear power plant together with a sophisticated plutonium separation facility. The Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been signed by 190 countries. However, international treaties safeguard only about 1% of the world’s highly-enriched uranium and 35% of the world’s plutonium.68 Currently, about 30 000 nuclear warheads exist worldwide, with 95% in the US and Russia, but enough refined and unrefined material to produce another 100 000 weapons.69 The explosion of fifty 15 kt nuclear devices (a total of 1.5 MT, or 0.1% of the yields proposed for a full-scale nuclear war) during a limited nuclear exchange in megacities could burn 63–313 Tg of fuel, adding 1–5 Tg of soot to the atmosphere, much of it to the stratosphere, and killing 2.6–16.7 million people.68 The soot emissions would cause significant short- and medium-term regional cooling.70 **Despite short-term cooling, the CO2 emissions would cause long-term warming**,

as they do with biomass burning.62 The CO2 emissions from such a conflict are estimated here from the fuel burn rate and the carbon content of fuels. Materials have the following carbon contents: plastics, 38–92%; tires and other rubbers, 59–91%; synthetic fibers, 63–86%;71 woody biomass, 41–45%; charcoal, 71%;72 asphalt, 80%; steel, 0.05–2%. We approximate roughly the carbon content of all combustible material in a city as 40–60%. Applying these percentages to the fuel burn gives CO2 emissions during an exchange as 92–690 Tg CO2. The annual electricity production due to nuclear energy in 2005 was 2768 TWh yr\_1. If one nuclear exchange as described above occurs over the next 30 yr, the net carbon emissions due to nuclear weapons proliferation caused by the expansion of nuclear energy worldwide would be 1.1–4.1 g CO2 kWh\_1, where the energy generation assumed is the annual 2005 generation for nuclear power multiplied by the number of yr being considered. This emission rate depends on the probability of a nuclear exchange over a given period and the strengths of nuclear devices used. Here, we bound the probability of the event occurring over 30 yr as between 0 and 1 to give the range of possible emissions for one such event as 0 to 4.1 g CO2 kWh\_1. This emission rate is placed in context in Table 3.

***Most recent evidence proves that even a limited nuke war turns their impacts and results in extinction.***

**Starr 12**

[Steven Starr - Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri-Columbia, Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, has been published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, his writings appear on the websites of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Scientists for Global Responsibility, and the International Network of Scientists Against Proliferation, “What is nuclear darkness?,” <http://www.nucleardarkness.org/web/whatisnucleardarkness/>]

**In a nuclear war, burning cities would create millions of tons of thick, black smoke**. **This smoke would rise above cloud level, into the stratosphere, where it would quickly spread around the planet. A large nuclear war would produce enough smoke to block** most **sunlight from reaching the Earth's surface. Massive absorption of warming sunlight by a global stratospheric smoke layer would rapidly create Ice Age temperatures on Earth** . The cold would last a long time; NASA computer models predict **40% of the smoke would still remain in the stratosphere ten years after a nuclear war. Half of 1% of the explosive power of US-Russian nuclear weapons can create enough nuclear darkness to impact global climate**. 100 Hiroshima-size weapons exploded in the cities of India and Pakistan would put up to 5 million tons of smoke in the stratosphere . **The smoke would destroy much of the Earth's protective ozone layer and drop temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere to levels last seen in the Little Ice Age. Shortened growing seasons could cause up to 1 billion people to starve to death.** A large nuclear war could put 150 million tons of smoke in the stratosphere and make global temperatures colder than they were 18,000 years ago during the coldest part of the last Ice Age. Killing frosts would occur every day for 1-3 years in the large agricultural regions of the Northern Hemisphere. Average global precipitation would be reduced by 45%. Earth's ozone layer would be decimated. Growing seasons would be eliminated. **A large nuclear war would utterly devastate the environment and cause most people to starve to death . Deadly climate change, radioactive fallout and toxic pollution would cause already stressed ecosystems to collapse. The result would be *a mass extinction event that would wipe***

# 1NR

## Overview

### 1NR – Econ Impact EXT

#### We control global impact uniqueness – Interdependence checks war. Plan undermines this crucial form of restraint.

Daniel **Griswold**, director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies, 4/20/**’7**, Trade, Democracy and Peace, p. http://www.freetrade.org/node/681

A second and even more potent way that trade has **promote**d **peace is by promoting** more **economic integration.** **As national economies become more intertwined with each other**, those **nations have** more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also **ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy.** In short, **globalization** has dramatically raised the economic cost of war.

#### Turns every aff scenario and causes global nuclear war

Kemp 10

Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

### Turns warming

#### Continued tea party influence blocks Obama’s climate agenda—electing moderates is key

Huq, ’13 [Saleemul Huq, irector, International Centre for Climate Change and Development, Independent University, Bangladesh, Dhaka, Responding to Climate Change, Comment: the US looks like it’s getting serious on climate change, <http://www.rtcc.org/2013/08/07/comment-the-us-looks-like-its-getting-serious-on-climate-change/>, jj]

It is very clear that President Obama and his team of senior advisers all accept the scale of the climate change problem and recognise the US’s responsibilities. This is in stark contrast to his predecessor President Bush who refused to take any significant action for eight years. During President Obama’s first term of office he tried to bring Congress on board towards a national response to tackling climate change, which proved to be unsuccessful. So in his second term he has decided to take whatever action he can by executive order and without requiring Congressional approval. While I have criticised his Climate Action Plan as being too little too late (when compared to the scale of the problem that has to be tackled), I must acknowledge that it is indeed a significant step forward compared to the past. State leverage The second important personality that is involved is the new Secretary of State (and former Senator) John Kerry who has a long and honourable history of engagement on this issue both at national as well as international levels. Unlike his predecessor, Hilary Clinton, he is very interested in this topic and is determined that the US plays a more positive role at the international level. He has already taken personal charge of US international relations on this topic. The most difficult element of the political landscape in the US on the topic of climate change has always been, and continues to be, the Republican Party, who control the House of Representatives in Congress (and thus can, and do, block any attempts to bring legislation to tackle climate change). Within the Republican Party the climate change denying tendency is led by the Tea Party wing of the party and a handful of Congressmen and Senators. However, even here there is a growing awareness amongst more sensible Republicans that they cannot continue to deny the reality of climate change. An example is the recent article in the New York Times, jointly authored by three former Republican heads of the US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), arguing for the Party to take sensible actions to tackle climate change.

#### Cap and trade incentivizes nuclear power

Coplan, 6 - Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law

(Karl S, “THE INTERCIVILIZATIONAL INEQUITIES OF NUCLEAR POWER WEIGHED AGAINST THE INTERGENERATIONAL INEQUITIES OF CARBON BASED ENERGY,” 17 Fordham Envtl. Law Rev. 227, Symposium, 2006)

<In addition to these potential direct subsidies to nuclear power, a carbon cap and trade scheme also provides other direct and indirect subsidies to nuclear power. By raising the cost of competing fossil fuel based power, nuclear generators enjoy a competitive price advantage and can raise their own prices. [26](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=33&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n26) Even more directly, because of the way that electrical generation capacity is allocated and priced by the Independent Systems Operator for each state, any increase  [\*233]  in the price for fossil fuel based electricity provided by the lowest marginal cost supplier is automatically passed on to the nuclear generators, which are usually base-load generators. [27](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=33&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n27)>

#### A carbon tax will jumpstart nuclear power

Murray, 08 **-** senior fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute (Ian, National Review, “Nuclear Power? – Yes please”, 6/16, lexis)

In all the hysteria about global warming, environmentalists have, for the most part, agreed on one thing above all -- that the use of fossil fuels must be made more expensive. Every proposal currently under consideration for the reduction of greenhouse-gas emissions seeks to raise prices as a brake on emissions, through either a cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax. Once this expense is included in the calculations, nuclear power becomes extremely competitive, and remains considerably cheaper than wind power. The Congressional Budget Office found that nuclear power is the most attractive source of electricity once the price of carbon emissions reaches $45 a ton. If natural-gas prices increase as rapidly as they have done recently, then that figure will come down even further. The British-government review found that nuclear provides "economic benefit regardless of the carbon price." Moreover, it provides carbon reductions much more cheaply than wind power does. Using nuclear power, it costs 60 cents to eliminate a ton of CO2 emissions, as opposed to a staggering $100 per ton for onshore wind power. It is true that a carbon tax amounts to a subsidy for nuclear power. But if carbon emissions are to be taxed, then that is the only subsidy that nuclear power will ever need.

## Impact

### A2: Econ Decline No Cause War

#### Best studies prove growth solves conflict

Jedidiah **Royal 10**, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signalling And The Problem Of Economic Crises”, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

Second, **on a dyadic level**. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that **'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states**. He argues that **interdependent states** are likely to **gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations**. However, **if the expectations of future trade decline**, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, **the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states**.4 Third, **others** have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) **find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn**. They write, **The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour**. Moreover, **the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-rein force each other**. (Blombcrj! & Hess. 2002. p. 89) **Economic decline has** also **been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism** (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana, 2004). **which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions**. Furthermore, **crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect**. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blombcrg. Mess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that **economic decline and use of force are** at least indirectly **correlated**. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that **the tendency towards diversionary tactics arr greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support**. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that **periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force**.

## Blocks

### \*A2: If Tea Party Wins, They Lose to Democrats

#### Whoever wins the GOP primary will win the general election --- primary states are some of the most reliably Republican in the country --- it’s just a question of whether voters pick moderates or Tea Partiers

Altman, 12/8-’13 (Alex Altman is a Washington correspondent for TIME. He previously worked as a writer and editor for TIME's Briefing section. A native of New York City, he has degrees from Colgate University and Northwestern University's Medill School of Journalism. Dec. 08, 2013, Time Magazine, 2014 GOP Primary War Widens, <http://swampland.time.com/2013/12/08/2014-gop-primary-war-widens/>, jj)

The outcomes of these primaries are unlikely to tip the balance of power in the Senate, because they are being fought in some of the nation’s reddest states. But they have the potential to alter the complexion of the Republican caucus if some of the upstarts can unseat more pragmatic incumbents. “2014 is going to be a heck of a primary season,” says Drew Ryun, a top official at the Madison Project. “There are going to be a lot of punches thrown.”

#### These seats are safe for Republicans --- moderates will win them now --- divided government is inevitable

Jim Malone, 12/18-13, Voice of America, Obama Has Major Stake in 2014 US Elections, <http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-has-major-stake-in-2014-us-elections/1813192.html>, jj

Lawmakers with Tea Party support got much of the blame for the shutdown, and that has sparked a new battle within the Republican Party, said Republican strategist Ford O’Connell. “Many mainstream Republicans are now pointing the finger at the Tea Party as well, not just Democrats," he said. "The Tea Party is on to the right issues. The question is: are they going to change their tactics and their messaging?” House Speaker Boehner recently lashed out at conservative groups that oppose compromise. “I think they are misleading their followers. I think they are pushing our members in places where they don’t want to be and frankly I just think that they have lost all credibility,” he said. Democrats won control of the House in 2006 but Republicans won it back in 2010. No major tide for either party was expected this year, said analyst Rhodes Cook.

“I don’t think we are going to have any big wave election like that in part because we had it, you know, in 2010. Those seats that were ready to topple have toppled," he said. "We are down basically to seats that are on pretty firm ground for the Republicans.”

### A2: Too Soon/Can’t Predict

#### Our disad is about which Republicans can win in the PRIMARY – and those elections are right around the corner

Julián Aguilar, The Texas Tribune, “Border Democrats See Immigration Reform Window Closing”, Sept 16th 2013, http://www.texastribune.org/2013/09/16/border-dems-window-pass-immigration-reform-closing/

Elections will certainly come in to play sooner than later, he added. “If we’re not able to put something together within the next three to five months, the primary season starts in Texas,” he said. “It breaks down and gets complicated very quickly.”

#### Not too soon – registration and get out the vote campaigns starting now – it’s the key time

Bolder Advocacy, (BA), “Now’s the Time to Think About Voting in 2014”, Sept 24th 2013, http://bolderadvocacy.org/blog/pull-out-those-calendars-preparing-for-the-2014-midterm

Is it too soon to think about next year’s national midterm and the election of Congress, one-third of the Senate, two-thirds of state governors, and almost all state legislatures? No, definitely not. Unfortunately, most nonprofits won’t even begin considering their November 2014 plans until the end of next summer. In such a small window, there is little time to plan, much less implement effective registration, education, and get-out-the-vote activities.

#### Prefer issue specific uniqueness—it’s not too soon to predict tea party losses in the status quo

Dave Rogers 10/10, October 10, 2013, My Bay City – Michigan, SHUTDOWN WOES: Government Turmoil May Affect 2014 Congress Races, <http://www.mybaycity.com/scripts/p3_v2/P3V3-0200.cfm?P3_ArticleID=8464>, jj

The Republican role in the federal government shutdown may hurt the reelection chances of three Michigan congressmen who have had Tea Party backing, according to political observers. Polls show Republican Congressmen Tim Walberg, Kerry Bentivolio and Dan Benishek all trailing significantly behind a generic Democratic opponent, reports Steve Carmody of Michigan Radio. Tea Party darling Benishek is not about to go quietly, generating about 3,500 "likes" on Facebook after announcing he would not take his salary until the shutdown is resolved and may donate it to charity. Right Wing Watch of the People for the American Way named Walberg one of the "Ten Scariest Republicans Heading to Congress" in 2010. He has been called "the birthers' birther" for his doubts about President Obama's place of birth. Bentivolio already is being "primaried" by an Oakland County lawyer with national political connections, David Trott, 52, of Birmingham. Trott announced Sept. 4 in the Republican primary against Bentivolio, the former reindeer rancher and educator who was a dark horse winner last year. Trott plans to enter the Republican primary next year to challenge Bentivolio, from Milford, who was thrust into front-runner status in 2012 after then-U.S. Rep. Thaddeus McCotter stepped down amid a petition scandal. Tom Jensen, an official of Public Policy Polling, the Democratic-leaning firm that conducted the voter survey, said it was commissioned by MoveOn.org. Jensen says their data shows voter discontent over the shutdown may tip the balance in November 2014. Poll results painted a gloomy picture for Benishek, with voter opinions linked to the government shutdown, according to results of the Public Policy Polling survey. Benishek drew a 54 percent negative job rating, with 33 percent approving and 13 percent not sure. Some 56 percent of those surveyed indicated they would vote for a Democratic opponent while 35 percent would re-elect the incumbent. Columnist George Weeks, writing in the Traverse City Record-Eagle, noted: "Benishek's Democratic opponent undoubtedly will be Jerry Cannon, 65, former Kalkaska County sheriff (1987-2004) and retired Army National Guard major general (1977-2012) who announced last week, after having been recruited by Democratic State Chairman Lon Johnson (also a Kalkaska area guy) and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee." Sixty-four percent of those polled by PPP, the Raleigh, NC firm, opposed shutting down the government as a way to stop the health care law, with 29 percent supporting. "Republicans have shot themselves in the foot and put themselves into a pretty bad position for next fall," Jensen told reporters. Jensen says it's not too soon to be predicting the result of an election more than a year away. "These were the sort of numbers we were starting to see in Democratic held districts at this time four years ago," says Jensen. Democrats lost control of the U.S. House in 2010, as the rise of the Tea Party powered the Republicans to victory.

### A2: no vote swtich

#### Election is still fluid—minds not made up

NEIL KING JR. and PATRICK O'CONNOR, 1-1-14, Wall Street Journal, Republicans Pin Hopes on Midterm Elections, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304202204579256691296159568>, jj

Whether the GOP can summon the wave it would need to grab the Senate will depend on many factors. The Obama administration has 10 months to deal with the political fallout from the health law. Continued signs of economic improvement could also ease the pressure on Democrats in some states. The dramatic shift in public attitudes toward the two parties in recent months also suggests the electorate remains fluid. Meanwhile, Republicans must navigate another round of tricky primary fights involving tea-party-aligned challengers that, even more so than 2012, threaten to splinter a party already rife with divisions. Many of those contests will be waged in states where Democrats have little chance of claiming a Senate seat. But the chaotic primary landscape also features crowded Republican fields in such states as Alaska, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky and North Carolina, where Democrats already hold the Senate seat or have rallied around a single candidate.

### \*\*\*2NC Link Wall – Top Level

#### Plan lets them pivot towards their popular national security policies—that saves them in the midterm

Friedersdorf, 10-11-’13 [Conor Friedersdorf is a staff writer at The Atlantic, where he focuses on politics and national affairs. 10-11-’13, The Atlantic, The Tea Party Is Damaging Its Credibility in the Way It Can Least Afford, <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/10/the-tea-party-is-damaging-its-credibility-in-the-way-it-can-least-afford/280500/>, jj]

The Tea Party ought to be able to do better. "Rand Paul is more in touch with the public mood on national security issues than a lot of G.O.P. foreign policy hands, Mike Lee has a better tax plan than any of his fellow Republican senators, Heritage Action is absolutely right about farm subsidies and the House G.O.P. leadership is wrong … I’ve been over this before, but it bears repeating: If you’re looking for policy innovation on the right, the populist wing is mostly where the action is," Ross Douthat correctly observes. "And yet none of this matters right now, because the current populist strategy isn’t going to work, isn’t going to make the populist’s ideas or the Republican Party more popular, and has marched the entire party into a cul-de-sac from which, it seems, only the uncourageous dealmaking K Street-friendly leadership types can rescue it." Pursuing a liberty-minded, small-government agenda need not involve reckless standoffs that risk America's credit, but you'd never know that from the last few weeks. It's frustrating as hell for those of us hungering for a credible Republican alternative to K Street, warmongering, and a liberty-destroying national-security state.

#### Restoring congressional war power is a win for the Tea Party

James, 8/30-’13 [Frank James joined NPR News in April 2009 to launch the blog, "The Two-Way," with co-blogger Mark Memmott. "The Two-Way" is the place where NPR.org gives readers breaking news and analysis — and engages users in conversations ("two-ways") about the most compelling stories being reported by NPR News and other news media. James came to NPR from the Chicago Tribune, where he worked for 20 years. In 2006, James created "The Swamp," the paper's successful politics and policy news blog whose readership climbed to a peak of 3 million page-views a month. Before that, James covered homeland security, technology and privacy and economics in the Tribune's Washington Bureau. He also reported for the Tribune from South Africa and covered politics and higher education. James also reported for The Wall Street Journal for nearly 10 years. James received a bachelor of arts degree in English from Dickinson College and now serves on its board of trustees. August 30, 2013, NPR, 6 Things To Keep In Mind As Obama Confronts Syria, <http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/08/30/217312197/six-things-to-keep-in-mind-as-obama-confronts-syria>, jj]

Tea Party/libertarians — The debate over the constitutional powers of the president versus Congress when it comes to military action has only intensified as Tea Party and libertarian lawmakers have joined congressional Republican ranks. So Obama is dealing with an even more conservative Republican Party on these issues. These lawmakers tend toward strict constructionist readings of the Constitution. One of their most common allegations against Obama is that his actions have been unconstitutional across a range of policies. Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., is perhaps the best-known of those lawmakers. "The Constitution is very explicit on this: When you go to war, Congress must authorize this," Paul said on Fox News Live Friday. They also tend to be suspicious of U.S. involvement abroad, making them heirs to the isolationists of the past century.